Nietzsche\u27s imperatives. by Winstead, William H.
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 
1-1-2001 
Nietzsche's imperatives. 
William H. Winstead 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 
Recommended Citation 
Winstead, William H., "Nietzsche's imperatives." (2001). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 
1992. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1992 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 




WILLIAM H. WINSTEAD IV
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment









WILLIAM H. WINSTEAD IV
Approved as to style and content by:
James!Der Derian, Member
Robert Sullivan, Member





WILLIAM H. WINSTEAD IV, B.A. CONNECTICUT COLLEGE
Ph D-, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
My dissertation examines three, interrelated themes in Friedrich Nietzsche’s
early writings. The first theme is the moral imperatives that appear in these
writings. These imperatives, which are scattered throughout The Birth of Tragedy
and the Untimely Meditations in seemingly haphazard fashion, articulate a rigorous,
post-Kantian concept ol morality designed to respond to the problems of modern
nationalism and modern nihilism. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I outline
the character, importance, and origin of Nietzsche's imperatives.
The second theme I examine is the relationship between Nietzsche's
imperatives and his political thought. I show, through close readings of Nietzsche's
early texts, that they deploy a series of moral imperatives to reformulate the tasks
and meaning ol modern political life. These imperatives tell the political community
what ought to be done to avoid the twin dangers of nihilism and nationalism by
articulating a broad principle of justice with universally valid foundations. Politics,
Nietzsche argues, unlike Machiavelli or Hobbes, but like Kant, must bend its knee
to necessary moral commands.
The third theme examined in my dissertation is the emergence, in
Nietzsche's early writings, of a political position that he will eventual call "great
politics." Great politics is Nietzsche's solution to the petty, or small, politics of
modern nationalism and modern nihilism. This concept of politics shifts the realm
°f P°' ltiCal StrUggle away from lhe state ™d towards those values that support the
state and legitimate its existence in its modem I'orm. It achieves this end by
revaluing values in response to the devaluation of values in modernity. These







II. "THE LAW OF ETERNAL JUSTICE”: THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 12
III. LEGISLATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT’ NIETZSCHF'S "OKItruth and lie in the extramorXLsS"
68
58
IV ' NcSSZcSSFARE DAVID STRAVSS THE
V SE
///\^
ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VI
• ON OF VALUES: SCHOPENHAUER ASEDUCATOR ...
143
Vn - T™ COMMONALITY TO COME: R/CHARD WAGNER IN
163






How laughable, the modem concept ofnationalities [moderne
U 18 a Clumsy wish
’ to want to see aation
[Nation ] as a visible mechanical unity, equipped with a
glorious governmental apparatus and military pomp
— Nietzsche, a note to himself (1870/1871)
Between the years of 1870 and 1876, Fnednch Nietzsche, a classical philologist at
the University of Basel, set down his thoughts on the world of Greek antiquity and then,
turning his sights to the contemporary world, issued four blistering polemics against the
newly founded German Reich, condemning it for its failure to escape the petty politics of
European nationalism, while refusing to give up his hope that the German state he had long
dreamed of might still be transformed into a political community guided by the highest
moral aims and worthy of the great cultural achievements of the ancient Athenians. These
thoughts, penned in Nietzsche's first two books- The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely
Meditations— are occupied with large-scale questions of politics and social life, and
iepresent one of the earliest attempts by a modern thinker to formulate a politics appropriate
to an era in which the predominant vocabulary for theorizing political life -liberalism and
conservativism, left and right, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary— appear less and
less capable of conceptualizing the problems posed by the period.
Nietzsche s writings from these years— in contrast to those appearing between
1878 and 1888, the final year of his authorship— are of particular interest to political
philosophers, because they formulate, with great originality and foresight, theoretical
solutions to the predominant pathology of modem politics— what Nietzsche calls, with
prophetic foresight, the madness of nationalism— and they do so without retreating from
the sphere ol politics or renouncing the possibilities of communal life. In these early
writings, Nietzsche still holds out the hope that modern political institutions— particularly
those institutions created by the unification of the various German States into a single
Empire in 1871— may be reformed and salvaged, that they may yet be saved from the
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destructive forces of national,s. identity politics and made to serve ends higher than those of
the accumulation of state power, the subordination of the individual to the ends of the
nation, and the regulation of social conflict for the purposes of the accumulation of wealth
The same may not be said of Nietzsche's great later works-Tta Spoke Zarathustra The
Genealogy ofMora,s, and Beyond Good and Evil among them-and so m my study of his
political thought, I concentrate on his early writings, the works of his first period, as he
termed it.
***
In Nietzsche's early wntings-and this holds true for all his works-he addresses
the problem of modem politics- the pathology of nationalism -through a genealogical
analysis that traces it back to its origins in a search for its potential solution. Nationalism
and the nation-state, he argues, originate in the process of secularization and the crisis in
meaning that it produces in Western society. They are a response to the decline of the
power of religion over social life, the eclipse of theological values, and the waning of the
influence of the church in modernity. This process of seculanzation terminates in what
Nietzsche famously describes as "the Death of God," an event that marks the onset of
nihilism in the West and the devaluation of those values that have historically given life
meaning and purpose. These values, Nietzsche argues— and he means first of all those
theological values promoted by the various Christian Churches- provided pre-modem
societies with a horizon ol meaning and an explanation of life sufficiently strong to bond
society together, and with their collapse in modernity, forces previously held in check are
unleashed and suppressed social antagonisms reemerge, creating a political crisis requiring
a new form of communal organization.
For Nietzsche, it is the nation-state, more than anything else, that provides this new
torm ol organization. It steps into the void created by the declining power of the church and
creates the bond necessary to hold together the inimical energies of secular society.
Nationalism
, on the other hand, as devotion to one's nation, in turn fulfills the need for
spiritual meaning created by nihilism and the process of secularization, replacing ineffective
religious values with newly created political values. The result, for Nietzsche, is that in
modernity, the state replaces the medieval church as the predominate organizing force in
society, nationalism becomes the dominant creed orienting the political community, and one
set of idols— the symbols and rituals of the church-, s replaced by anolher-those of the
nation-state. In the end, Nietzsche tells us, Christian theology gives way to a political
theology of the state, and citizens rediscover life's meaning and purpose in a devotion to
the nation-state.
This genealogy of the nation-state, which is articulated in The Birth ofTragedy, the
Untimely Meditations, and in writings from the period which he did not publish, is carried
out as part ol Nietzsche's critical assault on the theological pretensions of the German
Reich founded by Otto von Bismarck in 1871 through his extraordinary military and
political maneuvering with France and the South German States. Nietzsche, who at one
point welcomed the creation of a German state, even longed for it, going so fai as to
volunteer to serve in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 in an effort to advance the
cause of German unification, quickly became the Reich's sternest critic after the founding
ot the Second Empire devolved into grotesque self-satisfaction and a thoroughgoing failure
to icalizc the political, cultural, and educational possibilities created by the unification of the
long independent German states. It is these possibilities that Nietzsche's early writings
articulate in opposition to the ideology and theology of the state that quickly took hold of
most Germans minds after their rapid defeat of the French and their sudden incorporation
into a unified political community in 1871. Along with Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, the
Untimely Meditations attempt to conceptualize how those possibilities—justice, morality,
and lreedom, among them— could be realized in Germany and thereby legitimate its
existence independently ol the state and free from all remnants of theology. Taken together,
these two books work to formulate a new vision of political life, suited to modern
conditions, in which the lullest flowering of life, exemplified for Nietzsche by the classical
Greeks ol Periclean Athens, could once again be realized.
***
Scholars are largely divided on what this new vision of political life looks like. One
group, emphasizing Nietzsche's concept of "perspectivism," believes that it runs along a
horizontal axis, as liberal societies do, in which individuals evaluate the world from their
own perspectives, creating their own systems of value independently of any constraining
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authority, without an ultimate ground for their decistons beyond their own power to
evaluate.' Accord,ng to this view, at once pluralistic, postmodern, and leftist m its
American form, Nietzsche’s importance for political life lies in his transformation of the
negating, relativtzing power of Western nihtlism into a positive, creative force, capable of
unmask,ng illegttimate forms of authority by encouragmg indtviduals to create themselves
and their interpretations of the world in accordance with their own needs and ends. This
Nietzsche, the perspectival Nietzsche, is the advocate of a rad, cal, ex, stent, al tndiv,dualism,
a herald of the micro-poli ties of self-creation, who welcomes the death of God and the loss’
ol absolute standards of value as an unparalleled opportunity for genuine freedom, beyond
the horizons created by the imperatives of the nation-state and independently of the
constraints imposed by conventional moralities.
Another group ol scholars, approaching Nietzsche from the right, locate his
political importance not in his advocacy of a pluralistic perspectivism, but in his call to
revalue values in the wake of nihilism and establish a new table of virtues that would once
again be capable of guiding collective life towards a greater common good. 2 These political
philosophers, taking their cue from the late Allen Bloom, see liberal interpretations of
Nietzsche's thought as an unwarranted over-evaluation of the importance he assigns to self-
creation and relativistic value creation. They emphasis instead Nietzsche's cnticisms of
liberalism and his call lor a new aristocracy of philosophers who would legislate values
capable ol guiding society beyond the contingent and unproductive seas of pluralism. Their
interpretation of Nietzsche's luture political community runs along a vertical axis, which
separates the more virtuous from the less virtuous, the noble from the base, the master
lrom the slave. They emphasize, with as much justification as Nietzsche's more liberal
intcrpicters, the German philosopher's impatience with liberal individualism and its
This interpretation is best lormulated in the works of William Connolly and Bonnie
Honig. See, for example, William Connolly, The Ethos o/Pluralization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the
Displacement ofPolitics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
This interpretation is best formulated in the works of Peter Berkowitz and Bruce
Detwiler. See, for example, Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics ofan Immoralist
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the
Politics ofAristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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tendency to devolve into a complacent mediocrity which undervalues humanity's greatest
accomplishments and future possibilities.
Both of these interpretations of Nietzsche's response to nihilism and the process of
secularization have much to offer. I mention them, however, in order to emphasize their
one-sided nature. In my dissertation, I show that Nietzsche's contribution to political
thought l,es less in his advocacy of a liberal relativism or an aristocratic conservatism,
than in an attempt to think the possibility of both together. This possibility, I believe, is
realized most perfectly in Nietzsche's early writings, where he formulates the possibility of
a political community that would give full reign to the development of the fullest and most
dilfercntialcd forms of individualism without falling into the abyss of an indifferent, and
ultimately dangerous, relativism. In these works, Nietzsche attempts to overcome the
dichotomy ol liberalism and conservatism in order to theorize a form of community that
would at once advance the cause of the individual and simultaneously promote the common
gtxxl ol society. Nietzsche believed that he had uncovered (his possibility in the Greek
polls, and in his critiques of the German stole, formulated in The Birth ofTragedy and his
I our Untimely Meditations, he tried to show how some of the virtues of classical Athens
could be realized in the modern world.
Nietzsche's strategy in these works— in the Untimely Meditations and in his study
ol Greek tragedy, Ike Birth ofTragedy— is essentially moral. At first sight, this might
appear paradoxical, or even lalse. Nietzsche himself declared that he was the first
immoralist of the West, and in his Genealogy ofMorals , he subjects the value of the moral
values good and evil" to a critical revaluation which reveals their origin to lie less in a
solid and authoritative foundation than the immoral needs and interests of individuals and
society. Rather than simply constituting an unbridled assault on the principles of morality,
however, Nietzsche's genealogical revaluation of morality is carried out in the service of
morality, in the service of a more perfect and more rigorous morality, something perhaps
best characterized as a meta-morality, or a morality of morality. Far from asserting that we
should give up morality and feel Iree to kill, steal, and commit crimes of all kinds,
Nietzsche's "assault" on morality aims at its perfection and refinement, a task necessitated
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by Che emergence of nihilism itself, which deprives Judeo-Chnstian morality of its
theological foundations.
What, then, does Nietzsche's morality look like, and what role does it play in
political life? Nietzsche's morality, as a response to nihilism and a rejection of nationalism,
takes the lorm of a series of imperatives, scattered throughout his works, that tell what
ought to be done. They are not hypothetical imperatives, but categorical imperatives,
descendants of Kant s critical morality. Hypothetical imperatives tell what ought to be done
in order to achieve something else. They are expeditious and prudential, matters of
eliiciency, utility, and pragmatic interest: Do "x" to achieve "y." Categorical imperatives,
by contrast are unconditional. They tell what ought to be done irrespective of the particular
circumstances or desired ends. They simply articulate universal laws that command what
must be done, no matter what.
Nietzsche's imperatives look nothing like Kant's. Their content is different, and
they are derived irom dillerent sources. But Nietzsche's morality is nevertheless a
descendent of Kant's.
3
Nietzsche acknowledges his debt to Kant in many places and in
many ways, and it is worth noting some of them to understand the nature of his imperatives
and their originality. The most obvious way in which Nietzsche acknowledged this debt
was by choosing to write his dissertation on Kant's third critique, the Critique of
Judgement. Nietzsche never finished this dissertation, but the signs of that project appear in
his first book. The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche himself acknowledges that he used a
Kantian Iramework in that work to interpret the logic of Greek tragedy and its importance
to the political life ol Athens. And Nietzsche also acknowledges that his Untimely
Meditations owe something to Kant. In a Preface to that work wntten in 1885, nearly 10
Two important essays examine the concept of the imperative in Nietzsche's writings
and their relationship to Kant: Werner Hamacher's "The Promise of Interpretation:
Reflections on the Hermeneutical Imperative in Kant and Nietzsche," and Jean-Luc
Nancy's "'Our Probity!' On Truth in the Moral Sense in Nietzsche." Both may be found in
Looking After Nietzsche , ed. L.A. Rickels (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1990).
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years al Cer its completion, he tells us that the Meditations furthered Kant's legacy by
creating new "categorical imperatives" suitable for the post-Kantian era."
I mention these examples of Kant's importance to Nietzsche because Nietzsche's
imperatives are to a great extent a product of, and shaped by, his engagement with the
critical philosopher. Why is this so? Kant shows us that human reason is finite, limited,
and impcrlecl, fundamentally incapable of fathoming ultimate reality. This discovery had a
profound effect on Nietzsche, and he mentions the difficulties it poses for thinking about all
aspects of human existence in many places. More than anything else, it revealed to
Nict/sehc the true ground and source of nihilism in modernity— our inability to truly
understand our world and the impossibility of perfectly grounding our moral, political, and
epistemological judgements in any of the traditional sources: Reason, revelation, or nature.
Nietzsche treats this discovery, however, like the death of god itself, as an opportunity
rather than a liability. He sees it as a chance, perhaps the first chance in Western
civilization, to get behind conventional morality and consider what good might still remain
open now that the traditional sources of authority-God, reason, and nature-have been
closed off.
Ills this morality and good that Nietzsche's categorical imperatives articulate. They
express the one remaining authority that Nietzsche believes to still exist in a secular age
beset by the impcrlections of human reason. This authority, however, is a negative, rathcr
than a positive, authority, and Nietzsche derives it, in a manner reminiscent of some of
Kant s deductions in his critiques, from the limits of human reason and the essential
unknowability of human nature, the nature of the world, and the nature of God. The limits
ol human reason, Nietzsche believes, act to subordinate us to the authority of what it
cannot know. This authority acts as a check on or a limit to all authoritative delimitations of
humanity, be they those articulated by a state, a people, or an individual. As I have said,
this authority is purely negative, and yet it sullices lor Nietzsche to command specific
moral acts.
See Friedrich Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausga.be, ed. Giorgio
Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), vol. 1 1, 670.
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I'll give some examples from Nietzsche’s texts to concretize my discussion and
how this is possible. First, an example lrom Nietzsche's best known Untimely
Meditation, his second, ”On the Use and Abuse of History for Life.” In this essay,
Nietzsche is concerned with showing how our preoccupation with history in modernity can
serve the political community by expanding our conception of humanity beyond the
coniines of national characteristics. He writes about history in this essay, because he
believes that the rise of historicism in modernity has produced a debilitating relativism
which rightly exposes our cherished beliefs to be the contingent effects of particular
cultures and times, but which nevertheless fails to mobilize our knowledge of the great
deeds ol the past to advance the cause of humanity and individual self-cultivation. In the
final section of the meditation he recalls a categorical imperative of the past which would
advance the cause of humanity and the individual alike, were it only heeded. This
categorical imperative is the simple command which the Greeks inscribed in their temple at
Delphi: "Know thyself." For Nietzsche, the command to "know thyself" is a categorical
imperative necessitated by the rise of historicism and its exposure of the contingent nature
°! °ur valucs and bclicfs - Modern historicism, like Kant's critique of reason and the death
ol God, leach us that we arc not who we thought we were, that we must begin anew the
now interminable process of gelling to know ourselves. Only by heeding this categorical
imperative, Nietzsche believes, may we, like the Greeks of classical antiquity, once again
take possession ol ourselves and achieve a freedom worthy of the name.
Nietzsche announces another, analogous imperative in this same meditation. This
one concerns not the individual but the collective. It says, "Create lor yourselves the
concept ol a "people': You can never conceive it to be noble and lofty enough." This
imperative compliments the Delphic command to know yourself by expanding it to the
political community as a whole. It is necessitated, like the Delphic command, by our
inability to know how great a people could be or what a people should properly be.
Nietzsche oilers it as an alternative to the German people's belief that greatness and nobility
is achieved through the achievement of a state. For him, it is necessary fora people to
aspire instead to the highest possible accomplishment, for anything less, lie argues, docs an
injustice to the concept ol a people. In fact, both of Nietzsche's imperatives— the one for
8
'he CO"CCUvC
- lhc °lhcr for lhc individual -arc motivated by a concern forjustice, and this
holds true lor his other imperatives as well.
Nietzsche's concept ofjustice differs from most concepts of justice. It is not
concerned with the distribution of resources within a society or with retribution or the
ministration ol the law, though n remains in contact with these conceptions through its
difference from them. Nietzsche's concept of justice is, like Plato's and the pre-Socmtic
philosopher Heraclitus, who he often cites, an ontological concept. Being just, for
Nietzsche, means doingjuslicc to reality. It means recognizing how things arc, and
respecting them rather than concealing them behind convention or mendacity. Justice is,
therefore, like the authority Nietzsche derives his categorical imperatives from, a largely
negative concept. Because we can never know perfectly how things are, because we can
never know with the certainly of gtxtd conscience that we have doncjusticc to something or
someone, because we can never be sure we have properly understood and responded to
events and persons in the right way, we always risk, in our actions and our thoughts, being
unjust.
Nietzsche sees this concept of justice at work in Greek tragedy, where it plays an
important role in guiding the course of many dramas, particularly those of Aeschylus and
Sophocles. What these dramas reveal about the human condition, in all its dimensions,
Nietzsche believes, is the reality ol human hubris. The finitude and imperfections of
humanity cause it to be hubristic, however good its intentions. Without God, reason, or
nature to perfectly guide us, we inevitably fall prey to hubris, and the suffering that we
cxpei icncc lrom our imperfect deeds and mortal life, is the administration of justice. Greek
tragedy, lor Nietzsche, teaches us that we can never be perfectly just, and it thereby teaches
us that the attempt to be just, which Nietzsche's categorical imperatives command, requires
the hcioic lorlitude ol an Oedipus or a Prometheus. We must, like Oedipus, try to gel to the
bottom ol things and do justice to ourselves, the world, and those we live with, and
although we must also expect this attempt to fail, anything less, Nietzsche argues, would
be a form of injustice.
I he name lor this sort ol ethical altitude and the categorical imperatives that express
it is "pcrlcctionism." Greek tragedy, like the great examples of historical deeds that
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Nicl/schc focuses on his second Untimely Meditation, compels us to perfect ourselves
and promote the perfection of those we live with, our people, our community, and
ullnnatcly, humanity itself. Anything else, for Nietzsche, would do an injustice to
ourselves, our people, and our humanity. Nict/.schc seems to have derived Ins moral
perfectionism from Aristotle, whose Politics he studied in preparation for writing The Birth
"J Tragedy. Just as Aristotle claims that the end of life is the good life, and that the good
life is the best, most perfect life, so too docs Nietzsche assert, in all of writings, that the
best life ,s the most perfected life, the life, as he puts it, that is spacious and multiple, rich
and diverse, expansive and inclusive.
Nietzsche's belief that perfectionism can be our only moral position in a secular age
without absolutes, that it constitutes the highest good of individual and collective life,
explains why his new vision of political community is not quite the same as that of a
pluralistic, postmodern liberalism. Nietzsche's perfectionism prevents him from being a
straightforward advocate of value pluralism, because he values, as should already be clear,
some things more than others. His imperatives- his "oughts" or values-command the
vciy highest accomplishment. They express a concept ofjustice that always demands
moic— more self-knowledge, a higher concept of a people, a more perfect way of life.
Once the absolutes of God, reason, and nature arc swept away and rendered never perfectly
knowablc, we are placed in a position in which, Nietzsche believes, we must strive for an
cvci moic pcilcct lorm of individual and collective life, should we wish to be just. Rather
than advocating a straightforward value pluralism, then, Nietzsche believes that the value of
a perspective on the world increases as that perspective itself increases and becomes
bioadci
, dccpci, richer, and ultimately more universal. A broader perspective is, for him, a
more valuable and more just perspective. Perspectives arc unavoidable, but differences
exist between perspectives, and these differences have different values. Nietzsche's
morality is therefore a morality that commands us to refine our perspectives by striving for
self -perfection and self -overcoming, not for the sake of accruing power, but in order to
increase our capacity for justice, responsibility, and the good life.
Nietzsche's advocacy of moral perfectionism also explains why he should not be
considered simply a partisan of an aristocratic conscrvativism. To be sure, there is an
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aristocratic clement to his morality, but the aristocratic excellence which he wishes to
substitute lor myopic nationalism is an excellence available to all. Indeed, one reason why
Nietzsche's early works are valuable, is because they articulate this all-inclusive, endlessly
available excellence more clearly than his other writings, since his concern in these first
works is with the political community as a whole, and not simple with the "free spirit" who
he latter identifies as his primary audience. In his third Untimely Meditation, for example,
which is concerned to prove that the end of humanity is not the suite, as Hegel had argued,
but the perfection of individual and collective life, Nietzsche tells us that our task is to
become a genius and help others to become geniuses. The genius is, as the word's
etymology shows, the one who generates, the one who is involved in the process of
genesis, of creating and advancing the cause of humanity. Everyone, Nietzsche believes,
has this capacity, and by calling on everyone to become geniuses, he advances a position
which is very far from promoting the cause of a few, conservative, aristocrats, who revalue
values for the rcsl of us.
It is tempting to describe Nietzsche's vision of political community in his first
writings as aristocratic democracy. This concept of politics would not be a concept that he
himself speaks o( during this period, but it might be the best way to get at what he is after.
That is, it might best do justice to his intentions in The Birth ofTragedy, the Untimely
Meditations, and in the other writings from this period that articulate his political thought.
For these writings continually hold out the hope that a political community could
collectively elevate itself beyond the ends ol the nation-state and overcome nihilism through
their self-perfection and ennoblement. The categorical imperatives announced in these
works tell what ought to be done to achieve this, and Nietzsche intends them for the whole
of lhc demos. Whether or not this adds up to a concept of democracy, perhaps depends on
one's perspective. 1 believe, however, that his works can help us to theorize the possibility
ol a non-nationalistic form of political community, capable of confronting the disorienting
cllccts of nihilism and promoting the highest excellences of the demos.
CHAPTER II
"THE LAW OF ETERNAL JUSTICE”: THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
The relationship of the Dionysian and the Apollinian is recoam/ablein every form of the state [Staatsform] ....
ogniz
— Nietzsche, a note to himself
Aesthetics and Politics
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche investigates the effects of aesthetics on politics
and of politics on aesthetics. 1 His purpose is twofold. On the one hand, art's effect on
politics is to be presented through a genealogical investigation of Greek tragedy which
discloses why, in the classical polls, "tragedy and the state [Stoat] are bound together at
their loundations [in ihren Fundamenten verwachsen sind]
" (§23).
2 On the other hand,
Nietzsche presents the structural transformations which tragedy undergoes as it becomes an
object of philosophical, theoretical, and political speculation in order to awaken modernity
to the disastrous consequences resulting from the politicization of art and the
aestheticization of politics. Nietzsche's intentions are so far removed from efforts to turn
the aesthetic into an all encompassing ideology-and no charge has been leveled against
Major discussions of The Birth of Tragedy have not done justice to these basic
dimensions of Nietzsche's argument. John Sallis's otherwise close reading of the book
pays no attention to it (see Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy [Chicago-
University of Chicago Press, 1991]); M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern almost entirely avoid it m
their encyclopedic discussion of the work (see Nietzsche on Tragedy [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984]); Peter Sloterdijk makes more headway, but remains
ar from the book's lundamcntal problems (see Thinker on Stage: Nietzsche's Materialism,
trans. Jamie Owen Daniel [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989]); Barbara
\ on Rcibnitz s excellent "commentary" on The Birth of Tragedy pays attention to questions
aesthetics and politics, but only comments on the first twelve of the book's twenty-five
sections (see Ein Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsche "Die Geburt der Tragodie aus deni
Geiste derMusik " (Kap.1-12) [Stuttgart und Weimar, 1992]).
‘ Translations of Nietzsche's texts are my own. All references to The Birth of
Tragedy will appear in the body of the text. In order to facilitate use of both the German
text and English translations, references will cite the section numbers in Nietzsche's text.
Translations are from the Sdmtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe
, ed. Giorgio Colli
and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), I, 9-165. The unfortunate state
of English translations has been often noted. For an instructive reading of Walter
Kaulmann's "ideological misreading" of The Birth of Tragedy— his mistranslation— see
Andrzej Warminski, Readings in Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
1987), xliv-xlv.
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Nietzsche's writings with more frequency-that The Birth of Tragedy accomplishes the
very oppostte: It offers an elaborate critique of the tdeology of the aesthet.e and ruthlessly
polemic,zes against the various political ideologies it enables. 5 And it announces its
intention to do so on the first page of the "Foreword to Richard Wagner." There Nietzsche
places an "aesthetic problem [asthelisches Problem]- and a "German problem [deutschen
Problem]" at the center of his investigations, and although each of these problems results
1 rom a certain conllation of politics and aesthetics, he insists that resolving them depends
upon more than simply distinguishing between the playful values of the aesthetic and the
more serious problems of polities. Treating an "aesthetic problem" senously requires more
than the construction of antitheses such as "patriotic excitement and aesthetic revelry" or
"courageous seriousness and cheerful play." In the "Foreword to Richard Wagner,"
Nietzsche tells his readers that the "aesthetic problem" he investigates is so little opposed to
politics that it lies "right in the middle" of "German hopes":
You will recall that I collected these thoughts together during the same
period when your marvelous Festschrift on Beethoven came into being, that
is, during the terrors and sublimities [Schrecken und Erhabenheiten] of thewar that had just broken out. Yet, as regards this collection, anyone would
be mistaken who should think of the antithesis between patriotic excitement
and aesthetic revelry, of courageous seriousness and cheerful play: Rather,
to their astonishment, it would become clear to them, with a real reading of
this writing [einem wirklichen Lesen dieser Schrift], what a serious German
problem we are treating— one placed by us right in the middle of German
hopes, as vortex and turning point. But perhaps it will be simply offensive
tor just these readers to see an aesthetic problem taken so seriously, in case
they are namely in a state to recognize in art nothing more than a cheerful
sideline, a readily dispensable ringing of bells accompanying the
seriousness of existence [Ernst des Daseins\ " : As if no one knew what
For interpretations of Nietzsche which charge him with aestheticism, see Gert
Sautermeister, "Zur Grundlegung des Asthetizismus bei Nietzsche. Dialektik, Metaphysik
und Politik in der 'Geburt der Tragodie'," in NaturalismuslAsthetizismus, ed. Christa^
BUrger, Peter BUrger, and Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979),
224-243; Henning Ottmann, "Nietzsches Politische Philosophic. Versuche in
Postmoderner Politik," in Bayreuther Nietzsche-Kolloquium (Frankfurt am Main: Peter
Lang, 1989), 107-129; Thomas Heilke, Nietzsche's Tragic Regime: Culture, Aesthetic,
andPoliticalEducation (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998); Jurgen
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity , trans. Frederick Lawrence
(Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1987), 83-105; Josef Chytry, The Aesthetic State: A Quest
in Modern German Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 318-358;
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press, 1985); Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996).
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was involved in this contrast with such a
( Foreword to Richard Wagner")
"seriousness of existence."
Taking an "aesthetic problem" seriously may not only not be inconsistent with
problems of politics; under certain conditions it may be the only way to take the problems
they pose seriously. This is never truer than when politics becomes something more than
just rational calculation, the implementation of a program, a technique for actualizing a
theory, or a procedural means for realizing the law. Under these circumstances, politics ,s
not simply rational, programmatic, technical, or procedural. Nor is it only a matter of
employing abstract concepts, enforcing universal values, or according with timeless truths.
Rather, problems of aesthetics must be taken seriously once politics is recognized for what
it always will have been -ineluctably sensational and irrevocably worldly. Politics and
aesthetics, the "German problem" and the "aesthetic problem," are united in their inability
to dissociated themselves from the sensuous life of the body, from its feelings, passions,
moods, and emotions, from its drives and instincts, from, in short, the dimension of life
which, in contrast to the timeless universality of essences, the term "existential" was
designed to capture.
4
This dimension, which Nietzsche identifies in the "Foreword" with
the word existence [Dasein]," is the sphere of the aesthetic and the political, and to this
extent, the aesthetic is already political. Not simply because it shares the sphere of
sensibility with politics, but because it marks the rebellion of the material world against the
tyranny ol theory, the despotism of the philosophers, and the abstractions of the
supersensible. The philosophers and their theories— the whole phenomenon of
"Socratism" which Nietzsche struggles with throughout The Birth ofTragedy— have
always attempted to suppress this rebellion of the sensuous, irrational, contingent, non-
conceptual, and non-programmable. Problems of aesthetics, then, are indissociable from
problems ot politics to the extent that the contingence of sentiment constantly threatens to
upset the rule of reason and destabilize the order of the polis. The philosophers' response
to this unstable situation has always been to provide a theory of the aesthetic— what
Aristotle called a "poetics"— capable of determining the types of art and forms of feeling
which accord with the moral ends of the polis. Once these theories are in place and put into
On aesthetics and the realm of sensibility, see Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche
, vol. 1
(Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1989), 99-100.
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pract.ce, mt.onal.zed works of art can be produced and a program of aesthetic education
nstuuted. However much these programs may vary, they a„ attempt to make the .rational
rahonal and the contingent necessary, and in each case they do so through the hab.tnal
exposure ol the young to works of art whose effects ought to harmonize their souls in
accordance with the moral ends of the polls.
No better example of these efforts to politicize art- no better example of
Socratism— exists than the one which serves as Nietzsche's point of departure in The Birth
of Tragedy. This point of departure-the "aesthetic problem"-is announced on the book's
lirst page, but not until its twenty-second section is the philosopher named who is
responsible for placing it at the center of debates on tragedy: Aristotle. And only then does
Nietzsche finally identify the aesthetic phenomenon which Aristotle made the central
problem lor all future investigations of tragedy: Catharsis. Since Aristotle's Poetics
,
every
interpretation ol tragedy has had to grapple with the problem of tragedy's cathartic effect ,
with tragedy's strange ability to produce a feeling of pleasure in its audience through the
representation of painful, pitiable, and even terrifying events. 5 And every interpretation of
tragedy has had to decide upon this feeling's significance. These, then, are the problems
which define Nietzsche's "aesthetic problem." But they are not simply a problem of
aesthetics. Aristotle's first and longest presentation of catharsis takes place in the Politics. 6
Catharsis is a political problem— and this is the formulation which Nietzsche
adopts -because the sound ofmusic affects the polis. Indeed, the different forms of
sound the dillerent melodies— attect the polls in different ways. According to the
typology laid out in the Politics and put into play in The Birth of Tragedy, the only form of
music suitable tor purposes of rational education— for training citizens to experience pain
and pleasure in the right way- is one which makes the souls of the young moderate,
For Aristotle's discussion of catharsis, see Poetics
, trans. Richard Janko
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 17-18 (53b 1-14).
For Nietzsche's comments on the role of catharsis in the Politics, see Sdmtliche
Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. VII (notes from the period 1869-1874), 196, 220,
285. For a general discussion of Nietzsche's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of
catharsis, see Hedwig Wingler, "Aristotle in the Thought of Nietzsche and Thomas
Aquinas," in Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition, ed. James O'Flaherty,
Timothy Sellner, Robert Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976)
33-54.
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courageous, and balanced, and the ab.lity to create this effect, Aristotle says, makes this
type of music an indtspensable tnstrumenl of education for the virtuous polls. Other
melodies, however-and it is these which attract Nietzsche's attention- have the very
oppostte effect: That of catharsts. Rather than attun.ng the soul to a moderate temperament
catharric melodtes produce enthustasm (enthousiasmos) and an orgiastic (orgiasOkos)
feeling of inspiration. When these melodtes conclude, Anstotle says, the effect ts a
p asant feeling of release. In tragedy, this cathartic leelingof release is experienced as
joy— "harmless joy." 7 Such joy, however, has no ethical value, so these melodies must be
excluded from the process of education and confined to the theater. According to the
Politics, then, catharsis belongs in the theater and nowhere else. Tragedy in turn becomes
an instrument lor the cathartic purification of the emotions, while Aristotle's theory of
tragedy turns the theater into a site where the pathologies of the polls can be safely purged
and immoderate and excessive emotions-fear and pity are the two with which Aristotle is
most concerned harmlessly released. In the end, catharsis is politicized therapy,
momentary psychoanalysis, or, as Anstotle himself says, a "medical treatment" for the
body politics. 8
Nietzsche already indicates how close he is to Aristotle's concept of catharsis in the
Foreword to Richard Wagner." Of the two events referred to there— "I collected these
thoughts together during the same period when your [Wagner's] marvelous Festschrift on
Beethoven came into being, that is, dunng the terrors and sublimities [Schrecken und
hrhahenheiten
] of the war that had just broken out"— of these two events, both, in their
own way, are bound up with problems of the emotions and their excesses, and both, in
their own way, are the subject of Nietzsche's book. Indeed, the two feelings which
Nietzsche associates with the Franco-Prussian War— the terrifving and the
sublime— originate in the failed efforts to comprehend a magnitude so excessive that the
resulting emotions are themselves pure expressions of excess. It is all the more remarkable,
then, that Nietzsche should refer to Wagner's Festschrift on Beethoven and the terrors and
Anstotle, Politics
,
trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 240 (1342a
14-15).
Politics, 240 (1342a 10).
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subhmit.es of the Franeo-Pruss.an War in one and the same sentence, tor the Festschrift
has no other aim than to demonstrate music's properly sublime-and not at all
beautiful— character. " And by suggesting that the Franco- Prussian War and Wagner's
theory of music are united in the similarity of their effects, Nietzsche indicates just how
close he is to Aristotle's theory of catharsis. For according to that theory, the structure of
catharsis is itself homologous, even, as has often been remarked, homeopathic: Fear and
p.tv are purged by means of fear and pity. Tragedy's fearful and pitiable events inspire fear
and pity in the audience, and when the drama ends, these emotions are relieved. Yet
Nietzsche departs from Aristotle's theoiy of tragedy-and this departure lies at the root of
each of his criticisms of Anstotle in The Birth ofTragedy-^ he refers not to the
emotions of fear and pity but to the "sublimities of the war" and to a text on the sublimity
of music. Rather than following Aristotle's understanding of tragic catharsis as a
homeopathic remedy for those members of the polls who are prone to being swayed from
the virtuous middle by excessive emotions, Nietzsche's "Foreword" suggests that tragic
catharsis, achieved by a sublime, ecstatic form of music, is a necessary remedy and cure
lor a people subjected to the sublime excesses of war.
10
Indeed, Nietzsche seems to suggest
that the "German problem" has its origin in nothing other than the passionate excesses of
war, in a violence and terror whose magnitude renders them so incomprehensible, so
meaningless, senseless, and lacking in reason, that the pathos of politics gives way to the
apathy and resignation which Schopenhauer counseled in the face of the Will's insatiable
desire. And although Nietzsche's letters from this period clearly indicate that he was
beginning to lose sympathy with the present German war of conquest" for precisely these
reasons, he waits until the twenty-first section of The Birth of Tragedy to openly thematize
the various suggestions first outlined in the "Foreword." Only then does he speak of
tragedy s relationship to war, and only then is its relationship to politics— even to the
Richard Wagner, "Beethoven," in Richard Wagner's Prose Works, vol. V, trans.
William Ashton Ellis (New York: Broude Brothers, 1966), 77, 93, 103.
This was first of all the case for Nietzsche, who served in the Franco-Prussian War
as a medical orderly. He wrote "The Dionysian Worldview" for this reason, and as his
letters make clear, the war was a horrifying experience for which he was entirely
unprepared. See his letter of 23 November, 1879 to Erwin Rhode, in Selected Utters of
Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 69-71.
17
pohticul itself—addressed. There, as Che book's finale gets under way, Nietzsche provides
a description of tragedy's effect on polil.es whieh beg, ns to explain why he would place an
"aesthetic problem” "right in the middle of German hopes":
we can learn only from the Greeks what an almost miraculous suddenawakening of tragedy means for the innermost ground of the hie of a dcodIc\ileii mnersten Lebensgrund eines Volkes]. It is ihc people of ihc iraihc
Shnh
,lKtt ' lghl 'hC baUlCS 'he Persians;Zt%ht these wars in turn needs tragedy as a ncecssary drink of recoveryWhc wouid have supposed that precisely these people, after having beenagitated to their vciy core [bis in's Innerste
] for several generations by thelonysian demon, should still have possessed such a uniformly vigorous—8 P°lil,cal deling [einfachsten politischen
The analogy Nietzsche constructs here is unmistakable: Just as tragedy enabled the
C.iccks to recover their feeling lor the political, even after the interminable carnage of the
Persian Wars, so too would a rebirth of tragedy enable the Germans to recover their feeling
lor the political al ter the "terrors and sublimities" of the Franco-Prussian War. But
Nietzsche goes still further, finding in the tragic Greeks a feeling for the political and a
passion lor politics which is so elemental and original that it must not only be judged
suPcr lativc— "the simplest political feeling [des einfachsten politischen Gefuhls]"— but the
very foundation lor politics as such: It makes the tragic Greeks "the 'political men as such'
I
die 'politischen Menschen an sich'\." n Here again, Nietzsche owes something to
Aristotle. As Hie Birth of / ragedy unfolds, it becomes ever clearer that this outstanding
political lecling" and these outstanding "political men" arc the result of a sensibility and a
passion for politics which is moderate rather than excessive, and this emphasis on the
moderate, the medium, and the mean cannot help but recall the importance which
Aristotle's Politics assigns to these values. '* Indeed, just as Aristotle gives tragedy a place
in the polis because its cathartic purging of the passions returns it to a slate of moderation,
so too does Nietzsche insist that the moderating effects of tragedy arc essential if a people's
passion lor politics is not to become immoderate, unhealthy, and even pathological.
"Dcr gricchischc Staat," in Samtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. I,
771 .
On Nietzsche's readings of Aristotle's Politics
,
sec to Chylry, I’lie Aesthetic State,
326 .
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Immoderation, however, results not only from the suspension of the will in the face of the
sublime and terrifying excesses of war. At the other extreme lies the danger of total
politicization, of a rampant nationalism or a nationalist enthusiasm whose excessiveness
can be no less deadly. In contrast to the threat of political nihilism posed by the Franco-
Prussian War, the danger which political nationalism poses to "German hopes" has its
origins in the "patriotic excitement" which swept across Germany after Bismarck's
trouncing of the French forces. 1’ This danger is not one of a deadly and annihilating
violation of the borders of the state and its soldiers. The danger posed by "patnotic
excitement" comes from the opposite extreme: The establishment of the borders of the
nation and the identity of its citizens. This danger arises the moment a state is founded, and
in Germany this moment- the Reichsgriindung-cante with the conclusion of the war and
the subsequent uml ication of northern and southern Germany under the banner of a single
state: Deutschland.
With the conclusion ol the war and the subsequent founding of the German nation,
then, the question of the political arises. Or rather, the question of the "simplest political
teeling arises. For "the political" is neither an entity nor a concept nor an idea; it is,
Nietzsche says, a leeling. But he just as quickly admits the insufficiency of this
formulation when he goes on to speak of a "political drive [politischen Triebe]" and even a
"political instinct
[politischen Instinkte]" (§21). Whatever their differences, each of these
manifestations of the political is united in its resistance to the rational elucidation of political
life its theoretical systematization. Not without reason, then, does Nietzsche fail to
provide a theory of the political or a political theory in The Birth of Tragedy. Indeed, to the
consternation of so many readers, he never does write a systematic treatise on politics. 14
The political is too variant and too irrational to allow for its perfect translation into the
medium of the concept. These excesses may save it from being fully programmed by
philosopher-kings and Socratic theoreticians, but it also makes it into an enormous
13
For a discussion of Nietzsche's views on nationalism, see Carol Diethe, "Nietzsche
and Nationalism," History ofEuropean Ideas, vol. 14, no. 2 (March, 1992), 227-234.
For an explanation of this failure, see Bonnie Honig, "Nietzsche and the Recovery
ol Responsibility," in Political Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), 73-75.
19
problem— a "serious German problem," indeed, a problem for modernity as a whole. And
since the problem of excess, of too much or too little, of pathology or apathy, of
nationalism or nihilism -since this problem is impossible to resolve theoretically, the task
of realizing that simplest of political feelings must be approached some other way.
This other way, of course, leads Nietzsche back to the tragic Greeks. It is,
Nietzsche says, "only from the Greeks" that we can learn what "tragedy means for the
innermost ground of the life of a people [den innersten Lebensgrund eines Volkes] (§2 1 ).
And the first thing to be learned from the Greeks is that tragedy is not-as Nietzsche
mockingly wrote in the "Foreword"- "a readily dispensable ringing of bells accompanying
the 'seriousness of existence'." Tragedy strikes at the very core of existence, at its
"innermost ground," its "very core [bis in's Innerste}," and it moderates, mediates, and
attunes the sphere of sensibility to a mood of the middle or a middling mood. Indeed,
Nietzsche argues that the effect of tragedy on its spectators is even capable of altering their
"form of existence [Daseinsform]" (§15, § 19), of altering their attunement and retuning it
to a midpoint or medium between the extremes of political nihilism and political
nationalism. Everything in The Birth of Tragedy revolves around this elusive "middle
world
[Mittelwelt] (§3, §7, §24), this midpoint or medium which constitutes a "third
form" (§21) of existence between the extremes of nihilism and nationalism. Everything in
Ihe Birth of Tragedy, then, revolves around the problem of retuning the political, of
moderating its tendency to extremism. But this means something other than avoiding the
extremes. It means finding the midpoint or medium where they effect one another, where,
as Nietzsche says, they "enter into simultamous activity." And this problem— the "aesthetic
problem announced in the "Foreword"— constitutes the primordial problem of tragedy:
"Perhaps we may touch upon this primordial problem [Urproblem] with this question:
Which aesthetic effect [dsthetische Wirkung ] arises when the essentially separated powers
of art [Kunstmachte], the Apolliman and the Dionysian, enter into simultaneous activity?
Or more briefly: How does music behave towards image and concept?" (§ 1 6). 15
Plato tries to answer this question— what is catharsis?— in his Philebus (48a);
Aristotle takes up the problem in the Poetics ( 1448b 8-19, 1453b 10-14). On the history of
this problem as formulated by Aristotle, see Max Kommerell, Lessing und Aristoteles.
Untersuchung iiber die Theorie der Tragodie (Frankfurt am Main: 1960), 63-107.
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The Problem of the Extremes: the Apollinian and the Dionysian
Solving this problem and comprehending the effect of tragedy upon human
existence depends upon avoiding the extremes of the Apollinian and the Dionysian in order
to discover their middle ground, the place where they "enter into simultaneous activity,"
Indeed, the tragic effect, Nietzsche insists, is nothing other than an experience of the
middle. Not only does "Dionysus, the proper hero of the stage and center [M,telpmkt\ of
the vtsion" (§8), appear at the middle point of ,rag,c art, but the world of the stage, as the
presentation of the satyr chorus's ecstatic visions, ,s a "world of the middle IMittelwelt}-
(§24, §8), neither simply worldly or other-worldly. The absence of tragedy and the tragic
attunement, on the other hand, leads to various extreme effects and expenences, resulting
not in tragic pathos but in the pathologies of nihilism and nationalism. Avoiding these
extremes depends on understanding the effects of what Nietzsche calls the Apollinian and
the Dionysian. The concepts of the Apollinian and the Dionysian signify the concrete and
historical aliective states (Zustand) and moods (Slimming) investigated by aesthetics. 18
They are, Nietzsche says, "powers" (Macke), capable of affecting individuals, inducing
affects that are at once cognitive, non-subjective, and definitive for human existence. 17
They correspond exactly to the extremes of universality and particularity, and resolving the
"the primordial question" of tragedy and understanding its cathartic effect requires first
investigating them in turn before turning to their mutual interaction and "simultaneous
activity."
The Apollinian sphere is the sphere of particularity and therefore of individuality,
and within its jurisdiction, the individual is held sacred and obliged to follow the law of
individuation:
Considered as imperative and as giving prescriptions, this divination of
‘ 6
_ „
°n the Dionysian "Zustand " see §5, §6, §8, §9; on the Apollinian "Zustand" see
§9. For a "an abbreviated survey" of Nietzsche's basic states, including the Dionvsian
state but excluding the Apollinian state, see Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding ofHis Philosophical Activity
, trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Fredenck J.
Schmitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 339-349.
On the Dionysian "Stimmung" see §5, §8; on the Apollinian "Stimmung" see §6.
On the significance of Nietzsche's understanding of moods see Martin Heidegger,
Nietzsche
, vol. I, 114-26.
On the Dionysian etfect see §4, §7; on the Apollinian effect see §2, §4.
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aesthetic necessity of beauty. (§4)
pamllcl lhe
Under the influence of the Apollintan effect a state of measured res, takes over: In dreams,
m the figurative character of sculptural art, in the formal borders of the "conscious"
individual and the phystcal body, in the measuredness of the ethical law, the measured
harmony ol beauty, and in the formal frontiers of the state. But it must always be
remembered, N.etzsche emphasizes, that the "power [Macht]’ of the Apollintan "does not
90
respec, the tndivtdual" (§2).'°Thc paradoxtcal law of the indtvtdua. produces not
Thomas Hei r^,’
“ T*? inaccessiblc - Thus, when
I Dekalb: Northern IlhnoisU^tfvK ^ Political Education
the perspective of a "philosophical anthronokw- n
pproa(
r
hes The Blrth of tragedy from










uch difficulties are encountered: not only does Nietzsche reiect
fs i gf u tV
hTy and ,wilh it all accounts of the "human in itself [dir Mensch an sichV(§ 19), but he locates the foundation of political life outside the himan being and dln hropo,ogi 1 accoun ts ol its "nature." Man is not the measure here and the authoritv ofe human subject is to be delimited. What is authoritative, then, is the Dionysiancategorical imperative that eventually emerges in The Birth of Tragedy and its authoritv
"rumanmTieir’^
6 mablhty °f the human be,n8 to 8,ve an authoritative account of the
issues^S^Ctl°n °m he ^anthropological problematic opens up another series oflar too vast to be more than indicated here. They concern the work of the
anthropologist Levi-Strauss. Like Nietzsche, he is concerned with the structure of myth.
oreover, his texts have consistently taken up the problematic of Nietzsche's own
investigation: what is the relationship between the Apollinian and the Dionysian or in
terminology scared by both Levi-Strauss and Nietzsche, between myth and music. See TheRaw and the Cooked trans. J. D. Weightman (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 14-30- TheNaked Man, trans. J. D. Weightman (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), 645-667- Myth and
Meaning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 34-43. Furthermore, the earliest of
these texts opens with a critique of senalist methods of composition and theories of musical
signification. Sigmlicantly, this movement's greatest theorist, Pierre Boulez, is only the
most recent and important theorist ol Wagner's "emancipation of dissonance," an
emancipation which is not only at the very center of The Birth ofTragedy, but which
equally constitutes the tirst attempt at a post-structuralist theory of music without a
governing, gravitational center point in the diatonic system of tonal structure. Boulez even
conducted The Ring cycle at Bayreuth in a famous interpretation, the occasion of which
lead to a number ol important essays on the significance of Wagner's musical innovations;
see Orientations, trans. Martin Cooper (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 223-
291, esp. 275-6. As if to counter Boulez and with him Nietzsche and Wagner, Levi-
Strauss interprets The Ring in Myth and Meaning in a section which has as its themes
precisely those of The Birth of Tragedy, the section— which could have been called "The
Apollinian and the Dionysian"— is entitled "Myth and Music." Any evaluation of this
complex chain of relations would have to consider Derrida's critique of Levi-Strauss and
structuralism in the name of a Nietzschean play of dissonance. In Dela Grammatologie
(Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967) Derrida's deconstruction of the structuralist project
takes as its point ol departure Nietzsche's writings on the problematic of "play" (73), only
to bring that text to an end with the conclusion that "writing is always atonal" (443).
Finally, while it has been often noticed that Derrida's work has done much to delimit the
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Chile, cnccs, but sameness—abstract, identifiable unities whose indivisibility is at the basis
Ol mathematically equivalent "individuals." The law. then, is "One" and the same for all.
, ascribed into the individual as its possibility and limit. Failing to heed the law, the
individual— exemplified by Prometheus's "heroic effort" to "stride forth into the umvcrsal.
m the attempt to transcend the spell of individuation and be the one essence of the world"
(§9)— is doomed. Rather than universalizing the individual, the acknowledgement of the
hunt to the individual's absoluteness brings a pre-theorelieal and non-philosophical
"wisdom" not only into relation with practical activity, but, surprisingly, into a certain
correspondence with beauty. Their similarity lies in the parallel and analogous function of
measure: In every case, be it the knowledge of wisdom, the ethical law, or the necessity of
beauty, measure rules. And since, according to its concept, measure must necessarily show
ilscll and be representable and recognizable, it remains-in the strict sense of the word-an
aesthetic phenomenon, hence an effect of the aesthetic language of the Apollinian. But as
Apolhman and aesthetic, measure measures its own rule as well, thereby requiring lire
addition of a line delimiting its own limit: "That delicate line, which the dream image must
n°l overstep lest il cllcel us pathologically [pathologisch zu wirken], failing which (he
shine [Schein] would deceive us as crude reality, must not be absent from the image of
Apollo: 1 hat measured limitation, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that wise repose
\Ruhe] ol the god of sculpture" (§1). The cognitive quality of the Apollinian state lies in a
wisdom which recognizes the illusory character of the individual and the ^substantiality of
the epic myth ol the heroic sell
, however seductive its beauty.
I he mlc ol Apollinian measure exerts a valid lawfulness which not only makes
possible a knowledge of the sell , the ethical law, and beautiful works of art; it is also
fundamental to the sphere ol politics. Indeed, it is in this region, Nietzsche argues, that the
Apollinian cllcct most clearly shows itself, for it is precisely in the practical realm of the
will that rest most easily gives way to fear and anxiety, leading directly to the forgetting of
that "delicate line" separating illusion from reality. The effect is uniform: A pathological
Ircnzy to deny the illusory character ol all borders, in particular those of the individual and
its collective expression, the state. In ancient Greece, Nietzsche writes, the emergence ol
the Dionysian "cllcct
|
Wirkung]" (§4)— and this effect always causes the borders
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constitutive of identity to tremble-led to the birth of an author,tanamsm symptomatic of a
'orgetlulness of the law. Resistance to the Dionysian knew only one goal: The maintenance
o' IOrm m WhlCh measurc a,°ne became thc "** value, provoking a pure manifestation of
the Apoll inian effect:
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1Stent reSiSta"Ce ‘° titamc‘barbaric cLncc of the
%
The Doric stale and Doric art deserve consideration together to the extent that both are
founded upon a more fundamental value: The value of measure. 1 ’ This value, as Nietzsche
makes clear, is the political value parexcellence. Without it, the individual, the state, and
even community would be impossible, let alone beautiful works of art. But when the
"delicate line" delimiting this value's limit is forgotten, an exemplary demonstration of the
complicity between Apollinian art and politics occurs. Since Apollinian art is always
beautiful, the complicity manifests itself through a frightening confusion of art and a state
whose overriding function has become the maintenance of its own "beautiful illusion
|schone Schem]" (§1) through the preservation of its identifying borders. These borders
are, however, like all Apollinian measure, merely Schein, the illusory brilliance constitutive
of beauty. The aestheticization of the political results when the beautiful illusion of the
state s borders whatever their form— becomes so majestic that their apparent authority
effects a pathological seductiveness which suspends the will of precisely those individuals
the state was to have protected. Aesthetics— here the pleasurable feeling of
beauty— becomes the sole criterion of politics, and the illusion becomes total. Here, as
Nietzsche writes in a contemporaneous essay on "The Greek State," the "archetype ofthe
For a further discussion of the complicity between the Doric state and Doric art, see
Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche (Miinchen: C. H. Beck, 1995), 78-79.
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Me |Ul b"d dCS Slaates| ” rcvcals ilsdr
- a"d i" ‘ype is the "military genius"
—
Lycurgus ,s
exemplary—as the "original founder of the state lursprunglichenStaatengrunder].'*
1 n contrast to the political consequences of the purely Apolltnian effect- pure
because ,ts validity (Geltung, §21) is elevated to the sole value the world-the Dionysian
cl lect could not be more antithetical: "This is the first effect of the Dionysian tragedy The
state and society, the chasm between humans as such, gives way to an overpowering
ing ol unity [EinheitsgeJUhl\, which leads back to the heart of nature” (§7). As the
extreme ant, thesis to the grounding effect of the Apollinian prmciplc of individuation the
Dionysian effect unites individuated entities by upsetting the restfulness of individuation
From the perspective of the individual, such unrest is not simply upsetting: i, appears
terrilying, even maddening, for it indicates the overcoming of the individual's foundational
principle as its borders arc set into motion. Despite the exceptional character of such
experience, it has a long history. Nietzsche's own discussion departs-as it had in the case
ol the A pol li nian principium individuationis—from Schopenhauer's The World as Will and
Representation, the work in which he found that individuating principle's exemplary
presentation:
In the same plaec Schopenhauer has depicted for us the monstrous horrorwhich seizes man when he suddenly comes to doubt the cognitive form of
appearances because the principle of sufficient reason [Satz vow Grunde 1
in one ol its possible figures, appears to suffer an exception [eine
Ausnahme zuerleiden scheint]. If we add to this horror the blissful ecstasy
that rises up Irom the innermost ground [innersten Grunde] of mankind,
indeed ol nature, with this disintegration of the principium individuationis
we glimpse the essence
|
Wesen] of the Dionysian, which is brought nearest
to us by the analogy ol intoxication [Rausches]. (§1)
The ecstatic lecling ol being liberated Irom rational grounds is, according to Nietzsche, of
particular political significance. If the state founded in 1871 is to have any proper existence
and thus be something other than a repetition of a totalizing Socratism, its political form
must dil lerentiate itself from all forms ol politics which strive towards total stability.
Paradoxically, then, "German" political hopes— the realization of a specifically "German"
rebirth ol Greek political and cultural forms— can only be realized if this new stale delimits,
rather than makes absolute, the validity of its own sphere. Lacking such delimitation, its
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I undamental value- Apollinian measure-grows to enslaving proportions as Done
pathologies set ,n. Ancient Rome- "exhausting itself in a consuming chase after worldly
power and worldly honor"-is illustrative ofjust such an unchecked extension of the
political: "From out of the unconditioned validity of the political drive
[ unbedinglen
GellUng derP°m^" Triebe\, it is jus, as necessary that a people should go the path of
the most extreme secularization whose most magnificent but also most terrifying
expression is the Roman imperium (§21 ). Against its own intentions, Roman
imperialism, leads not to control and sovereignly. Rather, in its attempt to secure as much
ground as possible, its exemplary movement outwards becomes incessant, irresistible,
enslaving, and finally, as history attests, self-defeating. The self is lost not only because of
the world's enormity in comparison to the individual human or individual stale; of greater
significance is the confusion which reduces the infinite variety of possible worlds to a
single world: The empirical, aesthetic world of the political sphere. It is hardly surprising,
then, that such confusion tends toward the unconditional expansion of the fundamental
political value to the point of terrifying extremes and passionate dictates: The stale becomes
an end in itself. Modernity, distant as it may be from ancient Rome, remains under the
command ol just such dictates. Their command, no less than the Socratic obsession wilh
grounds, has only one effect: "Slavery [Knechtschaft]" (§20). Avoiding enslavement
requires the liberating yet anti-political motions of the Dionysian, for its force alone resists,
indeed, dissolves, the political instinct which strives to realize the illusion of totality: "With
every signil icant spreading of the Dionysian excitement one always traces how the
Dionysian liberation [Losung] from the chains of the individual makes itself fell first of all
Ihiough an injury to the political instincts [politisclien Instinkte], increased to the point of
indifference, yes, even hostility to them; just as certainly, on the other hand, the slate-
lorming Apollo [staatenbildende Apollo] is also the genius of the principium
individuationis
, and the state and sense of home cannot live without the affirmation of the
individual personality" (§21). Just as the sphere of individuation is not to be absolutized,
so too must its antithesis be moderated. Failure to do so would, to be sure, liberate
"Germany" from Roman style politics, but it would also bring political life in "Germany"
to an end and wilh it "Germany" itself.
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The Play of Metaphor
Avoiding the extremes of the Apollinian and Dtonystan depends on a tragic
expenence of a "middle world," on a passage between the extremes of total politicization
and total nthdtsm. And determ,nmg the structure of that passageway requtres explatntng
how the extremes of Apollinian individuality and Dtonystan universality come into contact
w„h one another in the tragtc effect to prcxiuce a mood of the tmddle and correspond, ngmode of politics. Everyth,ng rests, then, on answenng one quest,on: "Winch aesthetic
effect anses when the essentially separated powers of art, the Apollinian and the
Dionysian, enter into s.multaneous activity? Or more bnefly: How does music behave
towards image and concept?" (§16). In his desorption of the folk song-and this contains
tragedy's bas.c structure in embryonic fom, -Nietzsche speof.es the character of the
relationship of music to image and concept:
In the poetry of the folk song, language is strained to the most intense
egree to imitate music [die Musik nachzuahmen]: Thus does a new world
poetry begin with Archilochus, a world which contradicts the Homericone in its deepest 1 undament. We have thus indicated the only possible
relationship between poetry and music, word and tone: The word, theimage seeks an expression analogous to music and now suffers the violenceo music as such [einen der Musik analogen Ausdruck and erleidet jetzt die
Gewalt der Musik an sich\. (§6)
By placing analogy at the center of his analysis of tragedy, Nietzsche brings his
investigation into relation with one of philosophy's oldest and most powerful themes.
Analogy has consistently been employed to comprehend difference under the aspect of the
same through the perception of proportional similarities between otherwise diffenng
unities. Analogy is therelore a way of acknowledging differences while nevertheless
subsuming them under a larger totality. Originating in the pre-Socratics's efforts to specify
mathematical and ontological relations, it is Socrates' employment of the term to found the
ideal polis in Plato's Republic which insured its centrality for future philosophical and
political investigations."
1
It not only plays a fundamental role in insuring the success of
Aristotle's Metaphysics, but the use of this figure dominated Scholastic debates over the
See "Socrates'" analogical presentation of the essence of the Good as the
foundation of Being, in the Republic, 508a-509b.
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problem of .he analogy of being.» And it is precisely these debates which provided the
framework for Schopenhauer's own metaphysics of music - Building on exactly tins
moment in Schopenhauer's text, Nietzsche enters into the debate. For analogy has also
played a decisive role in discussion of tragedy. Aristotle attributes a unique function to
analogy in the successl ul tragedy: 1 1 is ihc mode of diction-different from those of the
dithyramb or epic- most appropriate to its specific poetic form. Its appropriateness
however, derives from the fact that analogy is the most general and defining font, of
metaphor, and since tragedy's diction is metaphorical in form, the essence of tragedy's
linguistic form is the analogical metaphor” When Aristotle claims that the ability to create
metaphors and perceive analogies is the very mark of genius, thus not simply an attribute
ol the poet or rhetoritician, its decisive significance begins to appear: It is the very
possibility of philosophers such as Aristotle writing treatises on subjects as diverse as
poetics, rhetoric, and metaphysics.” Analogy, metaphor, poetics, and rhetoric, far from
challenging the sovereignty of metaphysics, arc quite at home in it, cvcn-as the
dependence ol Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics upon analogy
demonstrate— fundamental to its success. 26
While Nietzsche's own employment of analogy not only places him squarely within
a long tradition to which he is otherwise self-consciously opposed, his further specification
ol the relationship between music and image deepens this debt when he reveals that the
particular form of analogy at work is precisely that attributed by Aristotle's Poetics to the
See Book I V of the Metaphysics.
On Schopenhauer's use of scholastic analogies in his philosophy of music sec Die
Welt als Wille and Vorstellung, Sdmtliche Werke
,
cd. Wolfgang von Lohneysen (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993) vol. I, §52, csp. 367. Nietzsche constructs his explanation of
tragic catharsis exclusively on the basis of this section.
See Poetics, 1 457b 1 -57b 1 8; 1 459a5-59a 1 5; Rhetoric, 1 4 1 0b36.
Sec Poetics, 1459a7-9; Rhetoric, 141 2a9- 13.
On the relationship between metaphysics and metaphor in Aristotle sec Derrida's
discussion—one largely dominate by Nietzsche's own writings on these issues— in the
essay, "la mythologie blanche: la mdtaphorc dans lc texte philosophique" in Marges de la
philosophic (Paris: Lcs Editions dc Minuit, 1972), 247-324.
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proper form of tragedy— metaphor:
WjrKAetawwi. which
wmsmim
piTo,ts;issav^:;r„"r"SSuT^^ WMkK a" S,e"e einesBeSrWes,
Wh.le Aristotle understands the proper form of tragic diction to involve an analogical
metaphor constructed on the basts of a transference of shared properl,es between pans of
substances similarly related to one another and discerned on the basis of theoretical abilities
ultimately philosophical in kind, Nietzsche defines the metaphor anew as a "vicarious
image that really floats before the poet in the place of a concept." 27 On the one hand, a
’vicarious image" takes the place of a concept, substituting a nondiscursive "image" for a
predicated property, Aristotle's onoma, the proper name which would have been
transferred 1 rom one pair of relations to another in order to form the metaphor. On the other
hand, the "image" is no longer grounded in the identity of a particular nominal substance
open to theoretical perception— the sine qua non of Aristotelian ontology— freeing
metaphor from its dependence on Aristotelian metaphysics and its concomitant poetics of
tragedy. Rather than the nominal transference of metaphor, an image appears which takes
the place ol Aristotle's proper name. Such place taking is accomplished through the
substitution of an image not only for a transferred property, but equally for the very
substance to which such a property is attributed. Music, then, is to be imitated by language
and image in tragedy through the appearance of metaphorical images and words whose
Z On Nietzsche and metaphor in The Birth of Tragedy, see Anne Tebartz-van Elst,
Asthetik der Metaphor: Zum Streit zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik bei Friedrich
Nietzsche (Miinchen: Karl Alber, 1995); Detlef Otto, "Die Version der Metapher zwischen
Musik und Begnff," in "Centauren-Geburten: Wissenschaft, Kunst und Philosophie beim
jungen Nietzsche, ed. Tilman Borsche, Fedenco Gerratana, Aldo Venturelli (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyer, 1994), 167-190; Anthony Stephens, "Nietzsche und die poetische Metapher,"
in Friedrich Nietzsche, Perspektivitdt und Tiefe, cd. Walter Gebhard (Frankfurt am Main
Peter Lang, 1982), 79-120.
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similarity to music should present at least one of its propcrt.es in the medium of "the
Apollm.an." But music lacks any permanent substance: I, neverappears phenomenally ,n
space, indeed, "it puts all appearances to shame.- The temporality of mus.c and the
spatiality of the .rnage prevents the s.mple creation of music's metaphor through the
transference of shared propert.es between pa.rs of substances similarly related to one
another and demands in its place another form of creation, one wh.ch, instead of
transferring attributes on the basis of an identical substance and a totalizing rhetorical
stracture, is forced to substitute a supplement to take the place of music's insubslant,ably
and failure to appear, namely, a non-rhetoncal form of "metaphor" as the "primordial
artistic appearance 11 and "primordial aesthetic phenomenon."
This supplement, as is well known, is the "will." In his analysis of the lyric poet,
Nietzsche asks, "as what does music appear in the mirror of images and concepts?" (§6).
His deceptively simple answer immediately follows : "Music appears as will" The
substituting, supplementing image, suspended before the eyes of the Apollm.an poet as an
analogical "metaphor" mimetically similar to music, appears to be the will. By means of a
peculiar lorm ol hermeneutics imageless music is brought into relation with the image, and
a metaphor— analogically similar to music-somehow appears. But, Nietzsche insists,
music cannot possibly be will: It only appears as will, as "the eternally willing, desiring,
longing. " "Music appears as will ": The structure of interpretation at the basis of the creation
of the analogical metaphor 1 unctions through a pointing away— a "deuten " (§6) as both
interpreting and pointing in which something is always understood as an other. The other
is musics other, "for," as Nietzsche writes, "music cannot possibly be, according to its
gssence, will" (§6). This is because music essentially has no appearance. Rather, it calls
See the indispensable fragment— originally intended for The Birth of
Tragedy— which has come to be known as "On Music and Words" in Samtliche Werke
,
VII, 359-369. An unreliable translation by Walter Kaufmann may be found in Carl
Dahlhaus's Between Romanticism and Modernism
, trans. Mary Whittall (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 106-116. Exemplary of the translation problems
found in this and other works by Nietzsche, in particular The Birth of Tragedy, is the
rendering of "allgemeinste Erscheinungsform" (361)— "most general form of appearances":
i.e., the transcendental condition for the possibility of the experience of appearances, an
obvious and extraordinary attempt to rearticulate Kant's and Schopenhauer's
Transcendental Aesthetic— as "most general manifestation" (108). Time and again, the
historical weight ol Nietzsche's very precise language is lost and with it the significance of
his argument.
31
l orth an appearance as its supplement. Its incomprehensibility, its lack of presence and
I at I ure to appear, provoke the attempt to comprehend it. setting the imagination in motion:
'Music necessitated the lyricist to figurative speech [Bilderrede]" (§6). Music necessarily
appears I iguratively, namely, as a Bilderrede, a figure of speech whose figure is the
analogical metaphor. Such analogical relating, however, does anything but insure the
possibility of a simple transference of properties from the medium of music to that of
language. For language, and with the "lyrical eloquence" brought to bear on the content
of such language, can do nothing to bring the sense of music "one step closer" (§6). A
fundamental disjunction prevents a simple passage from one to the other. However much
language may strain itself to imitate music, the mimetic relation between the two lacks ihe
integral passage required to insure the successful synthesis and dialectical resolution of the
antithetical relation between the two media. Not integrity and integration between
apparently disparate mediums, but the suffering-erfei&n-of one medium at the hands of
the other results when a "unification" of the Apolliman image and the Dionysian music
takes place: On the one hand, melody is the enabling condition of musical works and
I unctions as "thefirst and the universal [das Erste und Allgemeine], which, therefore, can
sul ler in itself several objectifications in several texts [mehrere Objektivationen. in
mehrerert Texten, ansich erleiden kann]" (§6); on the other hand, such texts- epic, lyric,
tragic-are subject to a process of disintegration and suffering characteristic of the
I undamentally violent and violating movement of passage from music's melodic
indeterminacy into a particular textual objectification: "The word, the image seeks an
expression analogous to music and now suffers the violence of music as such [einender
Musik analogen Ausdruck and erleidetjetzt die Gewalt der Musik an sich]" (§6).
Unification takes place through the violating disintegration of each signifying medium's
integrity; each sulfers at the hands of the other as a representational image takes the place of
music's non-representability.
No necessary link between music and the will can be found, only a contingent,
though altogether necessary, movement in which opposites are linked in a violent and
disintegrating process of substitution. The "analogical" "metaphor" securing the
synthesizing passage between media is neither analogical, metaphorical, nor synthesizing
32
m any proper sense. The use of each of rhese terms remains unjustified from the
perspective of a philosophically grounded rhetoric, while the "primordial aesthetic
Phenomenon” produced through substitution remains, thanks to the process of
substitution, itself subreptitious. Contrary to all expectations, but on the basis of this
necessary contingency, music's Dionysian effect is interpreted as the cause of music rather
than its effect: Music, the effect of which causes things to vibrate and sets them in motion,
is interpreted as will, the ability to set something into motion. This non-Aristotelian mode
of transference cannot possibly be metaphonc. Rather, this mode of contingent
transference ,s metonymic. In metonymy
substitution of one name for
another takes place, but not on the basis of the theoretical abilities which enable the creation
ol totalizing metaphors. Substitution is achieved through the abstraction of an experiential
quality— suffering, a mood of unrest as the feeling of being moved by an invisible and
incomprehensible power-into an independent essence now said to be the cause of the
cl lect, thereby personifying the affective quality by giving it a will and a causal ability. The
spiritualization achieved through personification naturally brings things to life, namely,
gives them a will of their own. Nietzsche attributes just such an enlivening function to the
non-rhetorical and ongmary aesthetic phenomenon called "metaphor": "Fundamentally [Im
C,mnde\ the aesthetic phenomenon [Osthetische PMnomen
] is simple; one is a poet when
one has the capability to continually see a living play [lebendiges Spiel] and to live
constantly surrounded by crowds of spirits [Geistersclmren]" (§8). The "vicarious image"
floating before the poet's Apolliman eye is a "play." The "analogical" "metaphor" serving
as a "vicarious image" and taking the place of a concept is not only playful because it floats
without a ground to bring its contingent, unstructured movements to rest, nor simply
because the image appears to be "alive" and moving without any definite purpose. The
image ot "play" should represent— analogically, metaphorically, mimetically— music in the
medium of the Apollinian, just as it should represent, through a transference of properties,
a unification ol these antithetical media. But the unification takes place through a
substituting and supplementing "as"-structure which leads through the violent medium of
"analogical" dissociation, through, in other words, the medium of play itself, the play of
ungrounded, metonymic substitutions without any sufficient reason or necessity, a play,
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crc ore, ol signification carried out between signif ying media, a play, finally, that can
properly come to no end, for it finds no final ground to rest upon. No, without reason then
does Nietzsche compare such intetprctation- V>,,,,„,r _to soothsaying (§ 1 , §8) m
which the disclosure of the present is delayed by the veiy ac, of supplementing and
substituting until a future revelation. For such supplementing and substituting take and
hold the place of the other, hold i, open, suspending the disclosure of its content
indefinitely. When that other turns out to be the "archetype of man [Urbilddes Memchen]'
(§8)-",he true man” (§8)-,he significance of tragedy shows itself, for Ihe substituting
image— the "metaphorical" image of "play"-is the veiy ,mage-its primordial archetype,
Ur-bild— ol man's being.
The Dramatic Play
Aneicnt Greek tragedy, as drama, puts this "play" on stage in a play about play.
Just as the "primordial aesthetie phenomenon" is an image of the violent and disintegrating
process of substitution produced by the transformative medium of "analogical"
dissociation, so is the "primordial dramatic phenomenon" -tragedy's second formal
element-a performance of that process of "play" in which actors play the role presented
bclorc their eyes as the "primordial aesthetie phenomenon": "The process [Prozefi]" of the
tiagic chorus is the primordial dramatic phenomenon
\ dramatisehe Urphanomen]: To see
oncscll transformed before oneself and now to act as if one really had entered into another
body, into another character" (§8). Tragedy is a play about play, the play of disintegration
and transformation which performs the archetypieally human: Transformation and
disintegration, in time, and, linally, to death. While the "primordial image of man"— the
arche-typc ol "the true man"— is an image whose figure is typed out as "Willed
Nietzsche's presentation makes the contingency of this particular configuration of letters all
too evident. As a term signifying substitution and transformation, it too may be substituted
with other names just as easily referring to the traits inscribed in the word " Wille ": "Satyr,"
chorus, Dionysus, tragic hero," "Oedipus," "Prometheus." Each of these terms, each
substitutable lor the other, each signifying the playful process of signification in which
appearances are brought into the world, type out a spelling of the typically human's
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Characters. As characters-the "written traits of nature [Schnftenzuge derNatur\"
(§8)- they spell out the role to be played on stage and the chamcter to be performed In
each case, however playful the perfomrance, they tell the story of suffenng as a drama
ab°u, tHe human and the character, she process of interpret,vc inscription
essentially determ,ntng it. Betng human means suffenng from individuation, from the
feeltng of betng torn to pteces by a process of tndividuating tnscriptton which exceeds the
individual will. Thus does Dtonysus-the figure of the essenttally human and so the figure
I igurtng the playful process of inscription, disintegration, and transformation-appear on
stage wearing the mask of the trag.c hero, a mask beanng all the markings of Apollo the





plUraHty °f flgures ’ in the mask of
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h Were
’ ensnared m the net of the individual will Asthe appeanng god now speaks and acts, he resembles an erring, strivingsuffering individual: And that he appears as such with this epic
determination and distinctness
[.Deutlichkeit




Parabollc appearance [gleichnisartigen Erscheinung ] . In
th, however, that hero is the suffering Dionysus of the Mvstenes, thatgod experiencing in itself the suffering of individuation, of whom
wonderf ul myths tell how he, as a boy, had been torn to pieces by the
Ijtans and now in this state is worshiped as Zagreus. Thus it is indicated
that this dismemberment, the properly Dionysian suffering , is like a





er tbc state mdlvlduation as the source and pnmordial ground of
all suffenng, as something objectionable in itself. (§10)
The tragic hero, as the exemplification of the truly human, is the Apollmian
figuration not precisely of Dionysus but of Dionysus's suffering. Dionysus is an
Apollinianfigure, and is therefore nothing essential; it is the suffering which— against all
expectations— has substance/ And tragedy, as an art form, consists in nothing more than
the presentation of this the Dionysian state of suffering: "The essence of tragedy can only
be interpreted as a manifestation and visualizing of the Dionysian states" (§8), or, as
See the notes Nietzsche devoted to working out the relations between being,
becoming, time, suffering, pain, pleasure, sensation, consonance and dissonance in
Sdmtliche Werke, vol. VII, 197-209, 213-217. Among the many important sentences
contained there is the following: "Das Substantielle ist die Empfindung, das Scheinbare der
Leib, die Materie.
[
What is substantial is sensation; the body and matter are what is merely
apparent!illusory. ]" (203). Suffering is one such sensation, or one class of sensations.
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Nietzsche wntes elsewhere, as "the Ashman sensiblizmg
| Versinnlichung) of the
Dionystan knowledge and effects" (,14). When the tragte chorus figures its Dionysian
state, Dionysus does no, appear-as ,n Anstotehan ontology-as one of the many ways in
which the being of the human is schematized and analogically related to being; Dionysus
appears as a non-logical and non-schematic figure of the inscriptive process of appearing a
I tgure in other words, of being figured by the Apollin.an process of individual,on by ils
dissimulatory play-,he process of disintegration and transformation to which the chorus is
subjected under the Dionysian effects-and resulting fragmentation, disunity and
sul fering.» The appearance of Dionysus in ihe mask of the tragic hero, then, is the
appearance of the process of appearing, of being individuated, hence Dionysus as the god
figuring "in itsell the suffering of individuation." Dionysus is not a thing, only ihe
suffering which all ihings are. Tragedy, then, performs a play-the play of
"metaphor" -about play, aboul the appearance of the being of the human as an incessant
process of play in which the human being is always subjected to the process of figuration
and disfiguration, is thus presented as nothing in itself, indeed, is played out, to the end. to
its death.
Freedom and Commonality
When Nietzsche states, in quasi-programmatic fashion, the "knowledge" "won"
through his investigations into the primordial elements of Greek tragedy, he indicates that
the tragedy’s cathartic effect, like its form, is inhabited by a certain dualism. After a lengthy
quotation from Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation, vol. I, to which
Nietzsche is by no means entirely faithful, a summation of his research appears:
According to Schopenhauer's doctrine, we thus understand music as the
unmediated language [unmittelbar Sprache] of the will and feel our fantasy
stimulated to figure that invisible and yet so lively world of spirits
[Geisterwelt] which speaks to us, and to embody this world in an analogical
example [analogen Beispiel]. On the other hand, image and concept, under
the eflect ol a truly corresponding music, come to an higher significance
On this process of disintegration and its distance from Schopenhauer's metaphysics
ol the will, see Werner Hamacher, '"Disgregation of the Will': Nietzsche on the Individual
and Individuality," in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the
Self, ed. Thomas Heller, Morton Sosna, David Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University
1986), 106-139, esp. 114-115.
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5T kinds of effects onisrs^
the most significant cxaniDle Iw „„ mUSI,L '- lvc bml1 lo ,llt’ myth, that is,
tragic myth' Tote my* Shic^sSXhfn^' 1 “? preclscly ,hc
parables [Gleichmssel, likenesses], (516)
h D,onysian knowledge in
Tragedy's cathartic effect consists in not one, but two moments. The first of these effects is
agam understood to be caused- following the strange process of hermeneutic
understanding previously encountered-by an illogical and unreasonable substitution of thew"^ mUS' C: MUS'C appcars® wil1 ' A "d 'he "analogical example" that results from the
Apolhman I iguration of the Dionysian music's effects again represents not music as such
bu, a lantaslic image substituted for the ghostly echoings of an invisible spin, world. When
this spirit world is embodied and made flesh, the individual is born from out of the spirit of
music as the archetypal hero and primordial form of the will. So is the invisible once more
translated into the sphere of the visible by means of a deceptive substitution in which music
as the medium of hermeneutic undcrstanding-sccms to be merely a means for the
illumination of appearances, thus an instrument through which to view the essence of
nature. But music cannot possibly be will.
The first effect of D.onysian music on the Apollinian art faculty-thc creation of
music's "analogical" appearance-docs not lake place on the basis of a theoretical ability,
n°i 1S lhc lanlasy— the locus of the creative powers of the imagination and home of the
Apolhman art faculty-grounded in the transcendental consciousness of the creative
subject. The fantastic abilities of the imagination arc freed from every form of reasonable
ground as music suddenly makes an appearance. This magical moment, when spirits speak
and even appear, is a joyous experience of freedom. Not freedom of the will, not freedom
defined as subjective causality, but freedom from the order of the present and its fixed
limits, its arbitrary divisions, its fashions, along with the alienation, hostility, and
subjugation they effect. Work gives way to play in a feeling of freedom— the liberation
f rom every stable ground and from the delimiting borders of individuation which such
ground supports. At the conclusion of the first section of The Birth ofTragedy, Nict/.schc
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presents the process of music’s transformation into ,mages and with ,, an experience of
Ireedom so I undamental as to const, tute no, only mode of liberation
then commonality:
but, il not community.
t£ront*™ man andmore celebrates her festival of hostl e> or subjugatcd-once
as a meXTo^ hmhfr o g ',
ng
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Speaks from oul of hls gestures. JusUs the animalstal , and the earth gives milk and honey, so too does something







work of art 1)
drCamS '^ 18 n° m°re an artlSt
’ he has become a
No presentation could be more fantastic or scandalous to the scientific standards of modem
philology; no presentation could do greater justice to the fantastic process unleashed by the
elf ects of a force exceeding every representational and logical standard. It liberates not only
man, but nature and even slaves in a feeling of freedom whose sign is the sensation of
shuddering imparted by music's vibrations, vibrations mediating and tuning the listener to
an attunement in which the imagination is set into a motion freed from the mtentionality of
vv alking and speech acts, thus moving one to a figuration necessarily leading beyond the
grounds of any subjective substance and into a position indicative of the originary
processes constitutive ol man. 31 And so movement takes over: One dances and sings, one
participates not in a transcendental substance-what the "Ur-Einen" is not- but in an
For a discussion ol freedom in The Birth of Tragedy, see Christoph Menke, "Die
Tragodie und die Freigeister," in Nach der Postmodern
, ed. Andreas Steffens (Dusseldorf:
Bollman Verlag, 1992), 235-264; see also Barbara von Reibnitz, Ein Kommentar zu
Friedrich Nietzsche "Die Geburtder Tragodie aus dem Geiste der Musik" (Kap.1-12), 83,
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ordinary mood-what the "Ur-Einen" is: Suffering. This mood is tndicative of the process
d llbCra"n8 transcendence
. tttdicative, therefore, of betng blissfully taken apart as
Apolliman delimitations and oppostttonal host, lit.es breakdown. Tins origtnary process,
netther arb.trary nor fashtonable and thus freed from every norm, law, or order of the
present, is a necessary one, the neeesstty of a reconciling, participatory freedom without
ground. The reconcltatton effected by the transform,ng effect of Dionysian ar, ,s no, even
exhausted by the deconstitution of the socially const,tuted hierarchies which mclude the
domination not only of man over man but equally of man over nature; whole worlds
otherwise opposed to one anolher-the Apolliman world of fmitude and the Dionysian
world of the infinite— are reconciled.
Freedom leaves the order of the present behind along with all representations of the
natural. It results in neither the anarchy nor the barbansm of the slate of nature, nor is it a
result ol a naturally constituted political community. Neither anarchy, barbarism, or a polls
results from the union of the Apollinian and the Dionysian, but a free community of equals
participating, as Nietzsche describes the results, in "an orgiastic feeling of freedom"
(§21). II that lreedom is first of all simply a poetic freedom, it is equally the basis for a
1 undamental experience of freedom in which one is subject to a process of transformation
treed from any mimetic relation to a natural or empirical ground. But it was Schiller, not
Nietzsche, who first brought this fact to light in his writings on the function of the chorus
in tragedy. In the preface to the Bride ofMessina,
Schiller battles with the common concept of the natural, against the illusion
usually demanded of dramatic poetry. Although the day itself on the
theatrical stage is an artificial one [ein kiinstlicher], the architecture only a
The freedom of which Nietzsche speaks here should not be confused with a
generalized, barbaric license. In the seventh section of The Birth ofTragedy he contrasts
the "Dionysian Greeks"— those that went to the theater— with the "Dionysian
Barbarians" those who practiced an unsublimated and terrifying form of freedom.
Nietzsche s concept ol Dionysian "freedom," which is derived from Schiller, stands in
sharp contrast to the bizarre conclusion reached by Silk and Stem in Nietzsche on Tragedy.
They claim, on the linal page ol their study (380), that Nietzsche's valorization of the
Dionysian really points to a scene from Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain: "two gray
women, hall naked, with matted hair.. .were tearing a little child to pieces, tearing it with
their hands in savage silence.. .and devouring the pieces." Nothing in Nietzsche's book
approaches cannibalism, and his emphasis on pathos-free moderation makes his position
on such matters unambiguous. Silk and Stern's conclusion is, needless to say, indicative of
a fatal misreading of Nietzsche's work, this last one merely the most ludicrous.
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openly S^ war isK- y nu nuncMiy ucuarcd against every naturalism! (§7)
Nietzsche's investigation into the birth of tragedy departs from natura. expiations and
wages a war not only against artistic naturalism but against every form of naturalism,
particularly those of the pre-political state of nature and the naturalness of political
existence. When Nietzsche goes on to write, "this is the first effect of the Dionysian
tragedy: IThe state and society, the chasm between humans as such, gives way to an
overpowering feeling of unity which leads back to the heart of nature" (§7), then the
paradoxical logic at work here is evident, for there is no natural path back to nature. Rather
than naturalism, the Greeks presented the chorus on stage as a "fictitious slate ofnature
[ftngierten Naturzuslandes]" with the chorus playing the roll of the "fictitious essence of
nature [fingierte Naturwesen]" (§7). This honest presentation- V/W/c/t," as Nietzsche
emphasizes- not only rejects naturalism; it so thoroughly unites the mendacious fictionally
of art with the truthfulness of nature- "the first effect of the Dionysian tragedy... leads
back to the heart of nature" -that the two become indissociabic: Each term depends on the
other, neither is purely itself, making "nature" a concept which is always already inscribed
by its opposite, art. Such a de-naturalization of the natural de-naturalizes the traditional
locations of freedom and community in cither a fictitious state of natural innocence or in the
political domination of a supposed state of nature. Since the site of the overcoming of this
opposition is the translormative effect of the Dionysian upon the Apollinian individual, and
since this process is tragedy's only subject matter, tragedy becomes the privileged location
ol an originary freedom and an originary commonality which temporarily suspends social
and political hierarchies, delimits their sphere of validity, and opens up another space— the
space of the other.
Shine
The lirst moment of the tragic effect is an illogical, unreasonable, and free




nCCa" n8 lhC figUre 01 lhC tra®ic Dionysus. The second moment of lhe
frag,c effect allows the "analogical example” created by the first effect ,0 shtne its
t
S‘ Si8nlfiCanCe'" WHClhCr “ *e tragic chorus, stngtng or the music
of a Wagner,an mustc-drama, mustc seems to lend itself to a greater comprehension of the
Apollintan action on the shtge: "As if the Dionysian really ,s in the servtce of the Apof.iman
and capable ol mcreastng ,ts effects, yes, as if music were even essentially the ar, of
present, ng [Darstellungskunst] for an Apollinian content” (§21). This duplicitous "as if"
Structure enables "the parabolic ,mage to step forth in the highest significance « and so
tncrease theeffectivityof the Apollintan image.- Under the tnfluence of the D.onys.an, the
trag,c listener's "mood [StimmungY is elevated by the dithyrambic chorus to such a degree
that when the tragic hero appears on stage the spectator sees not an actor, bu, a "trembling
.mage of the god" -Dionysus-which is "translated [abertrugV that is, analogically
transl erred, onto the masked actor (§8). Not an actor, ,n fact, not even a "god," but
"ghostly unreality
[geisterhafte VnwirklichkeitV (§8) appears- born of the Apolln
dream state-from out of the spirit and ghost, the Geisl, of music. No image, of course,
could possibly be more significant. A second moment, however, completes the Dionysian
cllcct upon the Apollinian, and with this moment the highest goal of art is achieved. At the
summit ol all ol art the tragic effect is realized and the spectral shine of the mythic
Apollinian "significance”-its "ghostly unreality”- presents itself:
A 1 the most essential point of all that Apollinian deception is broken throughand negated. The drama which, with the help of music, spreads itself out
bclorc us with such inwardly illuminated clarity [Deutlichkeit] in all of its
movements and figures, as if we saw the texture [Gewebe] arising on the
loom as the shuttle Hies up and down, reaches as a whole an effect lying
beyond all Apollinian artistic effects. In the total effect of tragedy the
Dionysian once more predominates; tragedy ends with a sound which could
never ring lorth [tdnen] from the realm of Apollinian art. And thus the
Apollinian deception proves to be that which it is— the continuous veiling
during the duration ol the tragedy of the properly Dionysian effect; but the
lattci is so powcrl ul that in the end it forces the Apollinian drama itself into
a sphcic where it begins to speak with Dionysian wisdom and even denies
itself and its Apollinian visibility [,Sichtbarkeit]. Thus the difficult relation of
the Apollinian and the Dionysian in tragedy would really be symboli/cd
through the fraternal union ol both deities: Dionysus speaks the language of
a
mian
Jean Luc Nancy has demonstrated how the "as if' structure is an inverted form of
ontological realism. Sec "Dies Irac," in Jean-Francois Lyotard (cd.). La Faculte'deJuger
(Pans: Minuit, 1985), 14. Nietzsche's text is as long commentary upon its structure.
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Apollo; Apollo, however, finally speaks the lammaee of^teby thC hlghest g°al of tra^cdy *"d of an as such is
As an artform tragedy reaches its "highest goal" when the process of metaphorical
transference and translation completes itself by breaking apan into a disunity indicative of a
lack of similarity, a lack of proportionality, and a lack of resemblance between the two
dist.net media, a lack which until now appeared as a plenitude of clarity, visibility, and
adequation. Not the smooth passage in accordance with the consonant dictates of analogy’s
logical foundation but a distinctly non-Apol liman dissonance is heard as the unity
constitutive ol the Apollinian drama is suspended, concluding the process of appealing
with the disappearance of the visible. Such fragmentation, decisively characterized by
Nietzsche as Selbstentzweiung (§22) -"bifurcation" as the auto-dissociation and auto-







from one medium to the othe-
rs made by means of an analogical metaphor. "As a whole," tragedy, the tragic effect, and
the "difficult relation" between the media which produce this effect- the Urproblem- arc
all I mally realized only when the deceptive veil of the Apollinian is finally negated by
concluding the process of appearing with the appearance of the process of appearing itself.
However, no higher positivity is revealed-a vain attempt to puncture the veil and effect an
apocalyptic appearance of Dionysus as the Ding an sich or the primordial Will— rather the
Apollinian veil is disclosed as veil: "The brightest distinctness [hellste Deutlichkeit] of the
image did not suffice us: For this appealed just as much to reveal Something as to veil it
[Eltwas zu offenbaren als zu verhullen]" (§24). The Apollinian "visibility" -SichtbarM/-
and distinctness" Deutlich/ce/7— which allow the Dionysian to appear through the
process of Versinnlichung (sensiblizing), is not the "visibility" of something: No particular
thing is visible and distinct. Instead, the possibility of visibility itself appears as the
thingliness of things, the shining Schein of their appearing as the possibility not so much
of appearances as apparitions.
14 No illusion can remain about the reality or naturalness of
On the concept of "shine" in Nietzsche's philosophy, see Robert Rethy , " Schein in
Nietzsche's Philosophy," in Nietzsche and Modern German Thought
, ed. Keith Anscll-
Pearson (London: Routledge, 1991), 59-87.
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t e ghostly unreal,ty" of the ''movements and figures" of Dionysus. The figures of the
1Vme mhabl1 a PeCU"ar SpaC° °f ' rrcal^' Nei‘»er of this world or another, embodied but
not exactly a body, the figures of this space five in the clouds, atop Mt. Olympus. Not only
does the arch, tec,ure of the dramattc scene Greek tragedy appear the font, of a
'
"luminous image of clouds [leuchtendes WolkenbiUfl" m which the indist.net, cloudy
'mag6 °f D,onysus aPPears- bal oven the figure of Apollo appears-i„ the penultimate
paragraph of Nietzsche’s text- "veiled in a cloud [in einen Wollc gehulUy (§25), its sunny
ladiance reduced to a shadowy indistinctness.
The tragic loss of presence effected by the fundamental heterogeneity of tragedy's
lormal elements also defines its content: The tragic. This phenomenon has always been
known as catharsis, and Nietzsche defines it as the essentially tragic- "the primordial
phenomenon of the tragic [das UrpMnomendes Tragischen 1" (§22)- making it, as
Aristotle does, the very essence of die tragic effect. But Nietzsche, unlike Aristotle, does
not understand the telos of tragedy's cathartic effect as a pleasurable purification of the
Pam* ul emoti°ns of pity and terror- referred to by Nietzsche as a "pathological-moral
process" (§22)-a purification which ought to habituate the citizens of the polis in the
correct emotional responses required by the state. 35 Rather than subordinating tragedy to the
ends of politics, Nietzsche insists that tragedy's cathartic effect acts as a suspension of
those dictates, in the process delimiting the validity of the Apollinian world of politics by
holding it open. As the precise analog to the "stellvertretendes Bild" of the "primordial
aesthetic phenomenon," the tragic effect is a "stellvertretendes Wirkung ," a "place-holding
effect" (§22). Tragedy's place-holding, supplementing effect— for art is a "supplement
[Supplement]" (§24) to nature-is an addition which, by taking away, paradoxically adds
something: The thought ol the other. A supplement to the supplementary image of the
Apollinian, the second moment of the tragic effect negates the "stellvertretendes Bild:'
ellecting a breakdown in the passage from the unrepresentable to its "metaphorical"
supplement, thereby disclosing the supplement as supplement— as the not-natural, the
See Poetics, 49b25-28; Politics, VIII, 5. 1339b42-1340a27 and 7. 1341b32-
1342al8. Nietzsche does not wholly reject the Aristotelian concern with pity and terror, but
he coniines them to the sphere ol the Apollinian elements of tragedy. So delimited, they are
irrelevant to and negated by tragedy's specifically Dionysian clement and Dionysian effects
with which it concludes.
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unrealistic, and the ant,-m ,me„c. The metaphor, the vicarious image allowing Dionysus to
appear ,n the Apo,liman figure of the hero, finally speaks agains, itself, denies itself and
disfigures itself, thus holding the place of the other-,he nalural, the real, the true-open
suspending its representation and with it Apollmian dictates of total politicization. The limit
to the Apoll,man- "that delicate line...that measured limitation"-is inscribed ,n the formal
structure of tragedy as its content, the tragic, and as tha, limit makes itself known, presence
IS lost. The tragic myth leads the world of appearances to its limits [an die Grenze] where
it denies itself" (§22).
Operatic Work
The Socratic founding of theoretical philosophy, with its disregard for theory's
Mmits and concomitant inauguration of metaphysics, also laid the basis for a political form
const. tutively incapable of comprehending the tragic limits of its own enterprise. In
modernity the same form of politics appears as an analogous manifestation of the Roman
imPerium Wllh lts barbarous form of nationalism. But precisely because this political fonn
rests on an aesthetic illusion- the beautiful illusion of Apolliman measure- its aesthetic
forms are also politicized. Nietzsche discovers the exemplary form of politicized aesthetics
and aestheticized politics in modernity's first unique art form-opera. But he had already
discovered its characteristic alterations of tragedy and their consequences for the tragic
eilect in the "tragedies" ol Euripides. While the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles de-
instrumentalize music by liberating it from the ends of the drama, a liberation which
suspends the action and its epic tension during the "pathos" of the "great rhetorical-lyrical
scenes (§ 1— ), Euripides dramas eilect a ' revolution in public language [Umschwung der
offentlichen Sprache]" (§11) which subjects language's Bights into music to the everyday
criterion ol instrumental communication with its canon of immediate comprehensibility. In
short, tragedy's art is theorized and its effect Intel lectuali zed. "Cool, paradoxical thoughts "
replace the Apollinian intuition ol appearances as appearances, Dionysian ecstasy gives
way to "liery affects ," and the tragic effect is transformed from an affirmation of the loss of
presence and suspension of the present into a "stimulating uncertainty" as the intellect
desires "to know what is to happen now and afterward" (§12). Euripides' rationalist
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me, od creates a des.re to know, confuses ar, with discursive communicator, and fails to
suspend the meehamcal flow of lime between “now and afterward." When the results turn
<>u, to be "thoughts" and ‘affects’ which are "imitated as reahstically as possible" (§12)
the con, us,on between ar, and nature, between the art, lie,al and the historically given
occurs, I he ground is set now for the confusion of poltties-of the nature of its
pailicipunts and the nature of the si iir U ,;tu cm lJte with art-a means ol representation which is just
that: Art, arliliec, and artificial.
In the New Attic Duhyramband m modern opera, Eurip.des' "linguistic revolution"
[
m IS "°l °nly Sli " effect
- lhc consequences are even more pronounced. Euripides'
"revolution
| UmschwungY turns the music of hts predecessors' "great rhetorical-lyrical
scenes" into an instrument for reprcsent.ng the everyday and the "natural," effectively
presenting the historically specific as the universal, in the process enslaving his audience to
the particular form of the real and the natural with which they arc presented. Just as
Euripides sets out to secure his "political hopes" (§11) through innovations appealing to the
popular desire I or immediate comprehensibility, so arc the effects of the New Attic
Dithyramb and modern opera inescapably linked to politics. And just as Eur.p.dcs
instrumcntalizcs music and makes it a means for presenting a strictly Apollmian drama-a
poeticized epic- so too is the relation between music and image, between the Dionysian
and the Apollmian, fundamentally reconfigured by the New Attic Duhyramband modern
opera. 1 he alteration necessarily effects the basic structure of tragedy which Nietzsche had
so painstakingly analyzed. Rather than music being translated into an image only for that
image to be destroyed in the end as its inadequacy to music is presented, music is now
i educed to a means lor presenting images. With the reversal of the analogy music appears
as image, as a tone painting, a mere copy of appearances— as a battle or a stormy sea. The
process ol mimetic duplication "bridging" the inherent untranslatability of music and image
now altered, the tragic effect is no longer liberating. In accordance with the reversal of the
analogy, the reformulation of the mode of mimesis, and the repairing of the unbridgeable
disjunction picviously inhabiting them, the liberating cllcct of music, of tragedy, and of the
music-drama is itself reversed and enslavement to the given results:
In this New Dithyramb, music is, in an outrageous manner, made into an
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our understanding ism he sahslied bv^hekn T'?''T
V
ds of music - 11
SSSses^^^sss?
Contrary to the mood of moderation effected by Aeschylian and Sophoelean tragedy the
particular attuncmcnt effected by the New Attic Dithyramb is neither creative nor receptive
Music is reduced to miming appearances. No transcendence of the given takes plaee, no
activity occurs, only the incapacitating confusion of Apollmian shine with truth and
universality, the prcctse opposite of the liberatory mood of the tragic effect. The fantasy
blankly registers the given, duplicates the natural, and repeats the past. It even denies its
repetitive instantiation of an arbitrary configuration of cloudy appcranccs and asserts itself
as a positivistic "understanding" and "knowledge." The "understanding" achieved thanks
to the "analogical" correlation of music to mere appearances holds the fantasy under arrest:
"Our lanlasy is arrested \Phanlasie...feslgehaUen mrd\ by these |analogical|
superficialities" (§17). Music, finally, is "reduced to being a slave to appearances \znr
Sklavin der Erscheinungen |
" (§17). So enslaved, the illusion becomes total.
It is, however, with the birth of modernity and particularly its unique aesthetic form
that Nietzsche I inds the effects of tragedy's decline most evident. With the birth of opera in
the 1600s in Italy, a development taking place under the influence of the revived interest in
(neck culture and Greek tragedy, the advocates of the new genre— their work asserting
ilsell as an authentic recreation and renaissance of ancient tragedy— transformed,
radicalized, and formalized the principles already at work in Euripides and the New Attic
Dithyramb. In the process they rejected the principles of church music and its great
cxcmplui the "incllably sublime and sacred [unaussprechbar erfui.betie und'heilige]"
music ol Palestrina (§ 19). In sharp contrast to the "unspeakably" sublime character of
Palestrina's Dionysian harmonics— his music's " un aus sprech bar" character— the
advocates of opera demanded that music be, above all, speakable, "sprech
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** COmprehensiblc
- communicative, servile. To this end new means of musical
express,on were fotmulated. The resulting principles-,he recitative and the sMo77“- di~ communication which speech should
al ord. For opera, contrary to the play a, the center of tragedy, is work-dmmattc work
The opus of opera ,s the work of narration laboring to commumcate itself. Its means are the
p ct pie lorms ol narrative. The recitative and the stilo rappresentativo. The recitative
recites, repeating aloud what has been memorized, intending it to be understood Not the
sublime, bu, the stay „ne of the drama-its epic mytkos-ts communicated, and „ is no,
sung, but declaimed, using every available rhetorical means to excite an effect. Its
style— the stilo rappresentativo— is, then, representational, rappresentativo.* These
pnnciples of narration-an impure and contradictory mixture of epic and lyric modes of
delivery—are a form of a protest against the church. In contrast to the church's polyphonic
and non-communicative music, the principles of opera must be seen as an attempt to enable
the communication of an image of man. Not just any image of the human will do; the
originary image of the human is to be put on stage and narrated. Its logos is to be
understood. The formal pnnciples of opera should make such representation possible, and
these same principles should insure that the originary and good nature of man's speech is
heard— clearly and distinctly. However little such representational style has to do with the
tragic cttect— the very breakdown of communication in the expression of the
incommunicable- such inadequacies are not perceived by the advocates of opera, for opera
is an art form whose origin lies not in ancient Greece, but in the fulfillment of an extra-
aesthetic, indeed, political end specific to modernity:
Bui this was not the opinion of the inventors of the recitative : They
themselves believed, and with them their age, that the secret of antique
music had been solved with the stilo rappresentativo, from out of which
alone the monstrous effect of an Orpheus, an Amphion, and even of Greek
tragedy is explained. The new style was accepted as the reawakening of the
most effective music [wirkungsvollsten Musik\, of ancient Greek music:
Indeed, in accordance with the universal and popular conception of the
Homeric world as the primordial world [Urwelt], one could abandon
oneself to the dream ol having descended once more into the paradisiacal
beginnings of humanity
, where music necessarily also must have had that
On stile rappresentativo, see Theodor Adorno's brief but suggestive remark on its
relationship to music, language, and intentionality in Quasi una Fantasia, trans. Rodney
Livingstone (Verso: New York, 1994), 3.
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thc
development of this rcillv r> . m'T ^
Clt uc scc ' nl° llte innermost
for itself an art but I s oL a ?'
pi,wcrful nccd forcibly gains
,^_e fatth ,hc ^ ““
feelings, immediately singlTth^ lhc
Opera presents the "l ull vo.ee" of an original, primordial, and prehistoric humanity.
And yet, oddly, it is the art form most proper to modernity; indeed, it has only existed in
modernity. But w.th the rediscovery of thc primordial logos of the primordial man at the
primordial and prehistoric origin of humanity what appears on thc operatic stage is not a
I ull, idyllic and idle voice, but a laborious process of narration in which music's
purity— "music necessarily also must have had that unsurpassed pur.ly"-is subjected to
technical procedures which not only put it to work in the service of historical narration, but
which lead it directly back to an authoritative text whose authority rests on a profound
confusion: In thc stilo rappresentativo "thc music is regarded as thc servant, the text thc
master, where music is compared w.th the body, thc text with the soul" (§19). Rather than
the ghostly appearance of a hero from out of the spirit of music, an appearance which
leaves the illusion ol presence behind, the enslavement of music to thc quite visible and
substantial materiality ol the written text reinforces thc authority of thc visible word. Since
the stilo rappresentativo is a style of representing appearances, nothing else is left to music
but, as a slave to appearances [Sklavin der Erscheinungen\, to imitate thc formal essence
ol appcaianccs and in thc play ol lines and proportions rouse an external delight" (§19).
I h' s "most effective music," then, is slavish and effects slavery: It serves thc ends of
humanity by abandoning one to thc "dream" ol thc primordial origin of thc good logos with
its "I ull voice," making its effect, in sharp contrast to the tragic effect, pacific: Art is here
"an empty and distracting trend in amusement" (§ 19).
Opera has as its ends the fulfillment of extra-aesthetic— "unasthetischer"— needs.
However, "good" these ends may be, they remain external to and distinct from thc ends ol
ar mdeed, they have .her origin in a "half-moral sphere [einerhalbmoralised SphareY
Cann°' POS ' t,Vdy rCpresent thc be'"g °f humanity; rather, i, fabneates ,, Art
cannot represent an original past and an ongtnal place: Its time and space are the present its
representattons sheerarttf.ee. Representations of an ongtnal human, ty, ,n an ongtnal place
at the paradtstacal ong.n of the world inevitably/uM/y-a* ,s artifice and artifical-and
when tts arttstry is dented, mendacious. Opera is one such art fomt. Its mendacity lies in ,ts
constitutive instrumentalism: Opera, and particularly its mustcal element, serves the end of
extra-aesthette needs. Art no longer an end In itself, it becomes a means to the
representational ends of an extra-aesthetic need. Not only are these ends said to be "half
ethical— the "good" in humanity is the ethical issue-they am also highly politicized. Art
serves the ends of opposing religious authority by asserting- putting on stage-thc image




r °f l"d| fference to us that the humanists of the time combatedthc old ecclesiastical representation of man as corrupt and lost with thisnewly created picture [Bild\ of the paradisiacal artist: So that opera is to beunderstood as the opposition dogma of the good man, with which at ihc“ lmc' a mea
!
ls of consolation was found against that pessimismwhich owing to the frightful uncertainties of all circumstances, mo™
y allraclcd precisely the most serious minded of that time. It sufficesus to have recognized how the proper magic and therewith the genesis of
his new ar lorm lies in the satisfaction of an entirely unaeslhetic need inhe optimistic glorification of the human in itself [<les Menschen mi sick1 inhe conception of thc primordial human
[Urmensch] as the human which isgood and artistic by nature: A principle of the opera that has gradually
changed into a threatening and upsetting demand which, in the face of the
socialist movements of the present, we cannot ignore any longer. The
good primordial human [Der gate Urmensch]" wants his rights \RechteV
What paradisiacal prospects! (§19)
To the church's enthusiastic assertion of one particular representation of man, humanism
opposes another image of the human being: More precisely, an image of the being of the
human, the Menschen an sich." Thus do the operatic humanists give up the medium of
scholastic argumentation— the concept giving representations their significance-and settle
on the artistic image, the Bild. The alteration of the medium of knowledge reflects the
piesent age's misunderstanding of presence. As the scholastics' towering intellectual
edifices begin to crumble and with them their attempts to prove god's existence, "frightful





Und arUSlry in‘° 'hC ” 0l' lHC hl""™ bc"'^ a ** most easily
achieved by the rcattily avatlablc means of an. A new p,elute was drawn up. a drama!,e lex,
vvr, en and staged, and the oppost.ton suddenly had something to stand upon: A reborn
human betng itseif" good and artistic, freely creattng its good future. It ought not he
suipnsing when thts luture turns out to be "socialist- kind, for the very principle from
Whtch opera originates- "the satisfaction of an ent.rely unaestheftc need ,n the opt, m,Stic
glortftcatton ol the human in itself"-, s found a, the center of the sexual,s, project only
be sat, si ted by the very same means: Like the opus of opera, social,sm also puls itself to
work, indeed, perhaps nothing is more valued by "the socialist movements of the present,"
Nietzsche writes, than the "dignity of work" (§18). In opera, no less than in socialist
doctrine, work is the means for realizmg-on stage and in society- the same end: "The
human ,n ilscll." But just that is utterly inaccessible. Socialism's ontological and
epistemological (oundations rest on a confusion of media resulting in a confused form of
cognition. Oppositional movements are forced to turn to artistic media and them art, lice
when the conceptual media of cognition turn out to be lacking or insufficient. In this way,
politics turn into aesthetics and aesthetics into politics. In both cases- the aesthetics of
opera and the politics of socialism- the instrument of opposition and the means to the
future's "paradisiacal prospects" ,s the same: The work and labor of self-narration and sclf-
dramatization ,n which the good appears to realize itself finally and fully with the
mechanical regularity ol the Euripidcan "deus ex machina" (§12, §14, §18). While the
industrialization of culture at work here- by means of a repeatable mechanics, divine
intervention is effected-insures a happy telos to the end of history's drama, and while this
same end reproduces itsell with a peculiarly mechanical regularity, the only thing
established by such repetitions is the ritualistic and ineffectual character of its doctrinal
"dogma." Indeed, the opposition's tendency to repetition of its "dogma" is already
inscribed within the structure of its doctrine: Its artifice arose out of an ontological need and
gave rise to an oppositional politics which asserted its adequation to the real: It was right.
Since this rightness rests on an epistemological foundation no more stable than the ability
to doubt god's authority, art must provide the ground for the missing foundation. If the





f°m: THC «** *^e. harmonious, an, f„U of prcscncc
° alrCUdy CX,Sl Withl" thC hUm™ -d require only hard work for Us future
'
rc\c alion through hard work. Here, as always, being nght and having righls (,Rechte
)
mean only one thing: Being beautiful, being able to ereate a whole, harmonious good
artwork, and, ,n the end, being one. Opera and its naturalist, ereaturely aesthetic set the
pixxxss in motion; socialism and socialist realism finished it.
But the dignity of humanism and socialist humanism cannot be confined to one
lorn, ol representation, for the principle itself-dramatic self-narration-can be readily
employed as a means to very different ends. Indeed, ,1 socialism represents the
I undamcnlal possibility of a reunion of the species through collective labor, the other basic
possibility is found in the division of the species into individualized unites with self-
generating narrative. The two structural narraltve possibiltties of epic my,has-on the one
hand, that of collective society, on the other, that of the collected, liberal individual-are
united, however, by the same rhythmic chant: Rights dignify. And ,n both cases the
recitative ol these two political movements' manlra-distinctly anti-Dionysian in its
ritualized rhythms and consonant harmonies-concludes to identical effect: Rather than the
tragic loss of prcscncc, the glowing and seductive beauty of the word "right," spoken with
a "lull voice," ellccts the same restful passivity with which one abandons oneself "to the
dream ol having descended once more into the paradisiacal beginnings of humanity." Such
origins, no longer overtly theological, refer not to a lost past, but to an inner prcscncc
which insures dignity. In modernity the "beautifully seductive and calming words of the
'dignity of the human' and the dignity of work"' (§ 18) arise as a means of consolation.
However "beautiful” their slogans may be, both liberalism— the "dignity of the
human"— and socialism-’lhe dignity of work" -remain aconluscd aestheticization of the
political which ends by calming everyone down.
"The Law of Eternal Justice"
Everything in The Birth ofTragedy moves toward the middle. Nowhere is this
more evident than when Nietzsche characterizes the most basic relation of all— "the
primordial relationship between the thing in itself and appearance": "Just as tragedy, with
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ltS metaph^'cal cons°lation [Troste]
, points towards the eternal life of this kerne, of
extstence through the conttnuous founder,ng of appearances, so does the symbolism of the
satyr chorus already speak of this pnmordta, relattonshtp between the thing in itself and
appearance [Urverhahnis zmschen Ding an sich and ErscheinungV (§8)." The emphasis
ought not be placed on "the thing itself or "appearance," for neither, as Nietzsche
emphasizes, is primordial. Rather, the "relationship between" them is originate. And if this
.s so, it is because the "thing in itself" ,s no, a, all "in itself,- le, alone a "thing - The
Birth ofTragedy the thing in itself" has a name- Dionysus- "the god which experiences
the suffering of individuation in itself” [die Uiden der Individualion an sich erfahrende
°o" <§ 10> ' AgainSt a" “Potions, the "thing in itself” is outside of itself, insenbed by
and suffering from indivtduatton. Rather than being a source of causality like
Schopenhauer's "thing in itself"— the substantial Will-Nietzsche's "thing in itself" is
thoroughly passive suffering. Nor then, can it be thought substantial for, subjected as it ,s
to suffering, it is, as myth has it, "torn to pieces by the Titans" (§10). Dismembered by
individuation rather than its source, overcoming this state of suffering is only possible by
entering into the space "between” them. From out of that space individuation arises, and
with it the sufferings of Dionysus. Passing through the medium between them, on the
other hand, suspends the individuated subject and with it the sufferings of Dionysus. And
the experience of the medium is itself the achievement of justice:
In so far as the subject is an artist, it is already released from its individual




cr Kaufmann badly mistranslates this sentence when he makes "bei dem
lortwahrenden Untergange der Erscheinungen" say "which abides through the perpetual
destrucUon of appearances." Nietzsche writes the opposite: "abiding" appears nowhere in
he text. One cannot go on, as Kautmann does, to then claim that "Here Nietzsche returns
to Schopenhauer s perspective," tor, as will become clear, Nietzsche's statement is a
rejection of Schopenhauer's hyposticization of an eternal will (see The Birth of Tragedyand The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Vintage, 1967], 62, note
#2).
The same must be said of Nietzsche's "metaphysics," for it is thoroughly
contaminated by its figurative opposite: "metaphor." First of all, Nietzsche's "metaphysics"
is not even demonstrated: it is an "Annahme ," an "assumption," neither deduced nor
demonstrated, its value consisting in its descriptive, not demonstrative, character. For a
thorough interpretation of this problem, see Michel Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics,
trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York, 1996); see also Lutz
Ellrich, "Rhetonk und Metaphysik," in Nietzsche-Studien, no. 23 (1994), 241-272.
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In .so lar as the subject is an arus.-and everyone who attends a tragedy is an artist-.he
dluston ol the "individual is overcome, and an experience of the medium between the
"indmdual" and the "one truly being subject" results. While the bas.c political and artistic
lorms of modernity rest on an amphibole whtch transposes elements of the Apollmian into
the regton of the D.onystan in order to make the essence of the human being appear,
tragedy discloses the appearance of the mdtvtdual to be inessential and derivative. And if
the individual is granted dignity and rights by modem political movements on the basis of a
Socratic theoria which attributes and, lifeless, and enslaving "conceptual hallucinations
I Begrijfs-Halluzinationen
I " to its essence, then tragedy grants dignity to the subject by
elevating it over such hallucinations: "Dignity can only be spoken of there where the
individual completely transcends itself [vMg iibersich hinaus geht]."x The dignity
achieved under the confused gaze of theoria, on the other hand, is neither right nor
dignified. Rather, it rellects a confusion: Schein has not been clarified as shine. The effect
ol this subreptitious confusion-in contrast to the tragic effect- is the barbarism of the
Doric state, of Roman nationalism, and, to be sure, of certain developments which would
take place in the "German" state long after Nietzsche’s death.
The first moment of justice— the trail of the "aesthetic phenomenon," of
shine-performs the process of critical clarification. Its effect lowers the human: Dignity is
not located in the conceptual cloak veiling the deceptive character of shine which seems to
insure the human being’s significance. The exposure of the veil with the lifting of the
cloak— the tragic hero's attempt to become "the one essence of the world" ends up only in
"Dcr griechische Staat," 765.
53
sulfenng (§9)-effects a feelmg of hum,Hat,on (Erniedrigung). Anyth, „g else ends up
seduced by , Hus,on. The cathartic purification of illusion-seeing shine as sh, no -del, nuts
the validity ol the sphere of Apollmian appearances, sharply distinguishing it from any
possible "in itself." In the process, ,t destroys the beautiful ",mages" mechanically
produced by opera's work of self-natraUon. Bu, in the second moment of just, Heat,on the
human being ends up in Erhdhung, an exalted state of elevation. With the overcoming of
the illusion of the individual's substantial, ty, the subject is elevated above ,t. In so far as
"we" appear ,n the world, "we" are ne.ther the "proper creators" of that appearance, nor arc
its ends "for us." While Eurip.dcan drama and modem opera return to the origin and
tnstrumentahze music in order to transparently communicate the essence of that appearance,
the process ol aesthetic justification is concerned exclusively with the medium between
ongm and end. Neither or, gin nor end, those who experiencing the tragic become a pure
means, their origin inaccessible and their end not simply withdrawn, but suspended and
Icl l open-ended. As instrumentalism and projects of self-narration -the good purposes of
"betterment or education" "for us" -are suspended, the illusion of immediacy gives way to
a medial experience: "The tragic myth leads the world of appearances to its limits [an die
Greuze] where it denies itself" (§22).
However horrifying this process may be, the catharsis it effects- the very
presentation and experience ofjustice— shows no traces of resignation. In the first moment
ot justice the hero is subjected to a suffering which figures death, presenting the hubris of
the indi\ idual will and a radical lorm of humiliation. In the second moment, however, a
strange, cathartic pleasure arises and a command prescribes a mode of action. This
moment Apollo finally speaks the language ol Dionysus, whereby the highest goal of
tragedy and of art as such is reached"— gives an imperative which results when the "law of
eternal justice" (§25) speaks:
The metaphysical joy in the tragic is a translation of the instinctive,
unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: The hero, the
highest appearance ol the will, is negated for our pleasure, because he is
only appearance, and the eternal life of the will is not touched by his
annihilation. "We believe in eternal life," cries tragedy; while music is the
immediate idea of this life. Plastic art has an entirely different aim: Here
Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual through the radiant







’ climinatcd bes from
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The categorical imperative concluding the tragic effect commands justice. This Stinrne
(voice), unlike the "full voice" of opera, bangs tragedy to a close by nether reveal,ng a
being nor disclosing a presence. The result, then, breaks open the present order,
suspending the illusion of totality, and this, Nietzsche insists, is just. For what it opens up
Other
[Anderes ] (§23) and "another world [anderenWelt]" (§17). Opening up to
the other, to a reborn Dionysus who has not yet arrived, to the possibility that there is
something more beyond the present order-each of these possibilities brings one into
accordance with the law, not simply the Apolliman law, but the law of the law, the
measureless law ofjustice which delimits the Apollinian sphere of the individual lest it
become unjust and "petrify into an Egyptian rigidity and coldness" (§9)3 Again and again
Nietzsche's text turns upon this moment, variously describing it as "negation."
"annihilation," "foundering," "breaking-up," "bifurcation," "disharmony," and
dissonance.” In every case it signals tragic catharsis with its "place-holding effect
[stellvertretendes WirkmgY (§22), and each time it "redeems us from the greedy impulse
alter this existence, and with an admonishing hand reminds us of another being [ein
anderes Sein] " (§21).
The purifying imperative of justice is the voice which finally effects the mood
specific to the tragic effect and a tragic culture. Tragedy's cathartic effect limits the world of
phenomenality, opening up, rather than reinforcing, the world of appearances, for they are,
only Schein, only a veil, only a myth. The limit to illusion— "lest it effect us
pathologically, failing which the shine would deceive us as crude reality"— moderates the
extremes, delimiting them by indicating what is extreme, what oversteps, thus, what is
fatal and brings about the hero's downfall. And that effect also has an effect on the drive to
On the relationship between "justice" and the Apollinian, see Dennis King Keenen,
"Moving in the Margin of Justice: Nietzsche's Reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound,"
in The Fate of the New Nietzsche , ed. Keith A nsell-Pearson and Howard Caygill





politics. Nietzsche contends that Greece-seen as the analog to post-war
"Gernrany "- provtdes the very mode, of a moderation legated between the extremes. Even
a er the bloody war w„h Persta, indeed, prectsely after it, the Greeks netthcr sunk into
apathettc, mhtltsttc res,gnat,on in the face of the war's horrifying abyss of suffering nor
did they fall prey to the pathologtcal nattonalism embodied in Roman tmpenal polittc,
beschaulich stimmender Wein], so must we be mindful of the tremendous
oftheD^nle^f^
Stlmulates
’ Punfies ^ and discharges the whole lifet he people [der ungeheuren
, das gauze Volksleben errevendenemigenden undentladenden Gewalt der Tragodie]
; we wifi first intimate itslghest \alue when it confronts us, as it did the Greeks, as the quintessence
p °Phylactlc Powers ot healing, as the mediator ruling Uvaltende
th£ Str°n§eSt^ m themselves mos t fatfl qualities of a
Tragedy is a highest value because its cathartic violence mediates between the extremes of
absolute immanence and absolute transcendence, effecting an attunement indicative of a
lorm of existence and corresponding politics which lie between the excesses of Roman
imperial politics and the ecstatic fatalism of Indian Buddhism. Lying between the extremes,
this is the mood oi the middle effected by "the mediator [Mittlerin]"— "the law of eternal
justice" which insures that the two extremes of the Apollinian and the Dionysian "unfold
their powers in rigorous, reciprocal proportion [strenger wechselseitiger Proportion] (§25).
The corresponding attunement, the mood of moderation— simultaneously sober and
drunk— results as the tragic effect acting as a means to health that rules over all extremes.
These extremes are the logical extension of the pure forms of the Apollinian and the
Dionysian. When the effect specific to either of these "drives"— the "Dionysian and
political dn\es is unchecked and allowed to manifest its pure, extreme form, the political
results are either the utter suspension of the political in "ecstatic brooding" or the
measureless extension ot the political in a destructive "chase after worldly power and
worldly honor." The particular attunement of this "splendid mixture" of sober ecstasy -its
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Slimmung— is an effect of the imperative, ihc Slinune (voice) commanding u process of
self-overcoming. Such critical clarification is, then, the very essence of justice and the only
path open to "GermanyV future. Why the "aesthetic problem" of catharsis would he as
'
Nietzsche wrote in the "Foreword," "right the middle of German hopes" is now
' '
apparent. For the tragic effect is the passageway, the "way to health [HeilmittelV which
places onc-an individual, a people, a nation, a cullure-in "the middle," effecting that
plest political feeling (§21 ) which lies between the extremes of the purely Apollinian
and purely Dionysian. This middling, but by no means ordinaiy, politics would
characicnze the non-nationalist nation as well as the particular community which was
nevertheless, mpanial. Conforming to neither the particularity of all things Apollinian nor
to the strict universality of the Dionysian, "Germany" would be a particular nation whose
particularity was not its own but the effect of its other, and that other- the universal,
Dionysos—would be msenbed in the body of this singular nation as its cultural idiom, , 1s
lorm ol existence, its way of life, its passions themselves. Its dissonant, discordant, and
open-ended altuncmcnt would be the sure sign of a rebirth of tragedy. The tragedy, of
course-at least this is how it is often referred to- was that tragedy never was reborn. In
its place the aestheticized politics so carefully analyzed by Nietzsche triumphed.
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CHAPTER III
LEGISLATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: NIETZSCHE'S "ON TRUTH AND
LIE IN THE EXTRA-MORAL SENSE"
SSrMttmasssx1
— Nietzsche, 'Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric"
Legislating Truth
1 n a letter to his friend Erwin Rhode, written shortly after the publication of The
Wr,h of Tragedy, N,el/.schc describes his plans for a second book, the so-called
Ptulosophenbiich {Philosopher's Hook).' It will be, he says, a "companion piece* to The
llirih of Tragedy.
!
Although Nietzsche wrote only two sections of the cotnpanion-'On
It ulh and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" and Philosophy in the Tragic Age ofthe
Greeks- each develops the themes articulated in his first book, and both can be read as
confirmation of his statement to Rhode.’ Like their predecessor, each intervenes ,n the
struggle characterized by The llirih ofTragedy as an "eternal conflict [ewigen KampJ]
between the theoretical and the tragic view of the world" (§17), a contest pilling Socrates
and the representatives ol Platonic philosophy against the rhetorician and the artist to
The * s no ^ Nietzsche s own. It was given to the collection of notes and writings
which he intended to turn into a book by Ernst Holzer and August Horncffcr, the editors of
the tenth volume ol Nietzsche's first collected works, the so-called Grofioktavausgabe. For
a discussion ol the titles Nicf/.sehc considered, sec Daniel Brcazcalc's usefull introduction
to his translation ol these notes and writings in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from
Nietzsche s Notebooks of the Early / H7()'s (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1992)
xviii-xxiii.
Sdmtliche Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe, cd. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Monti nari (Berlin: Walter dc Gruytcr, 1986), vol. 4, 132.
On the history ol the text sec Brcazcalc, Philosophy and Truth
, xviii-xxii ; for an
interpretation ol Nietzsche's reason's for lailing to complete the book sec xlviii-xlix.
58
ctermine who w,„ legislate the linguistic conventions govern,ng the poll,leal common,*
<
Just as Nletzsche had done in nemh ofrmsedy ^ devQ(es hjs efforts ^^
•
hrlosophenbuch to clarifying the ethical and politico, effects of these conventions on the
nation. And yet, though there can be no question that the Phibsophenbuch ,s
indeed a "companion piece" to The Birth of Tragedy, thus compamonship is marked by an
important and unm.stakable difference. For The Birth of Tragedy never addresses the'
problem of leg,slat,on directly, focus,ng instead on its effects, and no, until Nietzsche
wntes the essay which was to scve as the analytic core of the Phibsophenbuch does he
devote himself exclusively to the task of disclosing the logic and structure of legislative ac,
producing those effects.
That essay- "On Truth and Lie ,n the Extra-Moral Sense" -has emerged as one of
Nietzsche's most important and influential texts.' It has been read and reread in recent
years, resulting ,n a powerful senes of interpretations centering on the essay's insights into
the "eternal conflict" between philosophy and rhetoric. 6 These readings have come at a cost,
Lawrenif ^T* °SModernit? <trans - Derick
between Philosophy and Literature" (185-210).
* meuenre Distinction
P





) in Samtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe
(KSA ), ed. Giorgioand Mazzino Montinan (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), I, 875-890. Translationsrom the German are my own. Citations of the essay will be given in the body of the text,German page number first, followed by the corresponding page in Breazeale’s













’ "Metaphorical Architectures, in Looking After Nietzsche, trans. Peter
I . Conner and Mira Kamdar (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 89-1 12;
Paul de Man, "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)" in Allegories ofReading (New Haven- Yale
University Press, 1979), 103-118; J. Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and Disremembering in
Nietzsche s 'On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense'" in boundary 2, 9 (Spring/Fall 1981),
41-54. Alexander Nehamas's description of the text as "immensely overestimated" appears
to have more to do with his effort to valorize Nietzsche's late work than with any real
objection to the essay, lor he offers none (see Nietzsche, Life as Literature [Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard, 1985], 246, note 6). This evaluation is particularly odd given Nehamas's
interest in the literary character of Nietzsche's writing.
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howexer, for while they have done much lo illuminate the essay's indispensable tnsighls
mt° rhet°nC ’S rClal,°n to Ph"OS°Ph 'CalW 'hey have deflected attenhon away from the
essay's second fundamental theme: The role of rhetor,e in moral and political life ’ To be
sure, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Mora, Sense" polemizes again* "Socrattsm" by
demonstrating the tmposstbthty of freetng phtlosophtcal "truth” and liteta, speech from then
cntitnglement in rhetonc's tropes and ftgures, bu, its polemte does not stop there. Nietzsche
extends ,t- tnto the spheres of moral, ty and politics- by tnvestiga.ing the effects of the
philosopher’s "truth" on moral, ty and politics. His demonstration of the impossibility of
purifying phtlosophteal "truth" from its entanglement with rhetor,c, then, is by no means
the end of the story, rather, it serves as the foundation needed to illuminate a peculiar
legislative ability which rhetoric alone possesses, an ability, moreover, whose effects are as
much political and moral as they are epistemological. Rhetoric, Nietzsche argues, has
power, even the power to legislate laws and imperatives prescribing what is to be done,
and this power, he insists, is operative in both political and moral life. Its moral character is
already hinted at in the essay's title; its political import, on the other hand, emerges as
Nietzsche’s investigation into this strange legislative ability finds itself drawn into a debate
with the political philosophers over one of the most difficult and persistent issues in all of
modern political philosophy: The legislation of the social contract and the founding of the
political community.
It is no accident that Nietzsche turns to the problems of legislation and foundings in
On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense." He dictated the essay to von Gersdorff in an
atmosphere permeated by the hopes raised in the wake of the German founding of 1871
.
But the essay shares none of the optimism for the Reichsgriindung so apparent in The Birth
°! lra8edy- The philological community's hostile response to the book, the absence of any
Even those authors interested in Nietzsche's political thought have neglected to
investigate the essay. Keith Ansell-Pearson's An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political
Hunker_(New York: Cambridge University, 1994) makes no mention of it. The same is
true of Peter Bergmann's fine work, Nietzsche
, "the Last Antipolitical German"
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987). Mark Warren, on the
other hand, recognizes the coexistence ot two distinct themes in the essay and contemplates
the different account" which would result if one were to focus on the role of rhetoric in
"human relations" (see Nietzsche and Political Thought [Cambridge: MIT, 1988], 76). The
present essay is an attempt to provide such an account.
60
gem" nC S ' g,,S °‘ U rcbirth and the .meusificalion of ,hc -drive to
naUHna"Sm [A"'"0'“I" < 82 '> "> «* wake of Ihe Franco-Pruss.an War and
a" brOU8hl« '<> ** la-pes expressed in N,elZsehe, fim, book
»
ICSP<,nSC l° lhCSC deVCl°Pmente - "°n Tlalh and IJo in ihe Ex.ra-Moml Sense" Cells a Cable
a well-known Cable, and NieCsche is neither Che first nor the las, to employ it." Bu, he tells
d dil leicntly. I Ce sttcks ,0 its major themes-, fabulous moment of legislation takes place
;
hC7™ a8ainSt a" iS broU*hl to *» paace ,s estabhshed and a pohtica, eonnnnndy
founded, and the lifeof the tndividual is preserved-bu, as he develops these themes, he
employs them m order to comment on Ihe successes and failures of the RMxXrtMunii .
And this commentary is not only directed at Ihe German founding. Nietzsche develops his
1
-o.nls by joining a discussion winch extends back to ihe beginnings of modernity. I Ms
own essay is clearly a contribution lo its long and contentious history. The discussion's
participants include I lobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Benjamin Constant, and
no,r T" n \7
7< ’ <2
?
JaTary ' IK72 >- N‘" alc "« comments nune la'vonible ,n h,I
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' , Ulh and ,JC 1,1 lhe Extra-Moral Sense'," Graduate Faculty
7 13.2 (1991). Bonnie I Ionig draws attention to the purposes ol the
essriy s table in / optical theory and the Displacement ofPolitics (Ithaca: Cornell
nivcrsily, 1003 ), 43. Ol course, Nietzsche will again employ the genic ol the lablc lo
discuss the problem ol "truth" in his famous genealogy of metaphysics entitled "I low the
1 1 lie Wood Finally Became a Fable (The I Iistory of an Error)" (sec KSA VI 80-8 1) Onthe role ol fables in Nietzsche's work with reference to this fable in particular, see Philippe
Laeoue-I .abarthc, " I lie Fable," trails. I high Silverman, in The Subject of Philosophy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota), 1-13. On the structure of the fable in general, see
Jacques Derrida's reading ol Francis Pongc's Fable in "Psyche: Inventions ol the Other" in
Reading de Man Reading
, cd. I .mdsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: t Jnivcrsity
ol Minnesota, 1989), 25-65. On the role of fables in foundings, sec Derrida's "Declaration
ol Independence," New Political Science 15(1986). For the origin ol Nietzsche's own
I able, sec another brief essay composed for the Philosophenlmch
, "On the Pathos ol
I ruth," translated in Philosophy and Truth, 61-66.
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S^Ohen*1111161^ and °ne^ tHe Ce„tra
' Problems °f modern political philosophy— ihc originand character ol the social contract- lies at the center of Ihetr debate.
Nietzsche's own contnbutron to the debate consists m his efforts to think the
Ph osophtca, problem of "truth" and the poliucal and moral problem of Ration together
than m opposthon to one another. In order to carry ou, the task, he transposes
chopenhauer's theory of legislation into the sphere of "truth." Just as, accord, ng toSchopenhauer, an act of legation founds the state by establishing the dutres and nghts of
,cs members, so too does the leg.sla.ive act establishrng "truth" found socrety by rnstituhng
certain duties- telling the "truth" and keeprng one's prom,se-as well as certtun
benefits— membership in the community and freedom from the pain of punishment and
banishment. " And just as Schopenhauer had demonstrated the unavoidable moral
d, mens,on of the leg, slat, ve act at the basts of political life by pointing to the duties imposed
by the contract, so too does the leg.slative act distingurshing a "true" use of language from
its mendacious counterpart establish, as the title of Nietzsche's essay calls it, a society's
"moral sense”-the .mperative commanding a "truthful" use of language. The fable which
results from this displacement of the logic of leg.slation into the sphere of "truth" revolves
around the original moment of lawlessness and the onginal act of lawmaking at the basis of
the socral contract. As Nietzsche tells it, this moment, the primordial political moment
Nietzsche lust approaches the problem through Kant's polemical essav "IJbpr pm
PhSropvN^
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SSlgnS an entirely new value and function to™ lra
J
b telling. For Nietzsche s comments on Kant and Constant see KSA VII
"WnS Klaus-Uwe FischeFs discussion of Nietzsche's reading of their debate in ’Vom Grundsatz der Pflicht: ein Zitat" in Nietzsche-Studien #14, 426-427.
Schopenhauer's doctrine of the state synthesizes the competing theories of the
art‘culated by Hobbes and Kant. Accordingly, the state is a product, as
Hobbes had argued, of a "common contract [genieinsainen Vertrag]" while the "doctrine
ot state [Stcuitslehre], as Kant had argued against Hobbes, is a matter of law.
Schopenhauer, however, rejects Kant's attempt to bring that law into accordance with the
moral law, though he does, to be sure, acknowledge its moral dimension. Politics,
according to Schopenhauer, or the "doctrine of state," is nothing more or less than the
doctrine ol lawmaking— the "doctrine of legislation [Lehre von der Gesetzgebung]" (Die
Welt aIs Wide und Vorstellung [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993] I, §62).
62
marking the transmon front war to peace, from the Franeo-Prnssian War to the legislative
act founding the German state, achieves the .same end which has always motived the
legislation of social contracts- preserving the individual. Bu, ,n his account the peace
treaty!hat resu,.and the duties ,t es,ab,-shes^e less a matterof determining specific nghts
and obligations than of establishing collective control ov
the legislation oftruth :
er the power of language— through
world a, leas, the crudes'St”














’ am nch," when the proper designation forthis state would be precisely "poor." He misuses fixed conventions througharbitrary substitutions or even reversals of names. If he does this in a selftshand nioreover harmful manner, society will cease to trust him and wdlthereby shut him out. (877-878, 81)
Nietzsche's presentation transforms the logic of the social contract by displacing its
foundational moment into the sphere of language. 12 In h.s account, language and legislation
are so thoroughly united that the act of law-giving producing the social contract is
translormed into an act of legislation which establishes the linguistic conventions governing










nderks and 1 G - Ta>'lor, Nietzsche (London: MacMillan andmpany, 1948) 190. Bernard Pautrat describes the character of this displaced contractw ith precision when he writes, "ce contrat social est un contrat de langue" (Versions du
soled: figures et systeme de Nietzsche [Pans: Seuil, 1971], 221). See also Henning
Ottmann, Pfulosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987) 1 14-
H?llke
’ Nietzsche's Tragic Regime: Culture
, Aesthetics, and Political Education
(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 144-146.
Nietzsche's displacement of the social contract into the sphere of language can
easily be seen as a response to the first systematic text on the relationship between language
and contracts: Plato's Cratylus. Each of the topics Nietzsche's essay takes up— language,
linguistic legislation, and contractual agreements— has its origins there, and each of




y S S '8m,yme b"ld1^ Powcr <>f CKO social contract is accord,ngly
-Placed and Geminated throughout socety's linguistic conventions, endowing the
'
language of convention with the authonty and power associated with every contract Ye,
1 c contractual character of language's "fixed conventions" is by no means out the
open— lar from it, for it is derived from nothing written down or consciously adopted
Once the social contract is displaced into the sphere of language, it assumes an unwritten
unacknowledged, and unconscious form. It is neither drawn up nor signed, yet its
existence is demonstrated whenever the violators of convention are subjected to the powerw tch contracts have always employed to insure their preservation- punishment. Whoever
violates the rules governing the use of language is expelled from the community and "shut
out" ol society. Expuls,on is necessary because "liars”- this is the conventional term for
these rule breakers- pose a threat to the maintenance of social harmony and the
preservation of the "peace agreement." When they he, they break the peace treaty
suspending the war of all against all, violate the contract a, its basis, and endanger life
itself.
The real threat to life, however, comes not from liars. Nietzsche points to a more
serious problem lodged within the structure of social convention, and its resolution
becomes the central task of the essay. The difficulties involved in such a resolution arc
hardly betrayed by the simplicity with which the problem can be staled: Social convention
coni bets with the life of the individual, and conventional language violates the singularity
ol that hie. Nietzsche locates the origin ol the conflict and the contradictions it produces in
the peculiar structure of legislation which ends the helium omnium contra mimes. That
structure is unique, even unparalleled, for according to his presentation, it lacks something
no act of legislation can do without: A legislator. To be sure, a "peace agreement" is
achieved, "but" the agreement "brings something with it [Dieser Friendesschluss bring!
aberetwasmitsich],” and that "something" is neither willed nor legislated nor agreed
The significance ol this transformation is perhaps best measured by the extent to
which it has, through a vast and hopelessly entangled chain of influence, placed the
pioblcm ol society" and its practices at the center of contemporary debates in political
philosophy. To cite one of many possible example, sec Claude Lefort's essay "The
Question ol Democracy" in Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Maccy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 9-20, esp. 11-12.
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„Z " T'
°r SOC 'ety CTer le8 'Slated 'he langUage 0f the language of
<>rm y ‘ g a"d Va ' ,d desi8nalions." At the origin of society, then, there is




ZSebU"g ] "'5 In ‘h,S ^ - sovereign: It gives the "laws of
truth [Gesetze der Wahrheit]* and the members of society accordingly lose their claim to
sovereignty. Yet the lack of human legtslators and absence of integral individuals does no,
p event t e law from achieving the desired end of preserving the life of the individual Its
conventions are present, ve through and through, for the language of convention is indeed
contractual. Although no one legislated it, everyone is bound by it.”' And as long as
everyone remains bound to its laws, its preservative effects continue to operate. They do
so, however, at a grave cost, for they imprison man within a thoroughly contingent and
accidental linguistic convention. Indeed, they differ from the "walls of prison
[GefOngnissvandenY (883, 86) form bu, not effect. However much the language of
convention may appear to offer shelter to the individual and respite from the threats of
others, its laws inevitably violate the specificity of the individual, imprison without charges
or trail, and render the "peace agreement" self-defeating.
"A Mobile Army"
II anything characterizes social life according to Nietzsche's fable more than the
peculiar structure of the legislative act establishing its linguistic conventions- though
















^ are Sllent about the origin of language: they could
L^neuat ? 0 F th
8 ’ mail
wlthout *•" See F^drich Nietzsche on Rhetoric andanguage, -10. or the original, see Gesammelte Werke (Musarionausgabe), vol. 5, 469.
F°r aa altcuiP t lo this passage to the role of language in general in Nietzsche's
thinking see Daniel Breazeale's comments in his introduction to Philosophy and Truth
,XXX
.
n On the Origin ol Language," "all earlier naive standpoints [concerning the origin
of language] are rejected" (210, 468). Among them Nietzsche includes the theses that
language is the product of a "contract" or a "consensus" (210, 468).
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ten™ of the convent,on, the ten™ ate not their own; though no, a contract ,t ls
nevertheless bindtng-it is the collect, ve forgetting of each of these paradoxes. each
ease, the pecul.ar role of language in social „fe ,s forgotten. The effects of th,s forge, ngsyrup,ontanc of the v.ctory of "Socratism" ,„ Nietzsche's "eternal conn, cl," nnpnson manw„h,n language's art.fices and socety's convent.ons and reduce the .ntellect to pree.se,
v
the same state effected by Eunp.des' rationalized traged.es in The Birth ofTragedy
"Slavery" (888, 90). Far from setting one free, "truth," at leas, accord, ng to N.etzsche,
lamously metaphor, cal description of it, is more like an occupy,ng force govenung a
conquered territory. 17
The majority of N.etzsche's essay is devoted to demonstrating the order, ng ab.lity
°l thlS " trUth ’" and 11 doeS 80 ^ 'Eliminating how the leg,station of "truth" is, aga.ns, all
expectations, capable of command, ng and organizmg society, turning it into an occupied
territory ruled by a mobile army which maintains order and keeps the peace. This
demonstration, however, is carried out for the sake of another, far more press, ng task:
L, berating the mdmdual from its enslavement to this occupying force. N.etzsche performs
two operations in an effort to realize this end: On the one hand, his investigation into the
structure ol legislation leads to the articulation of an entirely new mode of legislation and an
entirely new lorm of "truth," both essential to the resolution of the social contract's
contradictory structure; on the other hand, nothmg new can emerge until the structure of
legislation is laid bare along with "truth’s" ability to command and organize society. This
second task reaches its decisive moment when, having thoroughly reinscribed the problem
of legislation within a linguistic context dominated by the question of "truth’s" relationship
to rhetoric, Nietzsche gives a highly rhetorical definition of "truth":
What then is truth? A mobile army [bewegliches Heer
] of metaphors,
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred and
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a nation [Volk] to be
canonical and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are
illusions; they are metaphors which have become worn out and have been
A politics ol truth" is set in motion here. Michel Foucault pursues this line of
thinking, calling lor "a new politics of truth" by referring to "the importance of Nietzsche."
See Truth and Power" in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mcpham, and Kate Soper (New
York: Pantheon, 1980), 133.
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"Truth," Nietzsche tnsists, is rhetor, cal. A proper, literal, and "true" language docs not
ex.s, which can be contrasted with an improper, figurative, and fictional language
constructed on Us foundation* for these foundations are themselves figurative/' And thus
figurative foundation, N.etzsche writes, exerts an mfiuence over the nation. Its metaphors
an metonymies become "canonical and binding.” "Tmth'-a mobile army of metaphors of
metonymies— binds the nation together with its figures. In the wake of a total war, then,
language mobilizes its forces, passing from one thing to another, conquering the territory
between them and establishing martial law wherever it gc*s. The peace treaty at the basis of
Ihc nation, on the other hand, is in turn dictated by the "laws of truth." This agreement is
binding, canonical, and contractual, and it makes rhetoric the foundation of the nation."














Und LugC Im aussei™oralisehen Sinne’," Nietzsche-Studien 17 0988)Despite the obvious importance of Gerber's work for Nietzsche, it is by no means clear that















detour " see Lacoue-Labarthe's influential essay "The
N.r.,;/
"Sobject of 1 hilosophy, 1 4-36. For a careful attempt to demonstrate how
ietzsche s adoption of Gerber s tropological model of language is less a break or detourhan an extension of his earlier investigations into the nature, origin, and development of
language, see Claudia Crawford's important work, The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory
ofLanguage (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 199-220. Unfortunately, Crawford
nowhere accounts lor Nietzsche's use of metaphor and analogy in The Birth of Tragedy.When these figures appear again in the Philosophenbuch and lectures on rhetoric,
Crawford claims that Nietzsche has adopted them from Gerber's tropological model of
language (215) in order to explain insights which he had arrived at long ago.
For a discussion of the role of rhetoric in political theorists' presentations of the
original contract F. R. Ankersmit's Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy Beyond Pad
and Value (Stanlord: Stanford University Press, 1996). See particularly chapter 5 "Politics
and Metaphor" (254-293) on the role of rhetoric in Plato, Hobbes, Rawls and others
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Unde, these conditions, rhetoric is severe,gn, rhetoric leg, slates, and rhetoric retains all ,hepower of u mobile army.
Nietzsche is not, however, the first to recognize rhetoric's power in politic* life In
dun m
1CClUrC C<>UrSC °" anC'Cm rhCt°nC
’ P“ * the University of Baselny c winter semester of 1872-73, he indieated how the problem of rhetoric impingesupon the sphere of polit.es by reminding his students of Anstotle, acknowledgement of
rhetorics power, its dynamis: "The cower UCmrn u, cp [Kraft] to discover and to make operative that
and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls
rhetor, c, is, a, the same time, the essence of language.''” Of course, language is also the
very possibility of political life for Aristotle, yet he never ela.ms that rhetor,e is the essence
<»l language, and he consistently subordinates rhetoric to logic and eth.es, even making it
<hc,r "offshoot" ,„ an effort to render it useless to demagogues.* Nietzsche, by contrast.
insists on the rhetorical character ol all language and elevates rhetoric to "the highest
activity of the well-educated political man."” But while his lectures allude to the well-
known centrality of rhetoric to political life, and while they unite Aristotle's two
fundamental determinations of the essence of the human bcmg- zoo„ poUlikon and zoor,
l°g0n broach the possibility that rhetor, c's tropes might metamorphose
,nto a peculiar species of military troops. Nor do they ever intimate that the rhetorical core
<>f "truth" might in fact be more likea mobile army governing society than a philosophical
absolute. Only in "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" docs Nietzsche make these
expansive claims. Indeed, in this essay he no longer attributes rhetoric's power to
demagogues, sophists, or well-educated political men, figuring it instead as a political force
"Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric," 21. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1 Chapter 2 On
^
urr°nnding the dating of the course sec the editor's introduction to
hv lt i hl ,
he ,< wUmc ‘md language, ix-xi. For an account of the lecture course
> ic ol the two students who attended, sec Begegnungen mil Nietzsche, Sander LGilman (Bonn: Bouvicr Vcrlag Herbert Grundmann, 1985), 1 1 1-1 12.
Rhetoric
, Book 1, Chapters 8, 2; Politics 1305 a.
"Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric," 3.
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' n °Wn nght: A m°b,le a™y ” Rhetonc 's* to mobilize its forces the moment i, is
forgotten, and the moment ,t is forgotten, language's persuasive force beg, ns to act „kc anarmy, secnnng the space between words and th.ngs, legislating their proper re, at,on and
oxer ,ng or nr,her enforc,ng_a peaceful, ordenng, and finally deaden, „g ,„fi ue„ce over
society.
Nietzsche's definit.on of "truth" says as much when ,t curiously links the themes of
metaphor and metonymy to the problem of human relations: "What then ts truth? A mob.le
army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms, ,„ short, a sum of human
relations [menschlichen Reiationen] which have teen poetically and rhetoncally intensified
transferred and embellished, and wh.ch, after long usage, seem to a nation to be canon, cal
and binding." The human relations N.etzsehe speaks of here are not, a, leas, not at firs, the
relations between human beings. Rather, the problem of "truth" is a problem of human
relations because the quest,on of "hath” has typically been posed ,n temrs of the relation of
humans to things. That relation has always involved a structure of adequation or
correspondence between subjects and objects, between words and the world, between
thought and what ,s thought, or between a perception and the perceived. Yet each of these
relations is, Nietzsche claims, also inescapably rhetorical. "Truth" cannot escape rhetoric
because its structure of adequation or correspondence depends upon the possibility of a
transference— from an object to a subject-and that possibility invariably leads bade to the
sphere ol rhetoric. For rhetonc's tropes are created precisely through transference-the
transference ol words from one object to another in the creation a new, figurative meaning.
Nietzsche's decisive innovation lies in his displacement of rhetonc's structure of
translerence into the sphere of "truth" where the question is less one of relating two objects
to one another than ol relating, through the creation of a structure of correspondence or
adequation, an object and a subject. In "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" as well
as in the other major section of the Philosophenbuch—Philosophy in the Tragic Age ofthe
,
Paul de Man offers an interpretation of the power of this "mobile army" in
Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” in The Rhetoric ofRomanticism (New York:
Columbia, 1984), 242-3. On Nietzsche's affinity with and return to sophism, see Reihard
Low, Nietzsche : Sophist und Erzieher. Philosophische Untersuchungen zutn






1C lnS ' SlS ‘hal lhC rhet0riCia" rC 'atCS thlngS *° than to other
bjects: The sculptor of language [SprachbiUnerV he writes, "designates only the
relation of things to man" (879, 82).» And according to his definition of -truth-a -,nob„e
army ol metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms- -that relation is first of all
structured according to the logic of metaphor: "The sculptor of language designates only the
relation ol things to man, and for expressing their relations he lays hold of the boldest
'
metaphors." No trope is better suited to relate things to man than metaphor, for its meaning
‘ S P' CUSCly lhUl °‘ lranslcrc"“- Metaphors transfer (meta-phora) meaning from one place
to another; they ferry (phora) meaning over (mem) the space separating two linguistic
unities. But even here Nietzsche expands the function traditionally attributed to metaphor,
lor he lads to restrict the use of metaphor to simple transferences between linguistic unities.
His displacement of rhetoric into the sphere of "truth" results, then, in the generalization of
the structure of metaphor across the whole of human experience. All experience, Nietzsche
insists, involves a transference, an Obenragung (879, 82), whether in the form of an
intuition, a perception, or a cognition. 25
Nietzsche's definition of "truth” does not, however, stop by identifying i, with
metaphor: "What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors |and| metonymies." "Truth"
has its origin in metaphor- the effect of a transference- but only with the conversion of
* he metaphor into a metonymy-a source of transcendent causalily-is the process of
See also Philosophy in the Tragic Age ofthe Greeks, §11, and Nietzsche's
discussion in Presentation ol Ancient Rhetoric," 23. Lacoue-Labarthc provides an




s allciyti°n, sec Alan Sehril t, Nietzsche and the Question ofInterpretation(New York: Roullcdgc, 1990), 125-6. When Anne Tebertz-van Elst claims that this
’
alteration violates the structure of metaphor as it has been traditionally conceived, she is
cntnciy concct, but when she claims that it has no validity by referring to the definition of
metaphor articulated by Max Black's Models and Metaphors: Studies in language and
Philosophy
, she demonstrates an unwillingness to read Nietzsche's text and the challenges
it poses to the Aristotelian concept ol metaphor. Her insistent reliance upon the criteria of
Paul Ricoeur to explicate Nietzsche's text docs little to help matters, because Nietzsche
docs not employ those criteria himscll. Sec Asthetik der Metaphor: zurn Streit zwischen
Philosophie and Rhetorik bei Friedrich Nietzsche (Frciburg/Munchcn: Vcrlag Karl Albcr
1994), 144.
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origination completed.” The clarity of this two step process has been so obscured by the
CSSd






haVe teen C°nVerted lnl° *«-• -cepts by means of
definition of "true" language^
°f metaPhor a"d metonymy in his
the innuential work of Roman Jakobson on the fo^m'S
0 structural lln8ui stics, partieularlv
metonymy in language See "Two a of t
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n so far as they— like Saussunan linguistics— stabilize isolatedand tm
-
hS by re ating them to one another, he forgets that Nietzsche always rejects
nIwIJT °"T










or the naive attem Pt to avoid them altogether. In "Nietzsche and
he Idea ol Metaphor, after giving an elucidation of the role of language in "On Truth and
Lie in the Extra- Moral Sense," Stern again asserts that Nietzsche is fundamentally hostile
to and uninterested in the stabilizing effect of rules, laws, and institutions, and then
generalizes these phenomena under " the sphere ofassociation" (72). As ought to be clear
by now, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" is nothing if not an extended
investigation into how people associate with one another once war is brought to an end and
a peace agreement formulated. Finally, since Stem is unable to see the relationship between
Nietzsche's investigations into rhetoric and twentieth-century linguistics, it ought to be
noted that he is not helped by his inability to read Nietzsche's definition of "truth."
Although he quotes it in "Nietzsche and the Idea of Metaphor" (70) and in his Nietzsche
( 136), as well as in his book with M. S. Silk, Nietzsche on Tragedy ([New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984], 339), in each case that definition- "a mobile army of
metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms"— is truncated to one and the same
element— metaphor. The role of metonymy simply drops out without explanation or
comment.
71
metonymy— ihc "leaf," "ho„esty"- h ,,s antipathy towards abstract, theoretical
argumentation prevents him from tdentifying those examp,es as presentations of the
metonymic production of "truth." He simply gives a definition of "truth" and proceeds to
g. vc examples. It ,s a strategy which has led inteipreters of the essay to fad to differentiate
between the various moments involved in the creation of "truth," and this failure has in turn
resulted in a simple conllation of "truth" with figurative discourse. The effect has been a
la, lure to recognize Nietzsche's efforts to think the problem of "truth" and the organization
ol a society's discursive practices together, and this failure has led to a concomitant
depohttdzation of the essay. If, however, one refers to Nietzsche's definition of metonymy
in h,s lectures on ancient rhelonc-"the substitution of cause and effect"-,hen the essay's
examples of the production of "true" concepts become perfectly clear. 21 And what they
exemplify is the production of a causal power which, Nietzsche will go on to argue, exerts





rom lhe “paling of the non-equatable [Gleichselzen<ks Nicht-Gleichen], Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally thesame as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is fomal byarbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting thedistinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea
| VorstelluW \ that in additionto the eaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": The prim3foL wfoZ
mcaTurrd ^'7 “ 1’' i^
l?VeS WCrC pCrllaPS woven . ^hed,
^
e s ed, colored, curled, and painted-but by incompetent hands so thatno specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful
likeness of the primordial form. We call a person "honest," and then askwhy has this person behaved so honestly today?" Our usual answer is, "on







We nothing whatsoever about an essential quality
called honesty : But we do know of countless individualized and
consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects inu hich they are unequal and which we now designate
[ bezeichnen ] as
honest" actions. Finally we formulate from them a qualitasocculta which
has the name "honesty."
(880 , 83 )
No trope better demonstrates the similarity between the rhetorical core of "truth"
and a mobile army than metonymy, because none invents power so easily as it does. When
rhetoric mobilizes its forces individual differences are arbitrarily discarded, things which
Piesentation ol Ancient Rhetoric," 59 . For a useful attempt to interpret Nietzsche's
examples by referring them back to his "Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric" sec Wayne




are noc equate with one another are equated and subsumed under the same concept the" m
h
8“ 8 SSPeCLS °f enl"ICS arC entire* gotten, and a transcendent power ,s created
wh,c brings things into being like a divine legisiator. So powerfu, ,s the nrobiie army a,
work in such creations, so easily are "we" persuaded by its impressive forces, that "we"
ai together lad to notice our own role m this annihilation of difference. If "truth's" mobile
army secures the space between concepts and things and legislates the laws which make Ihe
peacel ul intercourse of society possible, then this achievement is accomplished through the
total mobilization of every member of society ,n a military campaign which absolutely
eliminates difference. Under the influence of rhetoric's power, then, "we" equate things
which are not equal, "we" eliminate the space of difference lying between things, and "we"
produce the powerful abstractions attributed with the power of causality-the "honesty"
Which causes one to be honest, "the leaf" which cremes individual leaves. I, is this "we"
then, which expresses itself in the relations of exchange involved in the creation of these
abstractions, and it is the activity of this "we" -unconscious and unacknowledged-which
causes Nietzsche to in turn eharactenze these relations as "human relations" in his definition
ol "truth”- "human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified,
transferred and embellished." Intensification, transference, and embellishment, then, result
in the creation ol abstract powers which humans relate to as esoteric objects with a qualitas
occulta (occult quality). These esoteric powers are concepts which have been elevated by
means of rhetoric to a primordial form -Nietzsche's target here, as always, is
Platonism— whose power rests solely on the rhetorical operation which brought them into
being. It is even at work in Kant's "mysterious X" (879, 83), the unfathomable thing in
itself beyond human understanding, figured as an abstract source of causality behind the
world of appearances.
Once Nietzsche has tracked down the origin of this powerful source of causality, he
is in a position to begin tracing its effects on social life. And these effects are not difficult to
locate. Kant s mysterious X," no less than the qualitas occulta, form the basis of a secret
society with certain mystery' rites and ritualistic practices. However secretive the power
may be around which they are organized, those rites and practices- what Nietzsche simple
calls social "convention"— have been under constant discussion throughout modernity.
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t7a ring t0 N'etZSChe 'S genea'°8y ' th£Se dlSCUrS,VC “ng .hean eeping ones prom,se-consist in using the "valid delations" (877-878
I:7iC,n! ‘he rUeS °f^ themselves, as Nietzsche, definition. Uth spells out, canonical and binding"—a matter of law, indeed, of canon law and
its relig.ous authority. Concepts then, despite, or rather, because of their anthropomorphic
ongm, achieve a heavenly authonty winch no people can do without "Jus, as the Romans
and Etruscans cut up the heavens with ng,d mathematical tines and confined a god within
each ol the spaces thereby delimited, as within a templum, so too does every people have a
similarly mathematically d.v.ded conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth
understands by the demand of "truth” that each conceptual god be sough, only in Us
sphere (882, 85). Just as the Romans and Etruscans turned the heavens into a petrified
series of divis.ons, each serving as a temple for the worsh.p of a divine power, so too does
every people live under a transcendent system of conceptual div.sions whose divine
authority insures that those divisions are respected, maintained, and reinforced by its
practices. Metonymic substitutions produce a conceptual heaven of abstractions whose
universality and transcendental validity guide rational action with the force of an imperative
within a highly differentiated hierarchy of social relations. "As a 'rational' being,"
Nietzsche writes, man
places his acting under the domination of abstractions [Herrschaft of
Abstractionen]: He no longer tolerates being carried away by sudden
impressions, by intuitions [Anschauungen
] ; he universalizes
[verallgenieinert] all these impressions first into less colored, cooler
concepts, in order to bind the course of his life and acting to them.
Everything which makes man stand out against the animal depends upon
this ability to volatilize the intuitive metaphor into a schema, thus, to
dissolve an image into a concept; something is possible, namely, in the
legion ol those schemata which would never succeed under the intuitive
lirst impressions: The constructing [aujzubauen] of a pyramidal order
according to castes and degrees [Kasten und Graden], the creating of a new
world ol laws, privileges, subordinations, boundary determinations
[Granzbestimmungen
J , which now confronts that other intuitive world of
lirst impressions as the more solid, more universal, better known, more
human, and therefore as regulating and imperative \Festere, Allgemeinere,
Bekanntere, Meuschlichere und daher als das Regulirende und
Imperativische], (881-2, 84)
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<0 metaphors ,„to the ralmna,
‘ ' 8 ° ,C '°81Cal Schcmatism
’ he writ again argue ,n Philosophy in ,!„
Age ofthe Greeks that "the * ing" ' <,emp
..II -was prtxiuccd by Parmenides's summation of the imagination ,0 the task ol
sehcmttU/.ing reality, so ,00 does he insist in "On Truth and , in the I :xtra-Moral Sense"
on the dectsive importance ol the shift from a metaphoric and intuitive mode of cogni, to
one which is entirely schematic.* The movement from metaphor ,0 schema, front metaphor
10 metonymic concept, is a slut , from the singular and concrete ,0 the universal and abstract
by means ol metonymy. Tins same shin characterizes the movement I ron, the war of
.nchv,duals to the peace of society. The structure ol that society is produced by the
transformation of metaphors into universally valid and abstract
concepts schemata- -which guide practical life and tell what oughl to be done. They
determine, in other words, a socicly's "moral sense," lor they provide it will, the
iinperulives governing its practices. Following these imperatives and using the valid
designations for things- the concepts demanded Ivy the law-insures the reproduction ol
tin- social structure, and just as those concepts impose themselves from on high thanks to
Ihc hierarchical relationship which Ihcy have will, ll,c world of the individual and concrete,
so too ,s ll,at social structure one of hierarchical relations- "a pyramidal order according to
caslcs and degrees,” a "world of laws, privileges, subordinations, boundary
determinations." The unspoken contract al die basis of society exemplifies itself, then, in
one’s sense of duly to Ihc "laws of truth" feeling the law’s imperatives and carrying ihcm
mu. In Ihc end. Nietzsche's essay discloses 'Truth' lo lx- a feeling, and the possibility of
Icclmg the law', ol being passionate about il and passive towards it, finally brings lo light
ihc pathological eorcol Ihc moral law governing society. The pathos of a society's ethos is
nothing oilier than its "moral sense":
We still do not know where the drive to truth
|
Trieh zur Wahrlicit] comes
Irom: For so far we have only heard about the duty
|
Verpflichtwig\ to be
truthful which society poses in order lo exist; that is, to use the usual
metaphors or expressed morally: I he duly lo lie aeeording to lixcd
Ihc Kirill oj tragedy, § 14; Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Hie Greeks, trails.
Marianne Cowan (Chicago, Gateway: 1962), §11.
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utility of the truth. (881, 84)
^ l^c x cncrability, reliability, and
Once the rhetorical origins of "truth" are forgotten, so too is the sensuous,
persuasive power of rhetoric's figures. But neither that power nor the pathos it produces
cease to exist. Rather, "truth's" pathos makes itself felt in duty-the duty to "truth » to
designate one thing as "red" and another as "cold," yet another as "mute." Without
anyone's conscious knowledge, then, "truth's" rhetorical core exerts a persuasive power in
the lorm of * feeling— the feeling which arises from contrasting oneself with the liar "who
no one trusts, who all exclude.- Feeling constitutes the sensuous nature of Nietzsche's
"moral" sense, making it a serous communis, a commonality of sense, and a contractual
agreement of sense. And the overriding sense of this feeling is fear- fear of losing one's
membership within society and therefore one's self. It makes telling the "truth" an
imperative and reduces the creative capacities of the imagination to a state of passivity. And
yet precisely because self-preservation amounts to preserving a "fixed convention," its
members simultaneously sacnfice themselves to it. Telling the "truth," then, or lying "in the
designated manner," preserves convention, but the fixity of that convention and its
universal validity punfies it of any relation to the singularity of the lives it ought to
preserve. Preservation, then, ends up preserving what is left over of the individual's life
once it is reduced to an abstract universal, and the total elimination of the individual, the
unequal, and the absolutely different produces only one thing— ashes. Just as Nietzsche
had attacked Roman culture in The Birth of Tragedy for the leveling effects it had on life,
so too does he cite its burial practices for the exemplary way in which they demonstrate
On the pathos ol rhetoric and the persuasiveness of all language see "Presentation
ol Ancient Rhetoric" ( 13 1, 21-2) and the short essav written for the Philosophenbuch "On
the Pathos of Truth," (in Philosophy and Truth, 61-66).
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.
' 6 “ Pr6SerVed W ‘thm the "Pyram 'dal ord-" °f wastes, privileges, subordinations
an oundary determinations produced by fixing the conceptual relations govern, ng socialre anons: -The great structure lBm] of concept d,splays the ng,d regular, ty of a Ronran
columbarium" (882, 85). The stntcture of society may take the form of a pyram.d, but what
PreSen,eS d0es n°‘ even atta,n the suhstantiality of the mumm.fied corpse. Rather, the
ashes of the dead are all that is stored in the Roman columbanum, ashes from whieh every
trace ol individuality has been destroyed. 30
The True Lie
Nietzsche's investigation into the linguistic structure of social convention d.splaces
Ihe logic ol the social contract into the sphere of language. By investigating the unspoken,
unwritten, and unconscious contract wh,ch results from this d.splacement, he cuts the
Gordian knot responsible for the nation's aporetic character-the structure of leg,slat,on at
the basis of a soaety's linguistic conventions. While the first section of the essay discloses
this problem by demonstrating how socal life fails to preserve the l.fe of the individual and
even promotes a form of living death, the essay's second section attempts to resolve, or at
least respond to, the social contract's contradictory and aporetic structure. For that
contract- unspoken, unwritten, and entirely unconscious- is aporetic, and the effects of
that apona reverberate throughout the totality of social life. An impasse anses because a
peace agreement is required to preserve the life of the individual from the threats posed by
the war of all against all, yet the terms stipulated by that agreement and the practices
governing its conventions expunge every trace of individuality from individual expenence.
This apona, an apona which no society, no contract, and no convention can avoid, always
places the social totality and its universally valid linguistic practices in violent conflict with
the specificity and singularity of everything that society ought to preserve and all that those
practices ought to comprehend. It is itself a manifestation of the eternal conflict between the
advocates of reason and "truth" and the practitioners of a rhetoric no longer governed by
philosophy s theories. So long as that conflict is decided in favor of the rule of reason, a
On the metaphors of the pyramid and columbanum, see Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche
andMetaphor, trans. Duncan Large (Stanford: Stanford University, 1993 ), 66-7.
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legislative structure is preserved which insures the predictable, continuous, and mechanical
SU •sumption of particular subjects and objects undera universally valid social
convention— a national "style" "binding for all."
Resolving, or at least responding to tins contradictory state of affairs is only
possible ,1 a middle ground can be found, a space lying between pure universality and pure
mdiv,duality. A middle ground would .serve as, if not the mediator ending the conflict
between them, then at least the medium bringing them into contact with one another Only
on th,s condition would the inadequacy, incotrectness, and lack of correspondence between
these two poles be resolved, and only then would the contract and the convention ,t
SUPP°nS ' U" '" 'hCir PU 'P0SC: Prcscrv'"« thc individual. But ,n order to achieve that end
the inadequacy, incorrectness, and lack of correspondence between the socially sanctioned
linguistic conventions and the objects they attempt to grasp must first be remembered.
I ndeed, Nietzsche places all of his hopes on the possibility of remembering what has been
forgotten, insisting that the only thing needed for the discoveiy of a passage way through
the aporctic impasse is an act of remembering-remembering the inadequacy,
incorrectness, and lack of correspondence between the socially sanctioned linguistic
conventions and the objects they attempt to grasp. All that is needed, in other words, is to
remember that "truth" is a matter of adequacy, correctness, and correspondence, an
adequacy, correctness, and correspondence between a subject and an object, between
thought and the world, between a concept and what it designates, between a perception and
the perceived. Remembering "truth" then- what its structure demands and
requires— recalls something forgotten: The space between each of these relations, a space
which thwarts the certainly of every attempt to pass correctly from one side of the relation
to the other, a space which only rhetoric— a rhetoric no longer governed by philosophy and
its values— is able to cross.
11
And passing from one side to the other is tantamount to
passing a law, lor the laws ol "truth" arc established by securing and colonizing the space
between words and things. Remembering this space, remembering the space between
I he problem ol anamnesis had already been broached in a letter to Paul Dcusscn
several years earlier. There Nietzsche insists that anamnesis is the only basis of "the correct
philosophy ol every singular being \I)ie rechte Philosophie jedes Einzelnen\." Sec Briefe
III, SI (December 19, 1869).
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su Jects and objects, between though, and the world, between a concept and wha, „
estgnates between a perception and the perce,ved-rcmembenng each of these spaces
each of w ,ch must be crossed adequa,e,y and co„ec,ly ,f a "true" correspondence ,s to 'be
"shed between them, recalls a certatn middle sphere, and this sphere „es at the centero c eg, slat, ve act. Just as the whole of The Birth of Tragedy turned upon a "world of the
m, e mnelveuy (§24, §8, wherejust.ee ruled, so too does N.etzschc recall a certainm ‘ ° SPhCre ln "°n TrUlh and Lie ln the Extra-Moral Sense" m order to resolve the








any repose, security, and consistency. If but for an instantcc uld escape lrom the prison walls [Gefdngnisswdnden] of this faith hisself consciousness" would be immediately destroyed. It is even adiTtoUthing [or him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives anenurely different world from the one that man does, and thm the question ofw hich of these perceptions of the world is the more correct [richdgen] one isquite senseless, for this would have to have been decided previously inaccordance with the criterion of the correctperception, which means
y
inaccordance with a criterion which is not available . But in any case it seemsto me that "correct perception"- which would mean "the adequate








nfS ’ no exPression, but at most an aesthetic relation[asthetisches Verhalten]: I mean a suggestive transference, a stammering
translation into a completely foreign language [eine andeutende
Ubertragung, eine nachstammelnde Ubersetzung in eine ganz fremde
. prac he] .To that end, in any case, a freely poeticizing and freely inventive
middle sphere and middle power [einerfrei dichtende und frei erfmdenden
Mittel-Sphdre und Mittelkraft] is required. (884, 86)
32
No passage in Nietzsche's essay more clearly presents the origin of the social
contract s contradictory and aporetic structure, and no passage identifies the source of the
contract's failure so precisely: "Contradictory impossibility." It is impossible, indeed,
Michel Foucault, working from somewhat different premises, makes this middle
sphere the object ol his research in The Order of Things (trans. unidentified collective
[New York: Vintage, 1973]). The text ends by returning to Nietzsche and the problem of
language (382-387), and it begins by announcing the object of study: a "middle region
which liberates order itself" (xxi)— the much discussed episterne investigated by
"archaeology."
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contradictory to aUempf to overcoming ,Hc space which „cs between the spheres of su bjee,and object for that space, Nietzsche insists, is , of absolu,e differed "be.wee
absolutely dtlferent spheres [zwei absolu, versckieUenen SpUdren] snch as subject andO tject there is no causality, no correctness, no expression." And yet, even if absolute
‘ " k'ICntC ,S Unbridgeable
' throu8h It nevertheless takes place. Indeed it takes
place all the lime. Nietzsche even has a name lor the ability capable of bridging the spheresam ,1 ,s by no means an unconventional one. Following a tradition at leasl as old as
Aristotle's thcoiy of the imagination (,*,«„,,») as an intermediary between the sensible
world ol perception and the -supersensible world of thought, the same tradition Kant takes
tip when he places the imagination Wnbildungskraft) a, the center of his critical philosophy
as the I acuity mediating between sensibility and understanding, Nietzsche locates the ability
to bridge absolute difference in something not unlike the imagination. And like that
trad, 1, on, he places it the middle, as a "middle power” capable of bridging the gap
between the empirical, sensuous world of objects and the subjective world of thought,
understanding, and concepts.” But he radically breaks with tradition when hefrees tins
middle power" Irom ihc production and reproduction of abstract
concepts— schemata— created in order to subsume the world of objects under universally
binding categories. Indeed, once he has broken with tradition, he no longer uses the name
he inherited from Kanl-thc imagination- to designate this "primordial faculty." Instead
Nietzsche returns that faculty to its "primordial" status as "fantasy [Pfumtasie]” and once
the "imagination" is demoted to the level of "fantasy," it neither functions as a producer of
Kants universally valid schemata nor docs it subsume particular objects under those
H
.
* 11 Nietzsche and the Idea ol Metaphor," J. P. Stern draws attention to this
intermediary between two modes of thinking" (79), one oriented towards the abstract and
general, the other towards the individual and particular, but he fails to sec its affinities with
the Kantian imagination (sec also Stern's similar comments in Nietzsche, 145), I le goes on
to praise it as Nietzsche's "greatest achievement" (SO) and a much needed challenge to "the
absurd dichotomy ol 'scientific versus 'imaginative,' or again the antithesis between
'concept' and 'metaphor', 'abstract' and 'concrete'" (80-81). But when he suggests that
Nietzsche I ailed to link this greatest of achievements to the "the sphere of association" out
°f h' s "disdain" lor that sphere, he fails to remember that Nietzsche derives these insights
from an investigation ol the role which language plays in social convention (80).
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schemata."" Once absolute difference is recalled and a correct and adequate passageway
between the spheres is no longer guaranteed by the law. subsumption g.vcs way to anentue y tfferent mode ol relation and a new form of legislation. That relation is no longer •Huesuon o, the correctness or adequation of the relation between different spheres for the
'
question can no longer be answered with any certain,, „ cannot, Nietzsche wr,,, be
ectded,
' because the "criterion" needed to decide the correctness or incorrectness of the
re anon between the spheres does no, exist. The mere existence of a convention, on the
ca er hand, "guarantees absolutely nothtng about its necessity and exelusivejustificahon
and he so thoroughly problematized, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" iurns
tnto an essay not supply "on" (Uber) the d, stine,ion I*,ween "truth" and "he" and the act of
legislation establishing it In the end, the essay winds up in the space between them or as
the first word the essay's title indicates, "over" (Uher) them. And the moment that
opposition ,s transcended, the essay is no longer bound to the law which legislated it and
the moral , .operative it imposes. A, this moment, the most decisive moment ,n the essay,
Nietzsche finds a way of eluding the law and entering into the sphere of the "extra-moral "
With the discovery of this undecidable, "extra-moral" sphere, an entirely new form
ol legislation takes over. Whereas the "true" terms of the social convention had been
legislated in that fabulous moment after the war, a moment dunng which language alone
spoke, and while "truth's” laws dictated from then on the continuous repetition of that act
ol legislation whenever language was used, every use of language which takes place after
Nietzsche’s discovery of an "extra-moral" sphere is forced to respond to the absolute













rc the tianscendental and translating it into the terms of rhetoric,
hilippe Laeoue-Labarthe ("The Detour," 25) and, to a lesser extent, Arthur Dan to
Nietzsche as I hilosopher [New York: MacMillan, 1967], 4()) both point to this
ransf ormation. But neither ol them notices Nietzsche's engagement with the lynch pin of
the Kantian system— the imagination. This turn to imagination anticipates the work of two
ol Kant s best readers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy, both of whom discover a
certain 1 rcedom in the space it occupies. See Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics
, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990) and
Nancy's The Experience ofFreedom , trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford:’sianlord
University Press, 1993)
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anguagc almcd a, a thing must itself invoke a certain legislative power, a power which
Played no conseious role in the legislative ac, founding society. That power- "freely
poct'cm8 and Ircely inventive"-,ies the creative abilit.es of the fantasy. Once th.s
faculty" ,s recognized as the means for br.dg.ng the d,stance between subjects and objects
an once the absolute d.f lercnce between them is acknowledged, then the mechanical
coat,on o, a relat.onsh.p of correspondence g.ves way to the creat.ve attempt to correspond
o the singular.ty ol each and every experience, to "the singular and entirely individual
original experience [einmaligegam undgar Mividualmrle Vrerkbniss]" (879 83) of
every intuition. Rather than imposing a universal concept on a particular intuition in order
1° disclose „s significance, leg, slat,on now proceeds from the pan.cular to the universal,
and proceeding in this direction, ,1 is now "guided by intuitions rather than concepts" (888.
W). Lacking the certainly of adequation and unable to appeal to convention with any sort of
"justification," one now "speaks in nothing but forbidden [verbotenen] metaphors and in
unheard-of combinations of concepts
[,BegriffifUgungen
] in order at least to correspond
creatively [schopferisch zu entsprechen] to the impression of the powerful present intuition
through the shattering and mocking [Zertriimmern and Verhohnen] of the old conceptual
limits [Begrijfsschmnkenr (889, 90).“ Such shattering and mocking brings the
correspondence theory of truth to an end. Nietzsche replaces it with a call "to correspond
creatively" to the singular and incomparable character of every experience by using
language in new, fantastic, ways. Using language anew, using language creatively,
requires the powers ol the fantasy to be brought into play and the irreducible space of
freedom between words and things reeallcd.
With this recollection, however, comes something frightening- legislative powers
capable of opposing the rule of an irrational form of reason just as easily as they mock the
laws of an untruthful mode of "truth." Having already discovered the "frightful powers
J. Hillis Miller rightly identifies these "forbidden metaphors and unheard-of
combinations of concepts" as examples of the "abusive" rhetorical figure known as




45, 47, 49. For the signilieanec of catachresis in relationship to
philosophical theories of rhetoric sec the essay by Jacques Derrida which lakes "On Truth
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" as its point of departure— "White Mythology Metaphor
in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins ofPhilosophy.
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\furchlbareMdchte}' of ihc fantasy and the ungovernable sphere of absolute difference
"T
PULS 'hCm ' nl° P 'ay "«>PP- scientific tnith with completely otherypes ol truths' [ganzandersgeanete
'WahrheUenT (886. 88). Rather than working
under the command of "truth's” mobile army, these '"truths'" free society front its
occupy,
„
g forces, in order to accomplish this liberating end, ihey reinvoke the power of
' °r,C and SPCak ln "f0rb 'ddCn metaPhors *>d uaheard of combinations of concepts "
Whereas the origina^ act of legislation led to an agreement over "truth" wh.ch no one
leg,slated but all agreed to, Nietzsche's discovery, or better, h,s recollection, of those
Inghilul powers capable of opposing the conventional understand,ng of "truth " puts the
leg, slat,vc power back into the hands of society's members, enabling them, indeed forcing
them, to rewnte Ihc contract on their own. Far from being an act of willful and subjective
nominalism, such legislation is a unique and necessary attempt to correspond creatively to
the singularity of experience w„h a freely enacted decision. Only the creative response and
the unique decsion-not the use of hardened and congealed metaphors-has any chance of
doing justice to that singularity. And farfrom simply replacing one convention with
another, the '"truths'" produced by Nietzsche's legislators are entirely unconventional. For
they arc nether simply "true" nor simply "lies." They arc, rather, true lies, what Nietzsche
variously rclcrs to throughout the Philosophenbuch as the "necessary-lie"
[.Noth-LUge]
and the "frcc-lic [f>«-tage]"»These lies call attention to their artifice and affirm their
artistic character. And to the extent that they arc artful, Nietzsche insists, they are a unique
and unprecedented lorm of "truthful illusion," for "art treats illusion as illusion: therefore it
KSA VII, 622. See also Brcazcalc, 96-7.
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docs not wish to deceive; it « true . " '7 If this form of '"truth"' does justice to singularity it
,S because ,t remembers absolute difference and al, that remains foreign to any social
'
contract and social convent,on. indeed, ,« remembers the fore.gner, "the singular and
enurely md.vtdual," and it remembers that sueh singularity always speaks in a "foreign
language" (884, 86).
Nietzsche's essay ends by opening up a passageway for a "completely foreign
language" and for everyth, ng that remains fote.gn to a contract. By ending here, he can',
help but introduce a certain disorder into the "peace" of soe.al life, for every opening of the
socal contract breaks with its conventions by refusing to be governed by the deaden,ng
power of „s laws. And ye. this opening cannot do without those conventions and laws
ether. Just as there is no pure, unmediated access to the Dionysian in The Birth of
Tragedy, there is no unmediated access to the "completely foreign" either. The language of
convent,,,,, may not be a "true" language, but it is the only language ava.lable. If ,hat
convenuon is to be opened up and held open, then the aporetic disjunct,on between the
absolutely foreign and the utterly conventional, between the singular individual and the
social totality, requires resolution. While the language of convention stands in the way of
such a resolution, an opening ex, sis in the rules govern,ng its use. Indeed, Nietzsche’s
essay is nothing other than an extended meditation on those rules, a meditation which
demonstrates above all how they preclude every mediation between convention and the
unconventional by subordinating the latter to the former through Ihc petrification of various
rhetorical formations. But Nietzsche's essay also demonstrates the possibility of speaking
in "forbidden metaphors,” in metaphors which break with the rules of convention and put
37





C knov"lcdf of error
" Sec Paul dc Man's "Anthropomorphism and Trope
Zul ,(242) IZ Sl!S a charactcrization. It cannot be claimed, however, as dc Man docs,that this ormol truth is an attempt to "stop the turn towards error," for Nietzsche's essay
makes no such claim. Sec his "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)" in Allegories ofReading,
lid. Like dc Man s attempt to show how the essay deconstructs itself by falling into
contradictions Nietzsche is supposedly unaware of, J. Hillis Miller's efforts to demonstrate
at it is lncohcicnt and "sell-dismantling" ("Dismembering and Disremembcring in
Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense'," 51) can only succeed by claiming
that Nietzsche somehow overlooked the rhetorical dimension of his own text. Since
Nietzsche everywhere couches his presentation in explicitly rhetorical terms— nowhere
moic so than in his definition ol "truth" as a "mobile army"— such claims remain
unconvincing.
84
hose rule .o use in the service of the unconventionai. One cun, for instance, as Ntetzsche
aentons,rates, "destgnate the streanr as the ntov,ng path whtch eatrtes ntan where he wouldotherwise walk" ,888, 90). Thts destgnatton does no, obey the rule of "truth.- Rather "i,
“T" ,nt° COnfUS‘°n^ d ' SP'aces lx’undary -ones of abstractions" ,888
;
" y 8 S°' ' tChangeS thC ™leS °f the Those rules govern the tnte.lce,
ens ave to the drtve for truth," tnsurtng that i, obeys convention by handling concepts
‘ 6
’ USmg eVe°' d ‘e aS 11 15 des*8nated, count, ng its spots accurately, formtng the
ngh, rubrics and never violating the order of castes and sequence of class rank" (88- 85)
Ntetzsche, by contrast, alters the rules of the game and opens „ up to the free play of the
fantasy: "Thts drtve conttnuously confuses the rubrtes and cells of the concepts due to the
lact that it scLs lorth new translercnces, metaphors, metonymies; it continually shows the
destre to form the present world of the waking man so colorful, irregular, lacking ,n results
and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams" (887, 89). Setting
lorth eternally new transferences, metaphors, metonymies is precisely what convention
dictates against, yet it is the only possible res^nse to the absolutely foreign and new whtch
can be justified. While following the law repeats convention to the point of reducing the
individual to ashes, passing through the sphere of absolute dtfference responds to the
advent ol the loreigner by simultaneously repeating and transforming convention through
the invention of new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies. The terms remain the
same, but them meaning is transformed by altering their syntactical and rhetorical
relationship to one another. Nietzsche's ability to "designate the stream as the moving path
which carries man where he would otherwise walk" puts an end to solid ground of reason
and the simple intentionality of walking. Indeed, it legislates the meaning of "man" anew
by respecting the rules of convention that first created a rational world to be strolled
thiough with security. But this form of singular legislation respects those rules by
demonstrating the Iragile structure of the world they create, just as it creates the very
condition to which it refers: A stream W'hich carries man through life. Most peculiar of all,
then, this mode ol legislation creates the conditions which justify its creations, leaving
everything dillerent and nothing the same. The new, the different, and the excluded
suddenly entet into social life, not in order to be assimilated by its conventions, but to
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change those conventions oner nnH r,x,- on . , .ce and for all, and to do so ,n a manner which justifies the“ “ °f S°mClhln8 ^**** a„d was previously ouUawed: A slrca„,
mSUlnCC
' WhiCh CUrnCS ma" lhr™*h of legislation u.ses the rules of
'
convenhon agatnst themselves and opens them up to the freedom i, was destgned to
exclude, and thts freedom creates new conceptual relahons and new designations which
.ogether dcm,>nstrate the intellect's liberation through a playful performance: "That
monstrous framework [GaMtt] and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings
throughout his life in order to save himself is nothing but a scaffolding
| Geriisl] and play
8 [SP'elZeUg] k>r lhC b°ldCSl feats nsWUcke
]
of the 1,berated \freigey,ordenen\
intellect: And when he smashes this framework to p,cccs, throws ,, into confusion,
ironically puts it back together, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, i, is
revealed that n docs not need these makeshifts of neediness" (888, 90).
The liberated intellect, the intellect wh.eh passes through the sphere of freedom and
legislates anew, deciding on its own, no longer needs convention to guide it. 38 Legislating
anew, .1 perpetually reinvents convention, and only this incessant inventing, this always
deciding anew, suffices to resolve the contradictory structure of that convention. For only
then is the universality of the contract at its basis sufficiently brought into play with the
singularity of the individuals who agree to it. Only then are those individuals really
legislators and participants, and only then arc these legislators liberated enough to freely
respond to the singularity of experience and the sphere of absolute difference. So long as
the process of legislation continues, life is no longer measured against a nonexistent
measure with transcendent validity-convention, "truth"-and so it is no longer subjected
to the "distortion [Verzemmg]* (888, 90) which every fixed convention invariably effects.
Rather than sul lenng the distorting and deadening effects of a fixed and sedentary life,
these legislators revel in play and "dissimulation [Verstellung]" (888, 90)— in free and
necessary lies— and this mode of being, this form of life, constitutes for Nietzsche the only
But nor is it guided by its own pure autonomy. Rather, the intellect is subjected to
the play of the sphere of freedom, what Paul dc Man, following Roland Barthes, aptly
characterizes as "la liberation du signifiant." Sec his comments in Allegories ofReading
114-115.
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possible good life. Once the ,nte,lec. i. freed front the d.storting and deaden effects of
petrified convention, i, "cop.es human hfe, but takes it for a good dung" (888 90)
Copying hfe, reproducing it creative, y, or dissimulating ,t with free and necessaiy
.cs each o these acts amounts to the same thing, and each legislates from an extnt-mora,
' Phere which knows nothing but the good life. Each of these free speech acts knows
nothing of a transcendent "truth" in whose light life would appear wanting, imperfect
untruth! ul, and evil. And knowing nothing of this higher sphere of "truth," the individual
can, indeed, must live a life of tme lies, a hfe in which the mendacity of convention ,s
acknowledged, affirmed, even embraced. No, only is such honesty a condition of the good
life, but ,t ,s an absolute requirement for living together with foreigners and making peace
with everything that remains foreign to conventionality. For the good life, the life of free
and necessary lies, recognizes the limits of convention, opens up to a "foreign language,"
and responds to its call. If a certain mendacity and deceptiveness inevitably marks this
response, it is an acknowledgement of the impossibility of a truly adequate response and a
truly adequate decision. So long as this impossibility is acknowledged, the response may
involve a certain deceptiveness, but it "deceives without injuring [ohne zu schaden," (888,
90). No longer deceiving itself about the difficulty of responding, this form of response
genuinely respects the foreignness of the foreigner. And the foreigner lies not only beyond
the bounds of convention and outside the reach of any social contract; something of the
foreigner persists at the very center of every social contract and every social convention.
No language is capable of grasping the individual at the heart of society, and no language
can guarantee that it is adequate to "the singular and entirely individual." Making peace with
foreigners, then, not only means that the social contract must be perpetually legislated anew
in an endless effort to accommodate the foreigner. It also means making peace with
ourselves, with the inability to grasp the self perfectly and put ourselves on stable ground
once and tor all. It means accepting that the human being is carried through life on
something no more stable, unchanging, or solid than a stream— the stream of time.
A1 firming this absence ol transcendentals, this lack ol eternal foundations, this want, in
short, ol "truth," means affirming the foreigner who always haunts the individual, both
within society and without. Only then is the good life possible, only then is the promise of
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llV1"8 l°8ether n° ‘°nger empty
' and ««. as in a dream, ,s evening posstble in.»»— <*,. w. This „„„
intrav
e Soc,al contract and ,n evety attempt to formulate a form of assoc,at,on and mode of
being-together worthy of pohttca, phtlosophy's ortgtna, goal-thc good hfe. Ntcbtsche was
certatnly never an orthodox pohttca, phhosopher, bu, this is the lesson whtch concludes hts
e ucatton tn rhetonc. „ was a lesson in,ended for the German natton, bu, no "free" society
can avoid it. J
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CHAPTER IV
NIETZSCHE'S PRACTICE OF WARFARE
: DAVID STRAUSS THE
CONFESSOR AND THE WRITER
— Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
"Great Politics"
In Ecce Homo
, Nietzsche insists upon the importance of "David Strauss the
Confessor and the Writer," the first of hts four Untimely Meditations. In contras, to the
hostile reception which greeted the publication of The Birth ofTragedy a year and a half
earlier, this first attempt a, cultural criticism was, from the vantage point of a man
concluding hts authorship, an "extraordinary success.- Its "success” lies as much in Karl
Htllcbrand'sjudgement that it was the "best polemical text ever wntten in German" as it
does in the storm of protest which elicited upon publication.’ For the essay was intended
to be "offensive" (§11), to provoke a public which had already made up its mind and
icndcrcd its judgement on the cultural significance of a military victory. If the essay's
polemical style had an "indescribable impact" on public opinion, if it provoked debate
where there had been none, if it resulted in a series of "insanely hostile" newspaper
reviews, then these responses were sure signs of success and guarantors of the essay's
c, ,.
David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller," in Sdmtliche Werke
, Kritische
G,orgl° Colh and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1V8U) 1, 157-^42. All references to Nietzsche's writings will be to this edition.
I ranslations from the German are my own. Citations will be given in the body of the text in
accordance with the essay's numbered divisions. A translation of the text printed in the
Kritische Studienausgabe may be found in Unfashionable Observations, trans Richard T
Grey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
Ecce Homo
, "The Untimely Ones," §2.
Ibid.
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significance— the polemic had hit its target, it "had touched the sore spot of a vtctonous
nation," it had moved the public .
4
But Nietzsche also gives another reason for the essay's importance, one which has
ess to do with its reception than the evolution of h,s own concept of politics. In this brief
polemic, he says, something unheard-of finds a voice and makes itself known for the firs,
Ume: "A" en 'irely Bew mode of fre<= spiritedness [erne ganz neue ArtFreigeisterei]."*
Nietzsche attributes the newness of this free spirit to its wtllingness, everywhere evident in
David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer," to use language freely, to engage in
polemics, to write in an "offensive" style and make use, as he puts it, of an "unconditional
Ireedom of speech [unbedingtenRedefreiheii]."* And this conditionless freedom of speech,
this freedom to draw the sword, to enter into a duel and attack with the pen-this freedom
is not just new ,n its spiritedness; ,t ,s also the first sign in Nietzsche's oeuvre of a new
"concept of politics
[.BegriffPolitik]": "Greatpolitics [grosse Politik].' 7
In contrast to the sickly "petty politics [kleinen Politik]" of European nationalism or
the Realpoluik that dominated the German Reich in the postwar period, "great politics" is a
Friedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche Briefe, Kritiscfie Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli
and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), vol. 4, 157; Ecce Homo "The
Untimely Ones," §2. For a discussion of the letter, see Richard T. Grey's "Translator's
Afterword, " Unfashionable Observations, 399-400.
Ecce Homo, "The Untimely Ones," §2.
6
Ibid.
Ibid., "Why I am Destiny," §1.
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spirits
[ Geislerkrieg]," a "battle [Kampf] against the lies of the millennia < u
eschews positivistic definitions of politics as much as it d«s power politics, waging its
struggles outside of the institutions of parliament and independently of established political
parties and entrenched political positions. "Great politics” carries on, ,ts offensives ,n
language. It politicizes its prose and makes it "offensive." It wntes in an "offensive" style
and puts into practice a theory of polern.es and linguistic warfare." Perhaps more than any
other writer, Nietzsche employs a style which is polemical, offensive, oppositional and
antagonistic. 10 Although the new mexie of spintual warfare embodied ,n this combative style
is only conceptualized in hislater writings, its highly sublimated form of struggle can
bctween^Ss'C^^^^:




1 ohtikerund Soziologe (Essen: Die Blau Eule, 1994), 74-151; Bruce Detwiler Niet-Jhethe Politics ofAristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990)54-58. Excepting Lowith 's brief comments, none of these discussions take Nietzsche's
’





ie relatlon of style to "great politics," see Alan Schrift, Nietzsche and the
Question ofInterpretation: Between Hermeneutics andDeconstruction (New York-
Kentledge), 159- 160. For a discussion of style in Nietzsche's final polemics which departs
liom his earliest investigations into the Greeks, see Claudia Crawford's fine essay
Nietzsche s Psychology and Rhetoric of Redemption: Dionysus versus the Crucified " in
Nietzsche and Depth Psychology, ed. Jacob Golomb, Weaver Santaniello, Ronald Lehrer
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 271-294.
The titles of Nietzsche's books are instructive: The Genealogy ofMorals- A
Polemic [Eine Streitschriftf Twilight of the Idols , or How to Philosophize with a Hammer,
The Anti-Christ
, Nietzsche Contra Wagner. The polemical character of many of his other
texts is implicit in their titles: Untimely Meditations-, Human, All Too Human: A Book for
Free Spirits', Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudice ofMorality, Beyond Good and Evil:
Prelude to a Philosophy ofthe Future.
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Lie 111
- be seen a, work in Che "eternal battle [ewigen Kampfi between the titeoretica, and,rm
:
7 0l '"e WOr,d’ « lhC—< ™ °fTragedy « .7), Jusl as i, can beseen al work m hts attack on certain mendacious concepts of "truth” in "On Truth and .
the Extra-Mora! Sense.” But it is only in the warhke series of essays gathered together
un e, the Utle Vnttmely Meditations that Nietzsche makes the polem.c and its agonistic code
<»l conduct his primary mode of pohlica, struggle." first essay wages war on a book by
JV ‘d StraUSS
’ bl" N'" ' nSistS lhal hls atla<* has less to do with personal animosity
or an aggress, ve resseminten, than wtth a "prac.tcc of warfare
| Kriegs-PraxisT winch
attacks problems rather than persons- "I nrvor ici , i never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the
person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but
creep, ng and elustve calamity. Thus I attacked David Strauss-more precisely, the success
ol a senile book w„h the 'cultured' pet,pie of Germany: I caught this culture in the act.'"’
And what Nietzsche caught it in the act of was its own decline and degeneration into a form
ol barbarism whose signs are magnified as much by Strauss's book as they are by the
book's success with the German public.
II Nietzsche's attack on Strauss really does represent his first attempt at "great
politics"— and everything in Fcce Homo indicates that it docs-it is not difficult to
mi
On.the use ol polemics and its affinity with the agon seel P Stern
R
.'
J - Hollin>^lc (Cambridge: Cambridgeuniveisity Press, I JX9), x-xiv. For Nietzsche's own discussion of the aoon's politie-tlimport, sec Homers Wcttkampl," Sdmtliche Werke






: 4 Frenzied Look (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 1990)~ -, Bcrgmann, Nietzsche, the Ixist Antipolitical German , " I -5; Waller Kaufmann




1(7schc s use of polemics, sec Ronald Hayman, Nietzsche: A( ritual Life (New York: Oxlord University, 1980), 161. For Nietzsche's own
ol the success! ul polemic, sec his letter of 25 October, 1872, in Sdmtliche
Fcce Homo
, "Why I am so Wise," 7. This statement finds support in Nietzsche's
letter to Gersdorff, written 1 1 February, 1874, six months after the publication of his
essay He writes there: "Yesterday al Ludwigsburg they buried David Strauss. I very much
hope that I did not sadden his last months, and that he died without knowing anything
about me. It's rather on my mind." Sec Sdmtliche Iiriefe, vol. 4, 200. It should be recalled
that Strauss's Life ofJesus (1835) profoundly influenced Nietzsche as a student in Bonn
and contributed to his rejection of Christianity. Sec Curt Paul Janz, Nietzsche (Munich:
Carl Hanscr, 1978), I, 146; Werner Ross, Der dngstliche Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches
Irehen (Munich: Dcutschcr Taschcnbuch Vcrlag, 1994), 156; Horst Althaus Friedrich
Nietzsche (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstcin, 1993), 76.
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nderstand why he turns to a new concept of pohtics at precisely this moment. A year and aa carhcr, Ntetzsche could s,i„ hope that Wagner's revo.uttonary mus.c dramas would
‘
ba he the ears of Germany wtth tragedy, cathan.c dtthyramh, g.vmg b,nh to a form of
Pt.ht.cs that would signal a recovery from the mode™ stckness of nationalism and the
rccmcrgence of the great political contest, familiar to the Greeks. But in the wake of the
hostile reception THe BinH ofTragedy received, to say nothtng of the jingo,sm and Hag-
wav, ng that followed Germany, victory the Franeo-Prusstan War, the ba„s for the
young phtlologist, hopes foundered as the nation, passion for politics-wha, Ntetzsche,
hrs, book calls "the pel, t,cal"-grew to measureless proportions as i, succumbed toa
pathological form of nationalist self-glorification.
N.ct/sche's first attempt to resolve this problem appears in the essay written
contemporaneously with the first Untimely Meditation-''On Truth and Lie in the Extra-
Moral Sense." The essay investigates the ReichsgrUndung through a consideration of the
mechanisms at work in the legislation of any social contract, showing how the act of
founding a nation always depends upon a prior linguistic contract which endows the
language of convention with an authority and a power so persuasive that social life takes on
qualities conventionally reserved for the description of prison life. When Nietzsche ends
the essay by speculating on the role which a genuine culture might play in reversing this
process, he raises a topic which will be central to every one of his f uture writings.
Indeed, "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer" picks up where these brief
speculations on culture leave off. But rather than simply speculating on the role which
culture might play in reversing the authoritarian tendencies of political foundings, Nietzsche
now attempts to understand the power of a peculiar form of "culture" in the newly founded,
postwar Reich. To this extent his polemic is an extended meditation on the relationship
between culture and politics at a particular moment in history, and as his meditation
progresses, as he looks closer and closer at the role of "culture" in the newly founded
Reich, he notices something peculiar: These two phenomena— culture and politics, Geist
and Reich
, spirit and state— appear ever more difficult to differentiate. Their concepts
become ever less distinct, ever less clear, until finally one of them— the "concept of
culture
' (§ 1)— disappears altogether and the two begin to merge. What they merge into is a
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7 " f0m °f CUHUra' °r^ • new form of politicized cullure— „ isililliciili (o ld I which once thc distinctions between these two spheres begin to blur Bu,
whichever it is-a„d they may vciy well bc the same- this merging togeU,e, this blending
a"d m,X ",S °' PI
'
CV ' <,,ISly diSlincl na and previous distmc, spKcres-a„ of thi ,
lnS1SlS
' CharaClCr,ZCS deVel°Pme^ which arc by no means confined to ,hc
postwar Retch. Indeed, these developments are characteristic of something so new so all
pervasive and so characteristically modem, that they signal the emergence of "die 'modern
as such' \das Muderne an „W,'|« « | ). The "modern as such": The loss of distinctions the
conluston of qualities, the mixing of styles, the obliteration of individual differences, the
emergence ol chaos-each of these developments characterizes modem Germany, each is
id levied the distinctly "modern idea" of the "'culture-state' I'Ortar Sum']," and each
signals thc collapse of thc distinction between culture and the state, the German dels,
(spirtt) and the German Reich. » This is the "new phenomenon" which characterizes the
age, and il makes "thc stale the guiding star of cultivation \midung\." H
Whereas everything about thc age tends towards a certain nihilism, towards the
annihilation of differences and even "diversity" (§2), Nietzsche's polemic attempts to
clan I y, conceptualize, and correctly name these new developments. It attempts to counter
the drive towards systematicity, uniformity, and meaninglessness by driving a wedge
between culture and the state, by wrenching thc "Kidturstaaf apart in order to clarify the
concepts it unites under the mantle of thc imperious nation-state. This process of conceptual
/ wilight of the Idols, "What the Germans I .aek," §4. Nietzsche had already rciccted
ic elevation ol the "modern slate" to thc "'culture-state' {'Kullurstaaf]" in his 1872ec iiics ( n the I uturc ol our 1 Educational Institutions" by disclosing its I legclian premise"his hird lecture he stales, "it would perhaps be no exaggeration .0 say that, in the
subordination ol all strivings for cultivation \llildungsbeslrebungen\ to the ends ol state,
IUSM.I has appropriated, with success, the principle and useful heirloom ol thc I legclian
philosophy whose apotheosis of the stale \Apotheose ties Status
|
certainly reaches itssummn ", ,1,1s subordination." Sec "Uberdic Zukunrt unserc Bildungsanslaltcn" in
Stiinlliclic Werlce Krilisclie SUuUentnsgabe, 1, 706, 70S. A translation of the lectures may
l>c I on nd 111 On the h Mure ofour Educational Institutions; llomer and Classical Philoloev
tians. J. M. Kennedy (New York: MacMillan Company, 19 1 I). On the new Reich's
kidlurslaat and Kullurkampf, see Bergmann, Nietzsche, "the Last Antipolitical German "
Gordon Craig, Germany 1866 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 69-
/O.
"Ober die Zukunft unserc Bildungsanslaltcn," 710 (trails. 90).
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clarification is already underway in the esxiv’c ...
, ,
i me says opening pages. There Nietzsche describes
7 ;
bClW“n “ PeCU"ar f°rm °f Germa" ”CUllUrC" and lhC viconous Helen
. r cr to distinguish as clearly as possible between those qualities whieh led to victory i„
the Franco-Prussian War and those wh.eh serve German culture and the German spirit
’
iSS&sssrrsevcurance ’ of
nothing to do with culture— brought
8 ’ cd ln short, qualities that have
most important ofSqu^S'“ V,C^ OTWJenemies wh« lacked the
itself "mltiirp" in n ^
cs, one ean only wonder that what now calls
sSSS3sS?aa.
The militarization of "culture," its reduction to a means for realizing the demands of
warfare, for disciplining the body and training it to obey commands and follow the
Icader-none of this has anything to do with Nietzsche's concept of culture, nor does a
military victory have anything in common with his notion of cultural supenority. 15 Just as
the Macedonians' victor,es over the Greeks demonstrated only stricter discipline and greater
obedience- moral qualities, not cultural virtues-so loo does Germany's victory over
France demonstrate only the supenority of their officers and armies in the conducting of
warfare. And ,f Germany's victory ,s analogous in importance to the Macedonians'- this ,s
the analogy Nietzsche goes on to make— then the confusion of superior military might with
cultural superiority discloses not the triumph of German culture over French culture but a
blurring of spheres which ought to remain distinct and a mixing of values which are in
reality opposed to one another. When this blurring and mixing manifests itself in the
"subservience" of the sphere of culture to the demands of military leaders, when the sphere
' S
.
9" the relat'on of culture to militarism in Nietzsche's thinking and its uselessness to
National Socialism, see Georges Bataille, "Nietzsche and National Socialism," in On
Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 171. On the confusion
0 Reich s military ambitions with Germany's cultural achievements, see R. J.
Hollmgdale, Nietzsche (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 19-20. For an analysis
01 the military victory which concludes with a discussion of Nietzsche's insights sec*
Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945
, 34-37. See also Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche and
Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 7-8.
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'^ or "something that
2 "I “ tranSf°rmCd lnt° “— » a campaign an, an instr,
nil
* !'
lh° Cn<,S^ CmPlrC ' CUSe
’ CUlture ’ or Something that calls itself
urc is reduced to an instrument of politics, the military, and the Reich. And once the
cultural sphere becomes a space where political power can be exercised, mihtary virtues
i nculcated, and the objectives of the Reich realized, then "cu,ture”-or "someth,ng that calls
CU,tUre emergeS US a SPhcrc wh^ a distinctly modem form of power can be
exercised and a distinctly modern form of politics pul into practice.
Nietzsche locates the distinctiveness of th.s form of power ,n its ineluctable
negativity, a negativity which shares nothing in common w„h the qualil.es so often taken to
dclmc power: Ability, capabihty, and possibdity. 1„ contra,, to positive, productive
manifestations of power, the form of power which manifests itself in the cultural sphere of
the post-war Reich tends towards the very opposite: A militaristic aggression ending ,n
negation, abolition, and annihilation, each of which Nietzsche captures with the word
"extirpation." This "thing that calls itself culture," "if one allows ,1 to flourish and
proliferate, if one pampers it with the flattering delusion that il has been victorious, then it
has the power," Nietzsche says, "to extirpate the German spirit." Extirpation-the death of
spirit (deist) and onset of mindless (geistlos) national,sm- would result from the abolition
of the distinction between culture and polities, deist and Reich, freedom and militarism.
And il these distinctions arc abolished, Nietzsche insists, then Germany’s military victory
will be transformed into "a total defeat: Into the defeat-nuked, the extirpalion-oflhe
German deist infavor of the •German Reich" (§1). Confusing empire with spirit,
rendering politics indissociable Irom the ends of the imperious nation-state, subordinating
the spirit ol the nation to the ends of nationalism and its culture to the Reich— neither the
modern Reich nor its military forces arc capable of resolving these problems, for their
origin is "modern" politics itself. No wonder, then, that Nietzsche turns to a new "concept
9ft
°f fK1""CS" and “^ PraCt,Ce °f CUUural -rf- in the firs, Un,imelyMeCUatio, „ is
necessitated by the times themselves. 16
***




UltUre °r a f°re *gn arnty . This "batt'e [Kampjy is waged against an "inner cncmv"
,heo*^l«=*« thc centerofithe conn.ct is the concept of culture itself. "Culture"
'
becomes a locus of conn,c, and a field of battle the moment it is politicized, nationalized
and pu, in service of ends unrelated to its own. Whether this process takes the form of the
militarization of "culture" or is subordination to the ends of a*** matte, little- the same
results ensue, and the identical problems emerges: Distinctions break down, confusion sets
3nd m,sundersla"dl "S! hikes over. And no more significant misunderstanding emerges
tn the postwar Reich than the confusion of a military victory with a cultural triumph. It
threatens spirit with its annihilation and the nation with the mindlessness that takes over
whenever power ,s accumulated for power's sake. Clarifying this confusion and resolving
the problems it poses requires drawing distinctions, demarcating spheres, and
differentiating concepts. The first step in this process has already been seen: Nietzsche
distinguishes as sharply as possible between military virtues and genuine culture, between
the German Reich and German spirit. Once this distinction is in place, he proceeds to
examine the relationship between French culture and German "culture" at war's end. That
relationship, he says, appears no different than it did before the war: French culture still
persists. Indeed, not only does it still persist, but German "culture" remains as dependent
upon it as ever. Not only do the French "have a genuine culture," but it is from them,
Nietzsche insists, that the "Germans have hitherto copied everything" (§1). Not only did
the Germans not defeat French culture with their military superiority, not only does
Germany lack a genuine culture, but the Germans, to the extent that they posses a culture at
copy 11 from their neighbors-and poorly at that. And if German culture did not defeat
On the problems which modernity poses to politics for Nietzsche, see Daniel
Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (New' York: Routledge, 1997), 43-47; Keith Ansell-
Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker
, 83-97; Bonnie Flonig
Political Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993 )
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nch culture, .f Germany lacks a culture of its own and even borrows from the Frenchwhy, despite the unorigmality of thts copytng, imitatmg, and reproducing, does the
’
German publtc perstst in confustng a military victory with a cultural tnumph^
More than anyth,ng else, the d,spate between Nietzsche and hts enemtes revolvesround this quest,on and the mtsunderstandtng at its source. That mtsunderstandtng
* ttself as much the public's optmons about its "cultural" superiority as it does ,n
opinionators who tell the public wha, it wants to hear. Counter, ng confusion,
'
mtsunderstandtng, and opinion, on the other hand, requires not only a certain free
sptr, tedness and freedom of speech capable of ustng language without regard to the
imperatives dictating, command, ng, and ordenng opinion and convention. Free
spirttcdness and free speech are insufficient to the extent tha, they subst.tute one opmion for
another, one convent,on with another. As always, N,etZsche a,ms for more than jus,
opinion and convention, and in the first Untimely Meditation nothing short of the proper
name will do. One must names names, one must draw distinctions and differentiates
between concepts if a successful campatgn is to be waged agatns, a htghly milttanzed
publtc. And the first thing to be named, the firs, "thing" to be identified, unmasked, and
conceptual, zed, is, Ntetzsche writes, "this thing that calls itself culture [dieses Kultur sich
nennende Bwas]’ (§1). For this "thing that calls itself culture" is "culture" only in the most
nominal sense of the word. Indeed, it is the modern phenomenon of nominal,sm, the loss
o! proper names, correct concepts, and meaningful words, which lies at the origin of the
misunderstanding. Resolving it and winning the war against this "thing," this "inner
enemy,” depends as much upon disclosing the mechanisms working to conceal its true
identity as it does upon naming the rulers whose power is at work in its concealment.
Nietzsche pens the problem and names the power responsible for it at the opening of the
essay’s second section:
How is it yet possible that among the cultivated Germans the greatest
contentment prevails, a contentment that, since that last war, has shown
itself ready to break out in arrogant jubilation and to wax tnumphant? We
live under the illusion of having a genuine culture: The monstrous contrast
between this contented, indeed, triumphant faith and the obvious defect it
conceals appears to be noticed by only the rare few. For all those who opine
with public opinion [mit der djfentlichen Meinung meint] have bound their
eyes and plugged their ears— that contrast simply ought not to be there.
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and simple feelings'? I will name this n
C
|t\4
e expression of such strong
being, by its name [beTZZn nlnnfrZl
lh,S SpCC,CS of hu™n
IBildungsphilister],
cy are the cultivatedphilistines
In this paradoxical portrau of postwar Germany, it is not the politicians who ate in
power, nor do they gu.de public op.nion. The "power" whteh rules Germany in the wake
o the mc^runauns, Nietzsche says, is a species of human betng whose proper name ,<
the cultivated phtl,stine. Th.sd.st.netly modern phenomenon is no. simply a matter of
philistinism, of an indifference, disdain, or even opposition to culture. The "cultivated
Philistine" must be differentiated from the phi I, stine, for this species of human being is so
hide opposed to culture that „ takes itself to be the only one who possesses it. The
cultivated philistine knows what culture is, and it is certain in itsjudgemen,. And knowing
what culture is, the cultivated philistine assumes a certain power-,he power to name, to
use language is it will, and this means the power to "call itself [sic/, something u is
not: "Culture." This power, Nietzsche discovers, is exercised in ethical prescriptions that
take the lorm of an imperative. Just as everything in "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral
Sense" turns upon a certain "moral sense" at the heart of society which makes itself felt ,n
an imperative commanding the "truthful" use of language, and just as this imperative exerts
a power over society which is in truth neither ethical nor truthful, so too does everything in
David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer" revolve around an ethical imperative at the
heart of the post-war Reich which lacks an ethical basis but nevertheless functions as a
lorm of power capable of dictating what one "ought not" feel, think, or say . 17 In the
al termath ol the war, public opinion and its opimonators dictate that one "ought not" speak
°f lhe monstrous incongruity between the illusion of culture and the real thing.
Wheieas in "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense," Nietzsche had referred
the origin ol a similar lorm of power to a mythical, even unconscious, social contract, he
now' locates this distinctly modern form of power, this power to name the real and bring it
into existence, with those who control language and the dissemination of opinion in the
See "Uber Wahrheit und Liige im aussermoralischcn Sinnc," Samtliche Werke
Kritische Sludienausgabe, I, 881 -2 .
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,C sphere— ihc "journalists, the ’fabricate* iFabrikanten
|
of novels, traged.es poemsan htstor.es- («). Indeed, these opmionators appear so united in their beliefs their
control of language appears so centred, that the question of conspiracy becomes
unavoidable. And no, only docs Nietzsche ^se th.s poss.bd.ty and speak of a
homogeneous group- wh.eh "seems to have conspired to take control bmaMgat] of
he modern human being's hours of idleness and meditation-his 'cultural moments' " but
c goes on identify the method employed to aeh.eve this control: They "anesthehze him
by means ol the pnnted page [durch Mruck.es Papier Zu bemubenY (§1). The power of
.he word, of language, and power over the word and language, the power to control its
use, to print wha, one wants-,his is the power of any "homogeneous group" wh.eh
controls the printing presses, and this same power is required for any attempt "to control-
public opinion. If Nietzsche discovers a form of control and power ,n the mechanisms of
the modern media, if he sees the potential to "anesthetize [beUuben]" the individual by
means of the printed page, i, is because the incessant How of printed pages does not simply
s.un, deafen, numb, and stupefy the modern human bemg-it is even capable of deadening
the spirit and ktlhng off life. Each of these possibilities ,s inscribed ,n the word "beUmben,"
and each of these meanings emerges in the course of Nietzsche's essay as he examines h,s
conspirators. Indeed, not only do they emerge, but they emerge to conspire against the
conspirators themselves. For their conspiracy is one in appearance only. These journalists,
writers, and publishers only "seem [scheint]" to have formed a conspiracy. In actuality they
lubricate their narrative of cultural triumph in good faith, in a "tnumphant faith" which
renders them just as anesthetized to feeling the monstrous contrast between genuine culture
and its labricated imitation as anyone else.
It is not enough, then, simply to name names. Nietzsche must also bring this
triumphant laith" into conceptual clarity. For the power of the cultivated philistine rests on
laith alone, and so long as that "laith" persists, so long as it resists rational
comprehension and conceptual elucidation, the power of this "faith" will continue to
exercise power over its believers. So long as that power persists, the cultivated philistine
will continue to have "laith"— "faith" in his judgements, "faith" in his ability to judge, and,
above all, "laith" in the supremacy of these judgements. For so firmly and fanatically do
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the cultivated Philistines believe m thDP bel, the,r power tojudge, that they feel themselves to be notjust an entirely trustworthy court of judgement but ev
philistine " Mipt ,,
g t, even a supreme court. The "cultivated
P -hne, Nietzsche says, has become "the supremejudge Voters,en Richters^ of allGerman cultural problems" (§2), The cultivated philistine holds court and adjudicates over
a ju tcators, of these judges, lies the parttcular effect whtch them fatth has on thetr
ju gements. In eve^ case, and in good, even tnumphant, fatth, these judges err in the.r
ectsion. Indeed, they err because of their "fatth," because of their eonfuston of fatth wtth
genutne knowledge, real concepts, and rational thought. Whenever knowledge concepts
and reason are renounced in favor of faith, judgement ,s bound to err. Or so Ntetzsche
’
says. Judgtng judgement, judging the judges, assuming a still more supreme post,,on of
judgement-each of these tasks is fraught with diffieult.es, for each requires the tnvoeation
° “ meaSUr6
' 3 Cnten°n
' °r a conceP‘ its own judgements and decisions are to be
just, lied m turn. Every attempt to provtde such guarantors, however, invartably regresses
mto endless quest,ons about the cr, tenon employed to guarantee their correctness whtle
avoiding the question of cr, tenon, on the other hand, only leaves the problem unresolved
and open to the whims of public opinion and its opinionators. This problem, the
stmultamous need for and absence of a entenon by wh.ch one might adjudicate over
problems of culture, forms the nnpasse haunting every sentence of Nietzsche's essay.
Every sentence is an attempt to come to terms with it, and nowhere more so than w hen
Nietzsche mourns the loss of the one concept which could bring the confusion at war's end
to a close through the clarification of the judges' errors in judgement. That confusion
derives "Irani the fact that in Germany the pure concept of culture [der reine Begriffder
Kiillnr] has been lost” (§1). Nietzsche never says where that concept might be found, but
the definition he discovers locked within it leaves little doubt about its Greek origins.
"Culture"- this is the definition Nietzsche gives- "is above all the unity of artistic style
expressed in all the manifestations of a people's life [Kulture isl vor alien, Einheil des
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unstlertschen Sales m alien Lebensdusserungen ernes Volkes]" (§ l).'« when he ihcn
rontrasts this definition of genuine culture with "barbarism," it becomes clear that it is the
reeks, ,he people who first contrasted themselves with the barbanans, who prov.de .he
enter,on aga.nst wh.ch Germany, afitsttc accomp.ishments must be measured. Measured
against th.s or, ter,on, what passes for culture ,„ Germany looks like the very opposite of
genume culture. Measured against th.s entenon, the real name for what calls itself "culture"
,n Germany ,s "barbansm." "Barbar,sm"-,he very oppos.te of "culture"-,s the "absence
of style [SBMsWn or the chaot.c confusion of al, styles"
(§ .). And once style becomes
the enter,on for d.stmgu.sh.ng between culture and barbarism, the problem of style moves
to the forefront of Nietzsche's essay.
The Problem of Style
Everything in the first Untimely Meditation revolves around the problem of style,
and no topic has received more attention in recent years among Nietzsche's readers than
this one." It comes as someth,ng of a surpnse, then, to discover that Nietzsche's most
d.rect, extensive, and wide rangmg d.scussion of the topic occurs in a text wh.ch has
received as little attention as "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer." 20 The
unfashionableness of the essay's treatment of the topic- its relentless critique of cultural
philistinism— may have something to do with this, but whatever the reasons, the essay
n Daniel Breazeale's "Introduction" to his translation of Nietzsche's earlv notes
m






scusslons - See Philosophy and Truth: Selectionsfrom
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S N°tebooks °f t le Early 1870 's (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1992),
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Robert Ackermann's ground breaking work stands alone as the only sustained
investigation of the essay. See his Nietzsche: A Frenzied Is)ok, 27-42.
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canno, easily be , gnored or dlsm,ssed as a product ofjuvenilta. One reason for thts hasa ready been seen: -'David Strauss the Confessor and the Wnter" ,s Niefzsche's first attentpt
great pohttcs,- a, a politic conftned by netther the ,mpera„ves of the nat.on-state nor the
nationalism so character^,c of modern pohttcs. The essay's efforts to come to terms with
op,c of styie, on the other hand, se, the stage for each of his later d,sessions of the
pro era. When, for instance, Nietzsche takes up The Case of Wagner in one of his last
po emics and condemns the composer's decadence, he docs so because his music lacks
Myle „ IS all effect, drama, and theater, nothing more than the "chaos" of barbarism (The
Case of Wagner, S7-»8). By contrast, when Nietzsche insists the Gay Science thatius,
"One thing is needful-To give style' to one's character," he defines that task as the
achievement of "One taste [Bin Geschmack) ," emphasiztng m turn the relative
unimportance of the distinction between "good or bad" style (§290). And when Nietzsche
takes up the topic ,n Ecce Homo, he puts all the emphas,s-as he does in so many other
late texts-on the tempo, rhythm, and gesture needed to achieve stylistic unity, coherence,
and communicability, again pushing the question of good style and bad style to the side,
this time by dismissing the concept of "good style as such
[Oder Stil an sick:]" as mere
idealism ("Why I Write Such Good Books," §4).
This last point is by no means absent from "David Strauss the Confessor and the
Wnter. Indeed, the essay's distinction between genuine culture and philistine barbarism
depends entirely upon a rejection of the concept of "good style." For that distinction is by
no means synonymous with the distinction between good style and bad. On the contrary,
the distinction between culture and barbansm is measured against the criterion of style
alone. True culture," Nietzsche insists, "presupposes only a unity of style [Einheit des
Stiles]" (§2). Style alone, good, bad, or degenerate, is the defining feature of every culture,
he says, lor "even a bad and degenerate culture cannot be conceived as anything other" (§2)
than a stylistic unity. It is on the basis of this criterion, then, that Nietzsche distinguishes
between culture and barbarism, and the success or failure of the essay depends upon his
ability to clarify, differentiate, and justify that criterion. And this means more than simply
distinguishing between style and its absence. For the distinction between culture and




dir:rrCT barbanSm ' N,etZSChe says ' arc fomis of ™*y. They constitute iwOPPOSed Ways °f""S °f "Hi* a. .he basis of a people, a nationeommunuy. Coni using one with the other, judgtng barter,sm to be culture, results from a
re to distinguish between these two different structural possibilit.es. Defending the
istinuion between culture and barbarism, on the other hand, depends upon distinguishing
these two forms of unity as sharply as possible.
.
THC natUrC °f lhi“ d,SUnCli0n ' S already indicated when Nietzsche defines culture as
a unity o, style," for by making style and its unity his criterion, he avoids reducing the
question of culture's definition to a problem of its content. More than anything else, style
as always been defined as the opposite of content. The problem of distinguishing between
cu lure and barbarism, then, is nol a question of evaluating the contenl of one culture
against another in order to determine their relative worth. To this extent, Nietzsche's
discussion also avoids the problem of cultural nationalism, of having to evaluate ihe
differences between national cultures. And for the same reason it avoids the perennial
problem of culture's location, for if culture is defined only by the criterion of stylistic unity,
no limits arc placed on its sphere- the possibility of culture exists wherever there is human
lilc. Clothes, rooms, houses, city streets, fashionable shops, concerts halls, theaters,
museums, public institutions, the norms of social intercourse, the manners and movements
ol people-each of these, Nietzsche says, is a manifestation of culture, and each embodies
a style, a particular way of manifesting itself, a particular form of unily. This unity, he
makes clear, is not the same thing as an identity. Far from reducing a people, a nation, or a
community to a homogeneous collective, to a mass or a herd, the stylistic unity which
Nietzsche insists upon is a matter of plurality, of multiplicity, indeed, of a plurality and a
multiplicity which are not just plural and multiple, not just more of the same or the same
thing multiplied several times over. This plurality and multiplicity is characterized instead
by an essentially diversity, a "diversity" which has been "brought together into the
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variety
CVCn 1 ncccssdr
> Condltlon lor the nourishing of diversity, multiplicity, and
unely. Diversity, mu.Up.icUy, and vanety are only recognizable on the basis of a stylistic
formal unity, a shared context, and a communal horizon. To be sure any
T COnteXl ’ OT h°nZOn ,S "CVer m°re ,ha" —* many— there are alwayscu lures, nev ci culture but no people, nation, or community, indeed, no individual can
ever appear ,n the world, can ever be differentiated and become different, except by means
a StylC
' f°m - COntCXt ’ °r horiZO"- S<> - style from being an inessential addition a
mere ornament, superficial and peripheral, that substantive differences are only possible on
the basis ol a stylistic context. Indeed, so little is it a secondary addition to the "real” thing,
the "real" substance, or the "real" person, that the differences between them are only
recognizable on Ihc basis of the unity style affords. If Nietzsche focuses on style rather
than content, then, ,1 is only because the content of a culture and the style in which ,1
manifests itself are indissociable.» And this unity is the very opposite of .he unity at work
in barbarism.
Barbarism -the "absence of style" -is characterized not by a unity of style but by a
uniformity which, lacking style, fails to recognize difference and even remains indifferent
towards it. And the first and most serious form of difference to go unrecognized is "the
dillerence between the philistine and its opposite" (§2). Unable to recognize difference, the
cultivated philistine falls back on identity, uniformity, sameness, and convention. Each of
these contributes to the confusion of barbarism and culture, and each contributes- or
"probably" contributes— to the judgement which manifests this confusion:
The coni usion that reigns in the deluded mind of the cultivated philistine
probably derives from the fact that, finding everywhere people cast from the
same mold as himself [gleichformige Geprage seiner selbst wiederfindet],




zsche 's concept of "diversity," sec Daniel Breazeale, Philosophy ami
I ruth: Selectionsfrom Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early lH7()'s
, xxii.-xxv; Leslie Paul
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|esw" ltb rc8ard to matters of
unisono that though Zummone ? ^ [ ,'?
k'chan<sm. this mui
seduees him into believing .ha, a culmTe'S^way
So impressed ,s the culttvated ph.iistine by the uniformity found everywhere, by this
UmSOn°: lh ' S "eVery°ne m Uniso"'' so imposing is this sameness, tha, the cultivated
phthsttne makes a mistakenjudgement-the culttvated philistine tnfers, in the face of an
impress, ve and mtposmg homogeneity found evetywhere around him, the extstenee of the
Stylistic untty characteristic of genuine culture. But this conclusion is inferred on the basts
°f aC°nluSlon: The abse"“ the divers, ty which characterizes genutne culture is taken to
be evidence ol a stylistic unity. An absence of diversity, however, const,lutes not a
uniformity of style but uniformity plain and simple: Evetyone holds the same views,
everyone has the same needs, everyone believes in the same conventions, everyone, in
short, is like everyone else-the same. And once everyone is cast from the "same mold
[gleichformige Geprdge ]," dtfference as such falls by the wayside. Rather than constituting
a diverse culture, then, the form of unity characteristic of barbarism forms a "system,"
indeed, a "systematic and ruling philistinism [,systematische und zur Herrschaft gebrachte
Philisterei]" (§2). The power of the philistines, them ability to rule, consists in the ability to
systematically eliminate difference by subjecting all aspects of life to the same mold.
Everyone and everything bears the same stamp, everyone and everything is fabricated
according to the same mold, and this mold, this stamp, are so zealously defended and so
carelully guarded, that they are— or might as well be— "patented [patentirten ]" (§2).
Holding the patent to their mold, the philistines insure the uniformity of their products, and
having insured that nothing will exist that is not mechanically producible and reproducible,
the philistines are able to insure that they will remain in power through the exclusion and
negation ol genuinely productive artistic forms and genuine demands for a true style.
Exclusion and negation, then, insure uniformity and constitute the unity of the philistine's
system its mold and the "unity ol that mold [Einheit des Geprages] which so
monotonously strikes us about every cultivated person in present-day Germany becomes a
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2 '?'”?' —Ca"y pr0ductlve forms Md demands for a true style" (§2).
This is the negativity pecuhur to the distinctly modern form of power embodied^“ Ph '" Sl' nC- ,hC— *> -ven, the production of new artistic forms and toexclude every demand for a true style. Rather than possessing culture, let alone producing
' ' l 'ValCd Ph "'Sl,nC m 'Slakcs ^ what negates it. And proceeding
systematically, the cultivated philistine "eventually obtains a coherent system of such
negations, a system of nonculture [Nichl-Kultur} to which one nught actually be able to
concede a certain 'stylistic unity-assuming that it makes any sense a. ail to speak of
Sty'1Zed barbanSm " <§2) 11 " lh ' s nematic negation of everyth,ng that would contribute
<o a true culture which finally makes the cultivated philistine Nietzsche's "enemy," lor the
cultivated philistine ,s himself the enemy of everything which would oppose him.
Everything that fails to conform to his "mold" is viewed as hostile and as a threat to his
power. And whenever anything is encountered that fails to conform to the philistine’s
system, the cultivated philistine "wards off, negates, wtthdraws, plugs his ears, looks
away" (§2). The cultivated philistine can no, bear to hear of anyone else speak, nor can the
cultivated philistine stand the sight of anything other than himself. Whatever and whoever
differs becomes the object of "hate" and "enmity” (§2), and hating h,s enemies, the
cultivated philistine spends all his lime crippling, numbing, and dissolving every attempt to
create a genuinely "diverse" culture. Hating his enemies, the cultivated philistine remains
confined by his own narrowness and limits and seeks only to defend them and his power.
Foi the cultivated philistine is certain that he knows what culture is, and this certainly in the
correctness of his judgement is so little doubled that it constitutes an unshakable
"laith"— the "new faith."
Max Horkhcimer and Theodor Adorno lake Nict/.sehc's definition of barbarism as
their point ol departure for their analysis of the "eullurc industry." Sec Dialektikder




I >av,d Strauss the Confessor and the Writer" is a polemic again*, the "new
f
Ph",SUne,S UnShakab'e " faith " »>*»« and the philistine, unshakable
•n -n -right to rule over matters of culture. Bringing the rule of the philistine* to anend- for they are our rulers Uiie HenschendenV (§2)-and successfully listing the
pailteular form of power they possess-for they "hold the reigns of power [A«„ r
(i}2)— is less a matter of opposing genuine culture to philistinism than of allowing
philistinism to confess to its stylistic and conceptual incoherence. To be sure, the I ns,
Unnmely Meditation is oppositional, even offensive. I, is polemical and "warlike" in its
defense o! the distinction between "culture" and "barbarism." Bu, defending that distinction
and waging an cl leclive campaign against the ruling powers in Germany depends less upon
engaging in a war of words and a battle of opinions than upon an ability to listen and to
hear
“ "We must listen," Nietzsche says, "if the cultivated philistine "offers" a confession
(§2), for ,1 is only in such a confession that the barbarism of the cultivated philistine can be
heard. Only the cultivated philistine can demonstrate the incoherence and stylessness of
"what now calls itself 'culture' in Germany," and if such a demonstration is lacking, if no
confession is made, if no evidence of its "faith" is given, then perhaps it is because the
cultivated philistine has committed no sin and has nothing to confess. Or perhaps il is
because the confession is one of •failh* alonc-and Nietzsche does not exclude the
possibility that a something like "faith" may be necessary for the German spirit. Whichever
II may be, however, the issue can only be decided on the basis of a confession, and
Nietzsche hears one in an enormously popular book by David Strauss. David Slrauss-a
typical philistine" (§2)—offers a confession in the form of best-seller entitled I'lic Old
Failh mld llle A Confession ( 1 872).” "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer,"
on the olhci hand, is Nietzsche's account ol Strauss's confession. Nietzsche listens as
attentively as possible as Strauss confesses his "faith." Indeed, lie listens so attentively that
On the warlike character ol the lirst Untimely Meditation, sec Nietzsche's
comments in Fcce Homo, "The Untimely Ones," §1-2.
I n j us( three months, (he book- The Old Faith and the New: A Confession
( 1872)— had gone into four printings. On the book's popularity, see Werner Ross Her
angstliche Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches Leben
, 355.
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he hears not just a confession of his "faith," but also a a
takes Strauss's confession-no, in order to absolve him ofL
German spirit from this "sinful" "faith."
confession ol certain sins. Nietzsche
sins, but in order to free the
llt,e Th 2 ,
CTen °PCnS SlraUSS ’S b“* hC i confession lodged ,n i,s
OUi Fatih and the NeW: A Confession. By choosing Co make a confession and
not jus. a confession, buc a confession atom his beliefs, about hes "new faith," Strauss
confesses to havtng fa.th in his "faith." He really believes his beliefs, so much so that he
•rcats them as more than jus, beliefs, more than stmpiy a matter of personal faith, and more
than just a private matter. The "fact alone that he lets himself make public confessions about
tel 'CrS-" N ‘etZSChe SayS
'
"
already a confess,on" of this (§3). Strauss's "new
latth" ,s much more than a pnvate matter not stmply because his "faith" is "new » nor
stmpiy because it replaces the "old faith" of ChrishanUy. Strauss's "new faith" is a public
matter because ,t is, he confesses, a "faith" in the new, and this makes it the only "faith"
possible in modernity. Indeed, it makes it a "faith" in the modern, for Strauss confesses to
believing in "modern ideas," and his book is nothing other than a "catechism 'of modem
ideas'" (§3)—a jumbled and incoherent cosmology based on a mixture of Darwinism and
materialism. These "modern ideas," however, require neither thought nor philosophy to be
accepted. Strauss, who was once an important thinker, perhaps even an important
philosopher, confesses to bang neither a thinker nor a philosopher anymore, and he lakes
it as an article of "faith" that no one need think or philosophize any longer. It is enough
simply to believe. And it is enough simply to believe because Strauss is the founder of a
new religion. This religion— this too must be taken as an article of "faith"— is the religion
ol the I uture: The "philistine as the founder of the religion of the futurc-that is the "new
lailh in its most impressive form; the philistine turned fanatic— that is the unheard of
[unerhorte] phenomenon that distinguishes Germany today” (§4). However much Strauss
may deny that he is the founder of a religion, he still says that his "faith" is "the sole
universal avenue ol the lulure" (§3), and with this confession out in the open, Strauss
becomes a fanatic, a fanatic who wants to "rale the future [die Zukunft zu beherrschen]’
and become "life's leader [Lebensfihrer]' (§4).
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To Iree hfe from this fanatical ieader, NicCzschc counters Strauss's "faith" Wlth
something he ,s often thought to oppose: "Reason." Bringing an end to the "fanaticism
°f tHe Ph '" St 'ne P—g Strauss under the "control of reason
h
“ *r VernunftY «4>. 1. requ,res ashing him reasonabie questions and iistentng to
t e answers he provides in his confession. In "David Strauss the Confessor and the
Wnter," Nietzsche poses questions to "the confessor" and to "the writer," devoting five
sections of the essay to the confessor and five sections to the writer. Whereas the questions
posed to the confessor concent what Strauss says about the content of his "new faith," the
questions posed to the "wnter" are concerned with how Strauss wntes-the logic he
employs and his "style" of presentation. Both what Strauss says about the "new faith” and
the way ,n which he says it serve as confessions, and both serve to disclose the content of
the cultivated philistine's "new faith." Content and form, substance and style "the
confessor" and "the writer»-each discloses a religion of the future which aims at the same
thing: Reality, the real, and realism. For eveiy fanatic, every philistine, Nietzsche says, has
”la,th" ,n the reality of theirjudgements, and every fanatic and ph, I, stine believes that reality
conforms to these judgements. From beginning to end, the questions Nietzsche poses to
Strauss are answered w„h confessions which demonstrate an extraordinary interest in what
already exists, ,n the real, and in reality. And the reality Strauss believes in is the same as
the reality he believed in as a young-Hegelian, a thoroughly rational reality, indeed, a
reality which, merely because it is real, must be considered rational. The "rationality of all
that is real" (§2) this is the Hegelian slogan which Nietzsche hears Strauss confess to
over and over again. Rather than thinking and philosophizing about the limits which Kant's
critical philosophy places on human reason and its knowledge of reality, Strauss's reason
knows no limits. He lacks, Nietzsche says, "the foggiest notion of the fundamental
antinomies o( idealism and of the extreme relativity of all knowledge and reason. Or: It is
precisely reason that should inform him how little reason can discern about the in-itself of
things (§6). Nietzsche, who is by no means simply the enemy of reason, takes it upon
himsell to inform the philistine of precisely how irrational his form of reason is. The
philistine s irrationality and fanaticism results from the fact that he "conceives of only
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apotheosis of the trivial and the evervHav \a/k i .yday. Whatever has sueeccdcd, whatever is real no
matter how banal or trivial is iustifiprii t, « j ied by its mere cx.stcnec, and whatever exists, whatever
18 rat,0nal
- OUgh ' 10 Cominue e*>sling: "Whatever is Va,tonal,' whatever is
real that ts," Strauss confesses, "to remain unassatled"
(§2). So long as the real ,s
considered rattonal, so long as the rational is constdered to be real, the power of the
phthstmes is, at least according to Strauss's gospel, unassailable.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, assails thus power by showing that the phthstmes-
teah.y ,s no, a, all real. Indeed, it is so far from teing real that i, must be taken for the very
opposite ol reality: Artifice, construction, illusion, and delusion. Whenever Strauss makes
a conlcss.on about his "new faith," whenever he talks about its content, he inevitably talks
about a reality which is his alone-his own construct, constructed to be as aesthetically
pleasing aspossible. And nothing, of course, ought to be more pleasing in Strauss's "new
la„h" than its heaven. Like the old heaven of the "old faith," the new heaven of the "new
laith" is a place of music and song, of poetry and composers, of an in general. Indeed, this
heaven, Strauss confesses, is an "aesthetic heaven
[,HslhetischenHimmelreich ]' (§4), a
heaven ol art and artists where the great poets and composers stimulate the mind and the
imagination during one's hours of leisure. And yet even here, in the private rooms to which
the philistine retires al ter work to enjoy art's stimulation, in the place where art and artifice
ought to be at home, even here Nietzsche detects a certain delusion and falsification at
work. For what the "blessed or the new style arrive at in their aesthetic heaven" has very
little to do with art, let alone with anything heavenly. Rather than being heavenly, Strauss's
aesthetic heaven” turns out to be earthly and ephemeral, and rather than being "aesthetic,"
It appears thoroughly "unaesthetic [unasthelischY (§4). And there is gtxxl reason for this:
Strauss s aesthetic heaven" has nothing to do with cither aesthetics or heaven. Its works
ol ait have nothing transcendent about them— they arc not the "sublime master works” (§2)
Nietzsche commends. Strauss's artworks aim only at the "real" world and its imitation. The
philistine theory of art demands only the "imitation of reality" (§2). Rather than
transcending the mundane, the philistine demands the greatest possible realism. According
to the gospel of the "new faith " thrn -m *
,,
’ n,art must practice the crudest son of realism and corn
17
mVm °f the eVeryday ' And thlS-« » ** service or the ph„,stine's
ranscenden. ability, its ab.l.ty «o elevate one over the everyday, its ability to
umtnate the tllusory naturalness of the everyday-these possibilit.es, the posstbtlities of
• Ime rnaster works,- are renounced by Strauss in the course of his reflections on art
turning art into one more mechanism for rationalizing the real.
Not only does Strauss's "new faith" believe in an aesthetic heaven comprised of
artworks so "realistic" that they become anaesthetic instruments in defense of the real, bu,
t is same faith" reverses the process when it returns to reality. In Strauss’s topsy-turvy
world, no, only are works of ar, turned into instruments of the status quo, bu, the picture of
reality" which emerges in The Old Faith and the NeW appears extraordinarily unrealistic,
even artificial. Nietzsche detects this artifice in the particular form of courage which
Strauss's "faith" inspires. Strauss presents himself a "troublemaker" by disposition, a
rabble rouser and a man unafraid to depart from the status quo. Indeed, he insures his
readers of his courage, saying that, as a "troublemaker" by disposition, he has taken on the
"unpopular and thankless task of telling the world precisely what it least wants to hear"
(§7). To be sure, Nietzsche says, one hears much that is aggressive in Strauss's
confession, but his aggression always manifests itself in assertions without consequence.
He praises Darwin and constructs a materialist cosmology on Darwinian premises, but he
just as quickly goes on to reassure humanity' that the human being is no mere animal. He
even formulates an imperative, an ethical imperative, to avert the unpleasant consequences
of Darwin's theory of evolution, restoring humanity in the process to the position of
superiority undermined by that very theory: "Never forget even for a moment that you are a
human being and no mere creature of nature" (§7). Aggressively advocating Darwin,
Strauss robs him ol his sting and leaves reality unchanged: Rational through and through.
And with this, Strauss's courage turns into its opposite: Cowardly accommodation. For not
only is the world rational— "God," he says, "shows us that chance would be an
unreasonable master of the world, and that necessity, that is, the chain of causation
manilest in the world, is reason itself
" (§7)— but by subjecting the world to a "chain of
causation, he renders all action beside the point: Everything and everyone acts in
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accordance with strict laws, and these laws prevent any interference with "reality."
trauss s courage, then, is less real than "artificial [kOnstlicher): a "union of impudence
the phiT
"£SS
’ aUdaC'°US WOrdS and COWardly accornrnodation" (§7) designed to impress
listine even to Hatter him. Lacking character and strength, Strauss grades as
‘ W„h CharaCter and creating an affected supenonty and a generalize
illusion
fMscHeinr (§7). And affecting q ua„t,es he iacks, mastheading as someth, „g heis not, Strauss inspires not action but accommodation.
Nietzsche finds all of these confessions no, only in what Strauss's says about his
new fa„h," bu, even his style of wnting and mcxle of presentation confess to similar
beliefs. The logical structure of his argument, for instance, constructed on the basis of four
thematic subd,vis,ons-"Are We Still Christians? Do We Still Have Religion? How Do We
Conceive the World? How Do We Order Our Lives?"
( §9)-does not demonstrate any
senous thinking or philosophizing about why these questions ought to be grouped together
and not others, for the third question has nothing to do with the second, the fourth is
unrelated to the third, and all three lack any necessary relation to the first. Rather than unity
and coherence of presentation, a "faith" shows itself which has so little interest in reality
that it confuses itself with modern science. But if Strauss eschews the rigors of thinking
and philosophizing in the name of a "faith" in modern science, i, is because he less
interested in getting at reality than in presenting a picture and an image of reality which is as
pleasant and agreeable as possible. And neither logic, thought, or philosophy is required
for this, only art and artifice. His book employs the arts of seduction and masquerades as
something it is not. To this end Strauss wants only to impress, and to this end he uses his
words as a "means for aesthetic effect [asthetisches Effectmitlel]" (§9). He writes not to put
lorward an argument or to provoke thought, but in order to create feelings by means of an
aesthetic technique [asthetisches Mine!]' (§9), presenting things which are dark and
gloomy only on order to better highlight the comfort and agreeableness of the reader's final
destination: The Garden of Epicures. No one should be uncomfortable in this pleasuie
garden, where all the "pleasures" of the "arts" are at hand. Strauss himself confesses that
even he, a "genius" and a great critic, can enjoy these humble pleasures: "It would be a sign
ol ingratitude toward my genius if I were not to take pleasure in the fact that, along with the
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to
r relentlessly incistve critique, I was simultaneously endowed with the abilityenjoy the innocent pleasure of artistic creation" (§10). This false modesty is hardly
'
innocent. „ is,the rhetoric of an artificer, of someone who hkes to wear the mash of geniusO .kes to be theatrical, who hkes to play the role of the naive genius and the classical
writer. For Strauss himself confesses that "people have paid him the unsolicited honor of
re^ar ing him as a kind of classical prose writer" (§10).
II is this Strauss, Strauss the "classical prose writer," the "class, ea, author " the
m0de‘ °f Germa" Wnllng
- Wh° <*“ final|y ^ heard confessing to his sins-his stylistic
sms. Strauss may be a bad actor who hkes to be theatrical and wear the mask of the genius
bu, he ,s still less gifted as a stylist. For just as Stiauss's doctrines demonstrate the
incoherence and artificiality of an actor and a deceiver, so to does his style. Indeed the
former is reacted m the latter, and latter in the former. Style is inseparable from content,
and content Irom style. And Strauss's style, for all its appeal with the German public,
remains deceptive and pretentious. What pretends to be-and what it was taken for-,s
an "artistically rigorous cultural style [kunstlersch strengen KultursUls]’ (§ 1 1), a sign of
genuine German culture, of its vitality, its health, and its superiority over French culture.
But by pretending to be something it ,s not, Strauss's "style" discloses less the uniformity
and unity of a genuine cultural style than a "universally appealing lone [,allgemein
ansprechenden To,,]’ (§ 1 1). This tone manifests itself as much in the jargon of the
journalists as it does in Strauss's own "style." "Hat, hackneyed, powerless, and common'
(§11), this "style" is as inoffensive as it is unproductive. Thoroughly shorn of power and
creativity, it keeps to the everyday, to the norms of "today," and this makes it "modem."
Ol lending no one, creating nothing new, it repeats the same words and the same phrases
with such regularity that it finally "impresses itself \pragt sich...eiri\ upon the ear" (§11),
stamping it with such force that one no longer feels "at home" anywhere else. What ought
to be heard as flat, hackneyed, powerless, and common is accepted as the norm and the
"rule," even as "signs of health," while the "powerful, uncommon, and beautiful falls into
disrepute (§11). Once the elements of a genuine style fall into disrepute, this norm, this
rule, rules with the force ol an "imperative" (§1 1). It becomes an ethical obligation and a
law', a pow'er which exercises its "dominion
[Herrscluif,]" (§11) w'herevcr writing takes
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ovcment ol tKc pc,, „ becomes an "amhority
I Regimenty (§ , ,) and a p>wc ,. under
‘
winch every German writes and every German lives.
And the Germans do live in this language. I, is their home. -Germanness,"
icl/schc says, ,s not a matter of "nationalities and customs" (§12). "Germanness" is to be
lh£ ”German 'an8Ua8e" al°"e
' alone is the home of the German spu n
no. the German ***, and certainly no, the German race* The "Gcrmans"-and no, only
0 "GermanS'~arC " neUiSllC bc "'8s - ** *P'"> 'ivea in language, and to this extent „ is
not St.auss s C,od against whom one is in danger of sinning. It is language itself which
1S danger<>‘ bCing "Sinncd agalnsl l^sundig,]: language— "the mystery of all our
German ness WasMystenumaUerunsererDeutschheUY
(§12). German language, then the
home ol spirit and the "mystery" of everything German, is "something holy
\etwas
Kahxemr (§12). Its laws hold dominion over the "Germans," not the laws of the
journal, st, the Straussians, or the fabricators of "literature." These laws, not Strauss's
stylistic impci nine, govern the Germans, and il they do not quite constitute a "faith," they
do constitute a "mystery" which must be heeded.
I Iccdmg these laws, however, is by no means an easy matter. It requires a sensitive
car, a well-timed car, perhaps even a musical car. For this car must be attuned to "sound"
as such, not merely to the "universally appealing tone" of philistine optimism. Il must lx
attuned to the "aesthetically subtle and powerful laws of sound under whose dominion
\kunstlerisch zarten und krdftigen Geseize des Manges Herrschaft]" (§ 12) one ought to
write, indeed, under which every writer ought to "live." Ears which have been shaped and
molded by an incessant rhythm, by the sheer repetition of the journalist's jargon or the
ceaseless mantras of Hegelianism- "the real is the rational" -these ears arc inevitably
deafened by the drone. They lend to confuse a style exhibiting weakness, lameness, and
impotence with one filled with "signs of health." Strauss himself is guilty of such sins, of
such confusion and mistaken judgement. Indeed, Nietzsche discovers Strauss confessing
to such sins whenever his style employs a "twisted, overblown, or frazzled syntax" ($11)
On Nietzsche's rejection of the criterion of race sec, Sttmtliche Werke, Kritische
Studienausgabe
, VII, 645. For a discussion of the passage sec Geoffrey Hartman, The
Fateful Question ofCulture (New York: Columbia, 1997), 5-6.
kuIous neologisms, and metaphors which confusc ralhcr lhan^ ^
^
essay with some seventy examples of such errors drawn from Strauss's text errorswhich exemplify a loss of feeling for language and the growth of barbansm-eonfusion
meaninglessness, and the inability to differentiate. These examples demonstrate not a
healthy German spirit, but a spin, broken, weakened, and so confused, fact tha, „
reverses the nature and names of things"
( § 1 1) and finds "signs of health" where none
exist. These signs, Nietzsche insists, do not signify "health." They are a "cosmetic
veneer," an aesthetic illusion, merely "painted idols" (§12), the masks of an actor and a
deceiver, a genuine pretender. Rather than signs of the cultivated philistines' health, then,
Ihcy arc the "signs ol their dominion [Zeichen ihrer Herrschaft}" (§12), signs of an attempt
never consciously formulated, to impose a politicized style upon the nation, to impose an
'
imperative upon writers which dictates the conventions to be employed and the rules to be
followed. So long as these "signs" are taken to signify "health," tha, dominion will
continue, for the cultivated philistines' power rest on nothing other than then ability to
control language and reverse names.
From the start of his essay, Nietzsche attempted to read these signs of barbarism,
name the power behind them, and identify the mechanism by which this power ruled the
German spirit. If he has attempted, as he confesses in the essay's penultimate paragraph,
"to overturn its idols" (§ 12) and reverse Strauss's topsy-turvy world, he docs so not only
in order to expose the "sovereign" (§12) behind ,t all, to rob it of its victory robe, its
"cosmetic veneer" and painted face; he does so in order to honor those who sought, and
died seeking, as they built, created, and constructed a culture worthy of the name. This
culture, a genuine German culture, has never existed and perhaps never will. The founding
ol a Reich and the wining of a war are not sufficient in themselves to guarantee that the
German spirit has linally found a home. The "foundation [Fundament]" (§2) of this home,
Nietzsche says towards the beginning of his essay, must be sought after, constructed, and
built. II one listens, this demand can be heard in writings of the classical authors, and
nowhere more clearly than in Goethe. It is a demand to seek and an imperative to
experiment, and Nietzsche hears it in a simple sentence which Goethe is said to have




have contmually stnven^ -*- --- - m,h .
TO honor such sptrits, Ntetzsche says, „ ,s ,mperat,ve that one conhnuc
8 n°‘ ‘° mCreaSe qUantUy °f "knowledge" or "information," bu, to tncreaseone s capabthtyW «1). .ncreastng "capabthty" and culttvahng the sptnt-giving
S Y C to one s character these are the tasks with which Nietzsche closes his cntique They
arc demands, no doubt, presupposed by every "culture." Bu. they become ever more
imperative wtth the arriv al of the "modern as such." For nothing charactenzes modern, tv somuch as the loss of clear dtsttncttons, the confuston of qualit.es, the mtxtng of styles, and
t e obliteration ol individual diflerences. Nietzsche saw the coming barbarism and its
mabthty to recogntze "dtfference," "the difference between the philistine and its opposite"
(§2). If this "capability" has been lost, it is because the very need to make distinct,ons and
recogntze dtfferences is forgotten in modem, ty. Modernity, Nietzsche says, "has forgotten
IO distinguish [zu unterscheiden] between living and dead, genuine and counterfeit, onginal
and imitation, god and idol" (§ 12).
Recovenng that "capability" and learning to make distinctions depends upon the
"practice of warfare" which Nietzsche eventually calls "great politics." Practicing polemics
in an age that wants to hear nothing of distinctions is the first step towards having the
"capability" to distinguish, for it is the first step towards differentiating oneself from a
fabricated opinion, a patented model, and a barbaric system. But as Nietzsche brings his
essay to a close, he admits that the "capability" of distinguishing, of deciding and judging,
finally rests on nothing more secure than "instinct [Instinkt]" (§ 12).
27
However fragile this
j r , •
In "?n the 0n
.g
ln of Language" (1869-70), Nietzsche provides his clearest
ef mition of instinct: it "is not the result of conscious reflection, not the mere consequence




PrTr tPf 1 ° 1]TIan<rC^euste Leistung ] of an individual or a mass, corresponding tots character (see Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989], edited, translated, and introduced by Sander L. Gilman, Carole
Blair, David J. Parent, 210; for the original text see Gesammelte Werke
[Musanonausgabe], vol. 5, 469). Nietzsche's concept of instinct is neither simply a matter
of unconscious and irrational biology or history, but rather marks the point at which the
two meet. As such, it is subject to both cultivation and education. For a useful discussion
of the concept, see Thomas Heilke, Nietzsche's Tragic Regime: Culture, Aesthetics, and
roliticalEducation (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 141-144.
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foundation may seem, Nietzsche insists that "instinct" alone is capable of deeding between-ng and dead, gentnne and counterfeit, onginal and imitation, god and idol And
utsttnet* alone is at ti»e basis of tite new "concept of pttiitics* fitst heard in the Iflttitttefy
Meditations. For countering the power of the dead over the living, the imitation over the
original this depends upon an "instinct," upon anab.lity and a "capabiUty," w.lhng to becoutageous ,n ,ts use of language, to employ a powerful style, indeed, willing to
o end opinion, unmask actors, and pull the robes off rulers. So fragile ,s this "instinct"
that ,t resists being "patented" by "fabricators" and incorporated into a "system," and the
moment „ is, it ,s no longer powerful, courageous, or offensive; it is something stamped
with the deadening mechanisms of convention. However powerful those mechanisms may
e, Nietzsche never tired of fighting them, of fighting for the cultivation of "instinct
«
"capability," and "spin,." Nor did he ever find another basis for his polemical style and the
"concept of politics" it puts into practice.- Indeed, when he takes up the topic of style again
in Ecce Homo, he not only insists that it depends on "instinct" alone, but he renders a
judgement on his own instinct for style: It is, he says, "infallible." 29
However final this judgement may sound and however decisively it may seem to
end attempts to evaluate Nietzsche's efforts, this statement ought not be interpreted as an
attempt to bring the matter to a close. It is, rather, a challenge, a challenge to renew
investigations into style and its role in a new "concept of politics." Above all, however, it is
a call lor others to challenge Nietzsche, to engage in a dispute and enter into a highly
sublimated form of political struggle which requires its participants to take off their masks
and show themselves in public. Nietzsche's first Untimely Meditation did nothing else, but
it needed Strauss to bnng out its "free spintedness." This is nowhere clearer than in the
discussion ol the first Untimely Meditation which takes place in Ecce Homo. There
Nietzsche acknowledges how much he needed Strauss, how much he needed an opponent
against whom he could wield his pen, sharpen his style, and cultivate his agonistic instinct.
See, for example, Twilight of the Idols , "The Four Great Errors," §2. For a
discussion ol the passage, see Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of
the Soul: A Study ofHeroic Individualism, 72-74.
Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books," §4.
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He needed a combatant against whom he could
iorm of "warfare" which attacks problems
cultivate his "capabilities" and practice a
and positions rather than persons. Nietzsche's
rrtt"" >“ “•*- ««or, u t e traces ol this contest, of this agon, never disappeared. Indeed, they are
everywhere apparent the Untimely MedUations which_ „^^^ _
!
8° ” SChC 'S baUle agamSt ‘hc Phlllst"’c
- «* renews the contest and reftnes his
practice of warfare.” and each is an attempt to found a culture whtch would finally realize
the hopes born of the Reichsgriindung.
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CHAPTER V





' S n° dlspulc ovcr taste ande ui an oi me is a dispute over taste and tasting!"— Nietzsche, 7hus Spoke Zarathustra
Public Sentiment
If Nietzsche's nted.tahon on David Strauss exemplifies "great polttics" lor the firs,hme and th,s was tts author's content™-,hen the second UntimelyMeditation appears
to provide to first "theory."' .ndeed, nowhere else does Nietzsche appear more concerned
w„h the activity of theorizing, with the formulation and defense of propositions theses
and laws, with the construction of a systematic framework capable of illuminating
phenomena, even with that mosttraditional of all objects of theoretical speculation- the
eternal. Even the genre of Nietzsche's essay-the meditation-suggests the contemplative,
regarding activity of theoria. And yet the young philologist's intentions cannot be easily
assimilated to those of "the theoretical men" -Socrates, the scientist, and the
metaphysician." Not only is Nietzsche's essay, like its predecessors, a contribution to the
"eternal conflict” between the philosophers and the poets, the sciences and the arts, the
theoretician and the tragedian-and the tragic plays no small role in the meditation-but the
essay's task is to discover how politics is possible when theory falls short, to discover how
deeds, even great deeds, are possible when theory not only fails to provide the foundations
necessary for action, but contributes to their collapse. This problem, which is for Nietzsche
r ....









*' ' -43 "334 ' AI1 references to Nietzsche's wntings will be to this edition.
ranslations from the German are my own. Citations will be given in the body of the text inaccordance with the essay's numbered divisions. A translation of the text printed in the
Krilische Studienausgabe may be found in Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard TGray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
2 °n Nietzsche's critique of "theory" and the "theoretical man," see The Birth of
tragedy
, § 15; John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago-
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 132.
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e problem of modem politics, faffs to "great politics," toa form of pol.Ucs whtcl, returns
the^polit'
81 ”*1, ^Sk °^ the theorist and lire original aimof politics— the founding of
culminates in Nietzsche's complex portrait of perhaps the greatest politician of all— the
cgis ato, Zarathustra— but „ originates, and finds its paradigmatic form, in the second
Umimely Mediati°n - The^ -Viues not so much a ".booty" of "great pohties" as an
example o, Us founding, legislative, and constructive capacity- the very thtngs broking
lorn Ntctzsche-s polemtcal mediation on David Strauss-and it does so order to address
-he most press,ng problem of modern politics: On wha, basts is the tndtvidual to act and on
what grounds ,s a people to const, lute ttself once foundational assumptions are
undermined, once every norm believed to be objective, necessary, and true is reduced to an
idiosyncratic cultural product and every belief is subjected to the relativizing effects of
historicism?4
This problem, the difficult dilemma of founding a people onee the traditional forms
<>l foundations have become inoperative, invalid, and unjustified, is not new to Nietzsche's
corpus. He had identified the problem in his meditation on David Strauss, where he
observed that the "foundation [Fundament]" upon which "the German spirit might
construct its house" (§2) is missing. In that meditation, however, he had failed to find a
satisfactory solution to the dilemma, and lacking the requisite resources, he turned instead
to the task of conceptualizing the profoundly paradoxical consequences of the German
founding. The essay shows how the long sought after unification of the German peoples,
finally achieved with the founding of the second Reich and the constitution of the modern
German nation-state, not only failed to constitute a people, but produced a nation at
variance with itself, alienated from itself, so fractured and fragmented that it was,
paradoxically, the very opposite of itself- "un-German" (§11). This Germany, the post-
war Germany dissected in the first Untimely Meditation, appears in the ghostly form of a
, at-




GS a P° itiCal Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University,
On Nietzsche and historicism, see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
HistoryXChicago: University of Chicago, 1953), 26.
" "hOUl COntCm °r 8CnUinC sPedfici*y. a Place where barbarism -this is the- N,e,Sehe uscd-,s confused with Cure and where *** ls substituted for Oeis,
(spirit), Orm lor content, the exterior trappings of the slate for theoriginality of a people
an a culture. This is the ddemma Nietzsche inherits the second U^iym1,L
S ,aSk: Hc mUSt diSCOVer secure enough to transform the modern
nation-state—Germany servesas the paradigmatic examp,e-from a ghostly abstract,on a
mere lormahty and a mechanical process, into a living, sensuous unity-a united people a
genuine public, a body politic.
’
faced with this problem, the second UntimelyMeditation avoids all appeals to the
traditional instruments of politics. It refrains from suggesting constitutional revisions that
mighi bring the state closer to the people, and it makes no attempt to achieve political,
social, or cultural unification through patriotic calls for loyally to the nation, its parties or
d-s political institutions. Indeed, it shows so little interest in ,he traditional mechanisms and
instruments ol modern politics that Nietzsche instead (urns ,n the opposite
direction— inward, to the sphere of culture, to the sensuous core of the embodied
individual, to the sphere of sentiment, sensibility, and style, the place of taste, judgement,
and subjectivity. This turn, however-the turn from the social macrocosm to the
microcosm ol the individual-docs not represent a turn away from politics towards the
anti-political stance that has been attributed to him.' Ralhcr, it signals a displacement of the
macropolitical sphere of the slate into (hc micropolitical sphere of the soul and a recasting of
the terms of political debate. 6
This strategy emerges in the essay's Forward when Nietzsche describes his essay's
purpose: "I have sought," hc writes there, "to depict a sentiment [Empfindung] that has
.








csl conceptualized by Leslie Paul Thiele; sec Friedrich Nietzsche and
the 1 olUicsofthe Soul: A Study ofHeroic Individualism (Princeton: Princeton University
"2* 199°T Scc also David Conway, Nietzsche and the Political, (New York: Routlcdgc,
7), scc also Alexander Nchamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge MA •
Harvard University Press, 1985).
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rT„r en°U8h: ' " tak,ng reVenge 11 by to the pnbl.c (<fe
T
‘t] W ' th th ' S N“~ the problematic wh,chJ
" the whole of hts essay and detente the terms of „s tnvestigation. ,„deed itprov.des the ftrs, tnhmattons of its pohhcal program, and whatever else that program may
enuttl, „ requires the abandonment, the handtng over, even the saenf.ee of acel
'
sentiment, and not to those who ought to be, by right of Nietzsche's training and vocation
h,s presumed aud,ence-the speeiahstsof the philological community, the readers of the
’
“ ° " Y J°UmalS ' °r the of professors. Nietzsche abandons his sentiment to
c public at large, to the community of non-spec,alists, to those who he identifies in his
Foreword as "the people." This community is the recipient of his sentiment, and by
abandoning ,t to them, he intends to inaugurate a public debate on public sentiment on the
community's sense of itself and ,ts sense of community. He relinquishes a private,
subject, ve sentiment to the scruttny of the public realm and asks the public if it recognizes
that sentiment, if it is common to the public at large, if the existence of the community, of
something public and common to all, requires that one feels the way Nietzsche does and
share in h,s sentiment. And once Nietzsche draws the public intoa debate over the private
sphere ol sentiment, once he brings these two disparate and even antithetical realms
together- the public sphere of debate, the private sphere of individual sentiment-he
arrives at the topic which will dominate the entirety of h,s meditation: sensus communis,
community sense, or, in the language Nietzsche uses in the Foreword-public sentiment.
The sentiment at issue is already announced in the title to the second Untimely
Meditation- "On the Use and the Abuse of History for Life"-and when Nietzsche begins
the process ol abandoning it to the public and opening it up to public scrutiny, when he
asks the public if this sentiment defines the public's sense of itself and dominates the age,
he suggests that it originates in a sensibility that not only threatens the foundations of the
public and the public realm, but that poses a threat to the very existence of a public and a
people. History, the title says, can be abused, can become disadvantageous for life, a
Nachteii'— a drawback, a detriment, something injurious and harmful, a source of
sulfering and inlirmity. And when history comes to dominate a people's sense of itself,
when a people is dominated exclusively by a sensitivity to history and a "historical
123
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' SimV 'hen' and th ‘ S ' S *he " ,h™eW «D Nietzsche
proposes to .nvestigate- then i, can become nor merely disadvantageous, bur dangerous a
sentiment falls prey to the "historical fever” (Foreword! and iv,) becomes sensitive to the flow° *>me alone, to the transience of all ihines and io u—t l g to the contingency of all beliefs.it can even
lead, Nietzsche insists, to "the destruction of a ,*op,e lam Verderben eines Voltes
(F°reWOrd)
' l° 'he “s sense of self, its sense of unity and its
feelmg of community. In this case, the possibility of politics itself is closed off the
community needed to support it is absent, and the common space needed for its enactment
is found wanting.
This is the case Nietzsche's essay sets out not only to diagnose, but to cure heal
and remedy. ..requires the skills of a cultural physic,an capable of illuminating the effects
o. h, stone,sm and the historical sensibility through a diagnosis of "the peculiar symptoms
SympWm^ of thc •** (Foreword)— its senhments, tastes, and forms of
judgement. Curing a people of these symptoms and ridding it of the historical sickness in
turn requires countering those sentiments, tastes, and modes ofjudgement with others,
with ones that do not undermine a people's sense of self but rather reconstructs the lost
unity that makes politics possible and unites a people around a public space of deeds and
action. Nietzsche makes it clear that restonng this unity is not simply a matter of "political
reuml ication
|
politische Wiedervereinigung]” (§4). Political unity, as Nietzsche's
meditation on David Strauss makes clear, is not sufficient to insure the existence of a
people or a public sphere of action. Restoring a lost unity entails, rather, the discovery of
I oundations capable of uniting a public without making it uniform, ofconstituting a people
rather than a mass, oflaying thefoundationsfor singular persons rather than identical
individuals. It requires, moreover, the substitution of a certain utilitarian vanety of
liberalism responsible for each ol these latter possibilities with its anti thesis— a highly
esoteric lorm ol republicanism which Nietzsche derives from Schopenhauer and places at
.T , .
F' 'r Nietzsche s concept ol the "cultural physician," see his notes on the subjectThe Philosopher as Cultural Physician," in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from
'
Nietzsche s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, trans. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey
Humanities Press International, 1979), 69-76.
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“1 1“ ** P-Ple. Realizing this goal requlres the
. .
erm^"‘ng (§4), of the antithesis between the spheres of the public and
' *e stale and its people, the community and its sentiment, the political worldand individual actors. It is a task which aims to recreate public sentiment, eon sense
communis
- what Nietzsche calls the "sentiment of a people
and practices a politics of the sou,. He engages in a micro-pohtica, strategv to rcle a
macro-political problem— the failure of the German founding to found a German people 8
latecraft gives way to soulcraft here, and the result, achieved through a sentimental
education, ought to found a non-national nation of a non-national people which is both
justified and just.
"The Shattering and Dismantling of all Foundations"
Nietzsche's task in the second Untimely Meditation, is, in essence, the recovery of
the political. Like each of his earlier writings- The Birth of Tragedy, "On Truth and Lie in
an Extra-Mora, Sense," "David Strauss the Confessor and the Wnter"-h,s intention is to
lay the foundations for an ethical form of community and a jus, form of politics, and like
each ol his earlier writings, the second Untimely Mediation casts that task in terms of a
never ending agon between two opposing world views, the first tragic, practiced by the
poets, the artists, and the pre-Socratic philosophers, the second theoretical, practiced by the
proponents of science and post-Socratic philosophy. In the second Untimely Meditation,
Nietzsche stages the conflict around the problem of history, and he attributes the problem
his essay investigates— the loss of the senstts communis and the destruction of public
sentiment- to the absence of a tragic approach to history. In modernity, the demand arises
that history be a science” (§4), and the loss of a tragic, poetic, and even artistic approach
to history produces a series of ills which appear as a peculiar senes of symptomatic
sentiments. Each of these sentiments— nausea, skepticism, apathy, irony,
cynicism— results lrom the demand that history become a science, and far from supporting
On the role of micro-politics in Nietzsche’s political thought, see David Conwav
Nietzsche and the Political, 47-50.
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penooters these sentiments result in the closure of the public realm theun crmimng ol public sentiment, and the disintegration of a people.
Nietzsche attnbu.es each of these ills to the onset of historicism, and as his essayProceeds, he slow|y draws out lts T„ey^
oss of being, the unchangtng, and the eternal, and the loss of the stability grounds and
•°r r «—» ».—i.-ij!:r**"
"7 ’ i.ternal are lost and with the "the foundation IFundanent] of all of man's certainty
an rest (§ 10 ). The "tireless unraveling and histoncizmg of the moderns," Nietzsche
wntes, leads to the "shattering and dismantling of all foundations, and their disintegration
m.o a fluid, dispersing becoming [Werden]" (§9). Far from liberating a people or an
individual, however, far from simply freeing them from the constraints of absolutes and
opening up a space for a diversity of practices and values, histoncism, radically practiced
undermines the possibility of action and leads to the destruction of the self, the death of the
subject, and the end of the personality. The result, according to Nietzsche's analysis, is an
overflowing, stupefying, and violent historicizing" (§7), which robs individuals of the
power to act, d.sorients the subject with an excessive influx of historical material, and
produces a chaos in the soul of the actor which leaves it sick, suffering from a "historical
lever." When one is educated on a purely historical basis, the "strange symptoms" of this
lever appear as a senes of sentiments indicative of the destruction of the foundations
needed to act:
the mass of impressions storming into the young soul is so great the
surprising, barbaric, and violent impressions penetrate so^Prerinm8ly- ,,balle,d Up ln !lttle clumPs "— that the soul can only saveltsell through intentional stupidity. Wherever a more refined stronger
consciousness lay at its foundation [zu Grunde lag], a new sentiment
oubtless arises: Nausea [Ekel], The young person has become homeless
[heimatlos] and skeptical of all customs and concepts. Now he knows: In
every age it was different; it doesn't matter who you are. In melancholy
apathy [schwermUthiger Gefullosigkeii
]
he lets opinion after opinion pass
him by and understands Holderhn's mood when reading Laertieus Diogenes
on the lives and doctrines of the Greek philosophers: "Here I have
experienced something that already occurred to me several times before:
hat the ephemeral and changing character of human thoughts and systems
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StncSe"“ 'raglC ,ha" lhC dC'" nlCS wc lake to be the only
" anyth,
n
g captures the underlying ,n,x,d Nietzsche finds expressed in Hbldcrlin ifany concept expresses the unity of the sentnnents produced by a purely historical
educauon nausea, skepticism, and apathy-,, is nihilistn. To be sure, the concept appears
ZZirT™y '^ “ CVCryWhCrC PrCSCm iB lhC baCksr<>l",d F™'
of d t
8 ' S °“ °f rC 'aUV,Sm
' lhC l<>SS «"“y. and the irruption
tsorder, struggle, and connict be,ween thefaetsand values of different cultures and
d, leren, historical periods. He is describtng, ,n other words, the breakdown of fixed
ut lutal horizons and the onset of "continually shifting horizons," tndeed, of an "infinite
ent/on m tn whtch no opinion, thought, or system is perceived to be superior to any
<>lhc and all meaningful differences are erased. So potent are the effects of this breakdown
.ha, they lead not only lo the sentunents of nausea, skepticism, and apathy, however two
other .sentiments are also produced, and Nietzsche discovers them a, the basts of the people
Ills essay investigates- "irony" and "cynicism" (§9). These feelings are indicative ol an
indifference towards oneself and the world, and they result in rad,cal privation-,he retreat
Horn an alten world where one has no home and a turning inward that valorizes the private
sphere above all others. Indeed, these two sentiments are mdicalive of the loss of the world
and the withdrawal of the individual from it. "The individual," Nietzsche writes of this
condition, "becomes hesitant and uncertain and can no longer believe in himself; he sinks
inward, into Ins interior, which in this case means nothing but the cumulativejumble of
learned knowledge that has no outward effect, of learning that fails to become life" (§5),
It is this sinking inward into the sentiments of nausea, skepticism, apathy, irony,
and cynicism that Nict/.schc finds so threaten, ng to public sentiment and public action, for
lar from uniting a public, far from founding a people, they contribute lo, indeed, arc
symptomatic ol, the disintegration of the foundations needed to support them. The study of
history, according to Nietzsche, is ostensibly undertaken for the sake of action, in order to
learn about the world and how lo act in it, yet it results, when radically pursued, not in
action but inaction, not in one's appearance in the world but in one's withdrawal from it.
Radically pursued, the study ol history results in what Nietzsche calls the "weak
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the^w^y"
(^4)> and W6a^neSS is ' tse * f indicative °f tbc loss of Ihe public realm andemus conunums needed to support it. The weak personality is ineapable of acting inHe world, ,s radically dlssoclated from the publ]c^^ ^£





' beC°meS dlSSOC 'ated fr°m ,hC - external
ce s and action, producing an antithesis symptomatic of the very essence of them era m tv,dual: "The most proper property [eigensle Eigensckaft] of this modem human
being, Nietzsche wntes, is "the peculiar antithes.s between an interior that corresponds tono extenor and an extenor that corresponds to no interior- an antithesis unknown to the
ancient peoples of the world" (§4). Unlike the ancient peoples of the world, unlike the
tragic Greeks who lacked a radical awareness of history, the moderns, who are excessively
aware of the changing nature of all things, are racked by an unbridgeable antithesis that
separates the private sphere from the public, the individual from the people, the actor from
the world. When a world, a people, and a public losses definitive shape, when its horizons
continually shift and finally stretch out into infinity, action is foreclosed and the public
world is closed off. Nauseated not by perspective bu, by the breakdown of all
perspectives, the actor losses all purchase on the world and becomes insensitive to ,t. One
becomes, in other words, apathetic, lacking any pathos for the worid and devoid of any
leeling for it. This, Nietzsche insists, is the only means left open to the individual "for
overcoming those things which so violently press in upon it" (§4). The world itself must be
renounced, and with it all sense of reality, all feeling for "the real [das Wirkliche]" (§4) is
lost. Lacking pathos, sensitivity, and feeling, a quasi-pathological state emerges in which a
form of solipsistic idealism takes over and a radical, even barbaric subjectivism emerges:
the habit develops of no longer taking the real things seriously; from this
arises the weak personality" on whom the real, the subsisting makes only a
s lght impression. Eventually we become ever more negligent and indolent
towards the outer world [im Ausserlichen] and widen the precarious gulf
between content and form to the point of losing all feeling for barbarism
[zur Gefuhllosigkeitfiir die Barbarei
] (§4).
The loss ol the public world Nietzsche describes here, the retreat of the weakened
personality into the sensuous content of subjective interionty as it loses all sense for the
lorm of the world-this phenomenon is not only symptomatic of the destruction of a public
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space and the onset of a barbaric .nd.fference u> the world; „ also indices how damaged
,
er"a "°r'd °f SeM,ment haS beC°me ' Far from free'"S up the individual to freely
pract^dh"
Sent'me"tS aI>d sens‘tiv' ty. *he loss of the real resulting from a radically




a * ' n^° 3 so,'ps' sdc subjectivism which is the very opposite of historical
jectivity, the individual loses all trnct in irtrust in itself, the personality becomes too weak to act ,n— and one besms to ,ose °neseir ,n hisiory - "Thc
instead involuntarily asrhlsTo^rh^
rdare t0tmst *emselves, but
Play acting is the upshot of an excessive education in history. History, Nietzsche will argue
later in the second Untimely Meditation, can serve the invaluable function of providing
exemplary examples of deeds and acts, but when one is educated exclusively in histoty, all
perspective is lost, the great and the mediocre become indistinguishable, and the
overwhelming accumulation of historical facts "bewilders" the individual. Not knowing
how to act, uncertain of oneself and the world, "no one runs the risk of baring his own
person, but instead disguises himself behind the mask of the cultivated man, the scholar
Ihe poet, the politician" (§5). Out of fear and timidity, one assumes a role and a disguise,
and as a consequence the individual becomes mendacious and deceptive, dishonest no, only
to others, but to oneself." Historical education, Nietzsche argues, makes individuals
unethical and irresponsible, indeed, it forces them to become ham by weakening the
personality and robbing it of the strength to risk being themselves. Rather than acting on
one's own impulses, one becomes a mimetic machine and learns how to efficiently copy
"r m I
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COmC an ,m,taUOn °r a Self-“ P'ay accor. Along with the ,oSS of the worlden, radically practtced htsfonctsm results the loss of the self: "Inwardness " the realmo senttnrent, learns "to dance, to patnt its face, to express itself abstractions' and with
2 \ 8radUa,,y tC '°Se USelf"» . *he retreat front the world and them inwar w htch results culm, nates in a "coerced external uniformity" (§5). Rather thanpersona tt.es, "much less free ones," one finds 'anxiously disguised untversal human
ngs wo wear the bourgeois cloak of universality" (§5). And however much the
ourgeotste may look like a genera, w, II or a untversal subject, Ntetzsche writes it is in
y 11,6 VCry °PP°s ' te-» "eternal subjectlessness ,emger SubjectlosigkeUY (§ 5)
capable ol neither real action or genuine feeling.
Thts loss of the subject and loss of the world, this dtsmtegratton of the publtc and
pubhc senttment, culm, nates, accord,ng to Ntetzsche, in a extremely influential ethical and
po meal doctrine— utilitarianism. No one should be surprtsed, he writes, when under the
influence of "utilitarian vulganty," a "people pertshes of petty egoism and wretchedness of
OSS, f, cat,on and selfishness, after first falling apart and ceastng to be a people a, all" (§9).
Nor should one be surprtsed when a people, having lost all sense for the world and all
sense of itself, breaks apart into a form of individualism which knows how to act only
accord,ng to a strictly utilitarian logic. Having withdrawn from "an infinite horizon" into
-Ihe tiniest egotistical realm," havtng become concerned only with the private sphere and
sell -interest, this logic dictates that the individual "compromises, calculates, and
accommodates himself to the facts; he does not seethe but merely blinks and knows how to
his ovv n or his part) s ad\ antage in the advantage and disadvantage of others" (§9).
This mdiv,dual— the bourgeois subject-conforms to the facts, to objectivity, and having
conformed to the facts, this form of individual neither acts to change them nor seethes over
them, instead, the individual joins a political party and pursues interests through
compromise, calculation, and accommodation- through rational choices and instrumental
rationality. This form of individual is pragmatic and clever, deceptive and exploitative of
others, a prudent egoist and a member of what Nietzsche hyperbolical ly describes as "the
world system of egoism." Such prudent individuals, finally, recognize the futility of
rebellion and resistance, and so they welcome the founding of a state which protects them
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r°m the 'mPrUdenCe °f the rebC,llOUS and resistant— "the working Casses The statas a very spec, a, mtssion the worid system of egoism that is to be founded- ,t is
‘
supposed to become the patron of a„ prudent ego,sms ,n order to protect them with the
1
”1 ' ' i.tery^ P0''06 ^orces from ihe liorribie eruptions of imprudent egoism"
antithesis of republ.camsm and public sp.rit, the result of a rad.cally practicedh^msm- th,s ethtca, and pol.tical doctnne culm,nates, Nietzsche insists, ,n a state
y 1 s mihtary and pol.ce capacties. The paradox, cal result of this enterprise,
owever, ,s a state w.thout content or genuine specificity- poUticd unity without a people
or a culture of tts own. A police state is founded to protect self-interest where there are no
Sentimental Education
The task of the second Untimely Meditation is to cure a people of the h,stone,sm
responsible lor this paradoxical outcome and lay the foundations needed to unite a people
reconstitute its sens* communis, and open up a space for action and deeds-a public
world. It is a task for modermty in general and for Germany in particular, and as Nietzsche
emphasizes in the concluding section of the essay's fourth sect,on, i, extends far beyond
the strictly political goal of reunifying the autonomous states that make up northern and
southern Germany: "I hereby explicitly declare tha, i, is German unity into highest sense to
which we aspire, and to which we aspire more strongly than we do to political
reunification- the unity ofGerman spirit and German life after the destruction ofthe
antithesis betweenform and content, between inwardness and convention ” (§4). This is a
founding task; it seeks to legislate the foundations for a genuine political community by
reconstituting public sentiment-a people's common sense and its sens* communis- and
negating the antithesis between the private, inward sphere of sentiment and the public
world of convention where deeds and acts take shape. Each of these tasks-founding a
people, reconstituting its common sense, and opening up a world of action-is earned out
in response to historicism, and each requires that the rule of history— the "sole sovereign"
(§8) in modernity— somehow be overthrown.
131
oldest topics in politieal phitosophy—the education of the youth—and it leads him to annettpeete dost, nation. It leads him to the origin of political philosophy, to Plato Morean a e,se. Plato rejected history, change, and becoming; more than anyone else he
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' bU ‘ 'ike P,al°’ he «*- founding Of a
'
.
’ PCnJS UPO" ‘hC CUlt,Va,'°n °f according to new pedagogical
principles, and like Plato, he believes that those pnncples must free the young from the
historically sedimented practices of the past in order to turn them attention away from the
SP ere of change and becoming. For Nietzsche and Plato altlce, the micro-political sphere
* Senl 'mCnl-‘hc SOU|-'° battle ground where fundamental political problems are
°ught, and lor Nietzsche and Plato alike, conquering the sphere of sentiment is only
possible on the bas.s of a "new form of education” (§10) which robs the young of then
historical consciousness and allows them to forge, the past. This is the micro-pol, heal
quas,-Platonic strategy Nietzsche deploys to solve the macro-poli,ical problem motivating
his essay the lailure of the German founding to found a German people-and his
meditation presents this strategy as a l.beratoty enterpnse, as a freeing of the individual
I rom the coerced uniformity of the historically educated bourgeoisie, a freeing, finally
which founds a new form of individual and a new generation. "True historical natures,”
Nietzsche writes, are "great fighters against history, against the blind power of the real,”
and they light "not for the burial of their generation, but for the founding [zu begrtinden) of
new one" (§8). Nietzsche devotes the final sections of his essay to this foundational task,
to the legislation of the foundations capable of transforming the modern nat,on-state into a
genuine public united by a public sentiment and a sensus communis, and he frames the task
as a curative, healing operation which provides the antidote to the historical sickness
through a new, sentimental form of education.
Nietzsche uses two, quasi-technical terms to introduce the principles guiding this
new (orm ol education. These principles- the "balms and remedies effective against the
historical sickness" (§ 10)— serve as the "antidotes to the historical," and the terms






“-•—»«--w, «.JZJ.Zn ations needed to support a people and public realm, and Nietzsche deploys them inorder to broach the problem of sent,mem. The firs, of these two terms-,he
ahistoncal— provides Ntetzsche wtthan educattve principle capable of real,zmg the P.atomcemand that the young forget the past. "Wtth the term 'ahistoncal', he wntes, , destgnate
•he art and power to be able ,oforge, and to endose oneself wtthtn a Itmtted horizon" « ,)hts same art and power also provides Ntetzsche with a means for combattng the effects of
tstonesm, lor whereas a radtcally htstoricis, educatton ends in the loss of honzons as
.story expands tnto tnfinity, an educatton grounded in forgetting some portion of the
past Ntetzsche knows i, netther can nor should be forgotten entirely-allows the young to
lorm the honzons and perspectives necessary to gam a purchase on the world And
whereas the h.storicztng of the modems in turn results tn the deletion of the foundations
needed to gam access to the world, the ahistoncal -its direct antipode-serves as an
educative principle whtch allows those foundations to be reconstructed: "The ability to
sense ahistorically" Ntetzsche writes, "lays the foundation upon which something just,
healthy, and great, something that is truly human, can grow" (§1), Only on the basis of this
education in sentiment- the cultivation of the ability "to sense ahtstoncally [unhistorisch zu
empfinden]" -can the young cultivate a sensibility and a sentiment which is their own, and
only on this basts can the young form the horizons necessary to begin acting in the world.
An education grounded in the ahistoncal, then, not only serves as a means for
combating the effects of a pedagogy dominated by the study of history; it also lays the
foundations necessary for action and deeds. "All action requires forgetting" (§1), Nietzsche
insists, and without the honzon provided through an act of forgetting, without the
perspective opened up through a turning away from the past, one loses one's bearings in
the world and falls prey to the immobilizing sentiments the second Untimely Meditation so
diligently tracks down-nausea, skepticism, apathy, irony, and cynicism. Avoiding apathy
and inaction requires setting one's sight on the future, not the past, and so insistent is
Nietzsche on this point that he makes it the law of action. Indeed, he makes it the "universal





- d“ *at one forge, what canno, be meorporuied
i“ h0nZOn ^ - - one, attention on "what , to be> (§n .ton can deeds emerge, and no, only deeds, bu, just deeds- "every jus, deed"
,
WmeS - 'S made>“ trough the forgetting of wha, canno, be
assim. ated into one's honzon. The possibilities opened up through forgetfulness are by nomeans exhausted w„h th.s revelat.on, for the very same act of forgetting, Nietzsche admitsvery same deployment of the ahistoncal, leads no, just tojust deeds-,, also leads to thevery oppos.te of the just deed: "The unjust deed" (| I ). The ahistorical makes al, sorbs of
cods possible, just and unjust alike, for while it opens up horizons, i, closes others off
e ahistoncal may be the transcendental eond.Uon for every just deed and forgetting may
e the only basis for action, bu, because the horizons they enable remain limned, closed
'
and Unite, they cannot help but be unjust to the past. Whatever their ments-and Nietzsche
is the lirst to insist upon them- they shut most things out, close off access to the past and
fmally appear less enabling than terrifying, dangerous, and deadly, "a dead sea of night and
obi, v,on" (§ I ). Nietzsche himself calls the ahistoncal "the most unjust condition in the
world" (§ 1 ), and for all its necessity, it is a condition which is nevertheless "narrow,
ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, and deaf to warnings" (§l)_a necessary condition
lor all who would risk acting, but a dangerous one.
This danger make the ahistoncal a necessary but insufficient cure for the ills of
histoncism. The ahistoncal may lay the foundation for deeds and Nietzsche may legislate
us necessity lor every actor, but it cannot insure the justness of the deed or the actor. It may
open up a perspective on the world, but, because it closes others off, i, cannot insure that a
public world emerges. And though it may allow the young to cultivate sentiments of their
own, it does not necessarily unite a people and restore its sensus communis. Something
more is needed to achieve these goals, and that something is to be found through
remembering the past, not forgetting it. Another form of action, another form of sentiment,
and another (orm ofjudgement is needed, and Nietzsche proposes to find them through the
study of history. History, as the title to the second Untimely Meditation indicates, is not
only disadvantageous to life; it also has its advantages, necessary advantages, ones which
life— the life oi a people and the life of individuals-cannot do without. These advantages
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' $““ '° ** Pr°blemS reSU"' ng fr°m thc “cal. Whatever
, e incorporated tnto the horizons opened up by the ahistoncal n,us , be forgotten
.e zsche says , and because this act of forge,,,ng makes one dumb to the pas, and
tnsensutve to „ results judgements about the pas. whtch are themselves unjust theend, the problems result,ng from the ahistonca, are all probiems ofjudgement. Thc
.
“ a ,tant ol an .solated alpine valley,” Nietzsche wntes, someone whose -historical
knowledge and sentiment is very limited,- may be protected from the dangers of
histoneism, bu, the "judgements” whtch result from this limited horizon will mevitably tend
injustice (§ 1 ). Isolated in a valley, horizons drawn tight, such alpine dwellers
are cu, off from the rest of the world and their judgement suffers as a result. Thetr sense of
the world and abtltty to judge it are, as Nietzsche says, "very limited," and „ is precisely
this limited ability to judge and lack of a sentiment sensitive to the world that opens up the
p ibility of unjust deeds. History is needed, and an openness to it, in order to find
examples ol jus, deeds, models that can guide human action once traditional models have
been swept away under the Hood tide of historicism. History must be remembered, and no,
merely forgotten, because htstoricism destroys the traditional guideposts of action and w„h
it those absolutes which once resisted history's corrosive effects. After histone,sm, history
alone remains, and if any guidance for action is to be found, one must appeal to the great
deeds of the past. Only the exemplary deeds of history are capable guiding action once its
traditional foundations have crumbled, and so everything depends on one's sense of the
past and ability tojudge it. The "general welfare [allgemeine Wohlfart] "— Nietzsche's
decidedly broad term for this "everything"- "would require nothing more than to sow as
widely as possible the seeds of the power tojudge [Urteilskraft]" (§6).
In Nietzsche's attempt to found a new form of education capable of curing the ills
ol histoneism, everything, including the "general welfare" of a people, really does depend
on Urteilskraft
, on the power tojudge and the sentiments judgement expresses. If a
people's horizons are to be opened up, if the provincialism of the alpine dweller is to be
overcome and a genuinely open public space is to take shape, then the ability tojudge and
sense must be educated, cultivated, and allowed to grow. And if deeds are to emerge in that
public space, just deeds, then judgement and sentiment must be directed towards the past,
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ns of acuon have been swept away - Th ' s
that of the histortcist. It does not direct its attention to the past indiscriminately to




Uy (§6) ' Rath6r ‘han bUr> ing ‘he fMUre under lhe indiscriminate accumulation ofas arhfacts, this approach to histoty seeks to preset what the future needs
7
rar6St °f thmgS ”the h'*heSt a"d greatest of things"
( § 6). These are
am .guous terms- the loftiest, the rarest, the h.ghest, the greatest-and it ,s precisely thetramb, gutty, Nietzsche argues, that relieves the htstorian of the "mythology" -the "bad
mythology" (§6)-of "objectivity." Htstory is not a "photograph" (§6), ,t ,s something
w tch must be judged and tnterpreted. The loftiest, the rarest, the htghest, and the
greatest- these are quaht.es which are endlessly fought over, qualities whtch judgement
as trouble dectdtng, and no science, least of all a setence of history, has ever been able to
resolve the quarrels they gtve nse to. Htstory, Ntetzsche learned from Schopenhauer is not
the provtnce of sctence, for "htstory has to do with the absolutely partteular and with
mdtv, duals," and so it rematns tmpervtous to the genenc concepts used for scientific
class, fication. Histoty, Schopenhauer argued, cannot be a science, "and thus it
approx,mates in all respects to a work of fiction."” So too is there a certam fictive, aesthetic
qualtty to Nietzsche's approach to htstory, and when he tlluslrates what this approach looks
like, he pamts a picture of the histonan whtch places the problem ofjudgement al its very
center. The "genuine histonan," he writes,
observes all the motives and consequences of an event with such nuritv that
it has absolutely no effect on his subjectivity; this is the aesthetic
? '
wWchThTrainter'





’ contemPlates his inner picture; it is that total immersion in
t i gs, however, it is a superstition that the image that things produce insuch an aesthetically attuned person reproduces the empirical essence of
things. (§6)
This is a telling example, and it provides the key to Nietzsche’s understanding of
history and historiography. All of its imagery is drawn from the field of aesthetics. Indeed,
t
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. II trans E FJayne (New York: Dover, 1958), §58.
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drawn from a ,ong his.ory of works which al.cmpC ,o detennme ,he condiho.
necessary for a very specific aesthetic effect and a very specific aesthetic sentiment— thesentiment of the subltme. Schopenhauer, hke Kan, before him, uses ,ighte„ing lnd
thunder" and "a tempestuous sea" to exempltfy those things m nature which give nse to thesentiment of the sublime, those things which we>^ to be sublime." Schopenhauer’s
-ding, hke Kant's, these dynamic forces of nature give rtse to a dynamic sentiment- thedynamica ,y subltme. Viewed without
,
merest, safely free from danger, these forces are
capa e o avmg a dynamic el I ect on the observer as well : They can elevate us over our
se ves over our self-interest, and, in the face of temfying powers, they can arouse courage
and cal, forth the strength of resistance. Nietzsche, a remarkable slight of hand, makes
these forces the object of his genuine histonan, bu, rather than locating them nature he
discovers them h,story, in the great htstoneal actors whose exemplary deeds call forth
our courage and stiength of resistance. What the genuine histonan observes-free from the
self-,merest of "disguised egoists and partisans that wear an objective look," free from the
interests of the times and "the opinions of the present moment" (§6)-free from all these
interests, the genuine historian observes the great dynamic forces of the past, the great
historical actors, and observing them free from interest, they are judged sublime.' 2 The
sublime has always been defined as the great, indeed, as the absolutely great, and it is the
great- what in the past is great and worth knowing and preserving" (§6)-that Nietzsche
makes the object of the genuine histonan." What the genuine historian exemplifies, and
what Nietzsche's youth must learn from such a histonan, is the sentiment of the
sublime— the ability to judge the great, the ability to observe the sublime figures of h.story
free from self-interest and free from the interests of the times. And having learned to judge
t
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. I trans E FXayne (New York: Dover, 1958), §39; Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgement transWernerS. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hacked, 1987), §28 .
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Jean-Francois Lyotard has developed this approach to history in The Differend:Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of







^as Verhiiltniss der Schopenhauerischen Philosophic zu einer deutschen
Cultur, in Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. I, 779.
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and observ e, having become immune to ihe Historical fever and tlic dangers of the
sublime^




an ^ ' h38'8 for act'on ’ indeed, for moral, just action, because
mora sennment. It elevates one over the narrow horizons of the ahistorical
the
°^CnS 0„e's perspectives. ,t elevates the actor over self-interest and the interests of
preservatton or merely pnvate tnterests. Inrleed, so powerful is the sublime, elevating
heightening effect, that it allows one to "overcome oneself [rfc/r
(§ 10)
altogether. It suspends the will to 031(111310 to ~ill calculate, to compromise, to further the merely pnvate
and the narrowly interested. It frees one from ”,h», .i t I the tiniest egotistical realm," from the need
to accommodate oneself to the facts and seek one's own advantage through
accommodation. Without regard for the narrow, the limited, the pnvate and the personal,
Wlt °Ut rC8Urd f°r lha ‘ reSlnCtS the growth
- cu|hvation, and development of persons ,tma -es the honest, genuine deed possible. Only on the basis of the sentiment of the subltme
is a genuine act possible, and without it, one loses oneself under the canopy of history For







teiT Y°U no lon8er succeed in holding fast to the
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)™™ a ChUd SCeS; he fails t0 hear some thm8s that even a child
What the child sees and the prudent, calculating adult misses, of course, is the
possibility of acting without the canopy of history, of acting otherwise than history has
dictated up until now. The child-and even more so the youth educated in the sublime
examples of Nietzsche's great historical actors— sees possibilities that go beyond the
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prudent world of adult understand in o
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name—monumental history. Monumental h,story ts the history of the




achieved what appeared incomprehensibleThese singular individuals did not calculate in accordance with reality. They overcame itopened it up, and expanded humanity-,he rational, the real, and the possible. The
achieved .something great, and to this extent, they achieved something sub and
'
incomprehensible. The sublime, then, is moral not simply because it shakes the
Inundations of prudent, self-limiting and self-negating calculation. It is moral not simply
( ;;;
eXPOSCS lhe mdiV,dUal l° incomprehensible that-,f one has the power
.
O onto,, makes the honest deed possible. It is also moral because it opens up
on/ons that appeared closed, destroys limits that appeared natural, and opens up the
rr °f lhC Wry 8reateSt Th,S iS Whal an “nun history teaches-a, the greatness
| das Grasse
] that once existed was a, least possible at one time, and
consequently will probably be possible once again" (§2). The possibility of
possibility— this is what monumental history teaches. Possibility is possible the
incomprehensible, the sublime, and the great are possible-,his is the lesson Nietzsche's
youth must learn. And they must learn it, Nietzsche writes, as a "commandment"-
"Whatever was once able to expand the concept of 'humanity' further," monumental
history teaches, "must be eternally present in order to enable this expansion" (§2). This is




vides two other imperatives as corollaries: "know thyself” (Slot andX™ WheTTr! °r a 'PCOplrC -
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"ever conceive „ !ote noble a d
Speak
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S to lhc dividual, the second concerns lhe
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*** of the individual and“mun.ty Act m




lhc expansion of humanity through deeper sell -understanding and a higher
"humam !" itc-Ts'T tef^r
’ ‘hC “ lmPe !'atives is necessary and not arbitrary becauseunity a ks
,
d definitive meaning in modernity and must therefore be thought anew
legihmactalto IteriteTh^onci'sm'™







(§ 10). Whereas the first of these lavs the f
traditional gui deposts have been destroyed by histoncism, —





*>«- «.0, The second UnUme.y" says very Itttle about rchgton. but its treatment of histoty-of the genuine
htstonan— reveals the aesthcttc core of a certain tndtspensable form of
history—monumental h,story. The greatest htstortca, deeds exceed comprehension, and socy arc subhmc. They elevate the observer over the gtven range of htstortcal posstbth.ies
and so they elevate one over the endless sea of htstortcal facts and into the suprahtstortcal
'
onumcnlal htsloty demonstrates the possibility of possibility, and on the basis of the
moral tmpcrattve ,t commands- possibility must be eternally posstble- 1 , elevates one over
hlStOIy and mt° elern,ty: ”The foundation of all of man's certatnty and rest"
(§ 10> - ^ fr°m de'imiting
- stablli/‘ng, and dosing off horizons, this extremely fragile,
refined loundalton places certainty in the hands of those who arc capable of "holding fast to
the subltme." Holding fast to the sublime stops calculate in tts tracks and opens up other
possibilities. Far from holding one down, this elevating, empowering foundation lifts one
up, commands one to "overcome oneself [sick uberwinden]’ (§10), and expands
humanity's horizons.
Everything really does depend, then, on the ability to judge, on the ability to hold
last to the sublime and the taste for it, and Nietzsche's education in monumental history
aims at nothing more than the refinement of that ability. "Judgement and taste [das Urleil
und dor Geschmack]," Nietzsche writes, must be made "more refined and more sublime
[Seiner undsublimirter]" (§4) if a people is to be unified, its common sense restored, and a
public sphere reopened. After all foundations have collapsed, after every norm of action







pre^ »"«-«> »«.»- Th,.
V ercomes .tself and perpetually expands its horizons- not through theexpansion of the nation-state, no, through the pragntattc utilizatton of its nnhtarv forees hu,roug a people s elevatton over its borders. The nahonal culture which Nietzsche seeks to
ov^d
1S aCU * tUr̂ °f lhc sublime, a culture of constant self-overcoming, and constant^y^
^
the nation-state. This is a culture of the non-national, for the sentiment that it expresses
exceeds the confines of the nation and lifts one over it. The singular individuals united by
is cu lure sec lat beyond the borders of the nation, and the republicanism they
practice- their concern for the "general welfare," their heroic public spmtedness-extends
far beyond any nationalism. Indeed, these singular actors live in a republic high above the
com ines o, the nation-state, and the greatness they strive for extends to all of humanity.
These "singular individuals," Nietzsche writes,
na tins dialogue between spirits continues, undisturbed bv the wantonoisy chattering of the dwarfs that crawl beneath them The task of hisiorvIS to be their mediator and so to ever incite and Icnd sriength to the
^
production of the great. No, the goal of humanity cannot possibly lie in itsend point, but only ,n its highest exemplars. (§9)
P
Y
This is the goal of Nietzsche's sentimental education -to raise humanity to the level
of ns highest exemplars. It proceeds from a moral imperative that founds a new form of
education, a new culture, a new, non-nationalist form of cosmopolitan republicanism,
and- most of all -a new generation attuned to the sentiment of the sublime. It lays the
foundations for a people by teaching them to hold onto the elevating force of the sublime; it
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opens up the most public of nnhlir .
humanity; it makes genuine aCtjon possible by^monsllui^ Us^ssib^lt^itV^
^°'
e
foundations for a new fornr of state ,hrough a new fom, of^^ ^the sensus communis by Cul tiVating a taste for onIy sentiment open to all—'the
incomprehensibly sublime In the end ,h„
founding to found a German people.
essay— the failure of the German
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CHAPTER VI
THE REVALUATIONOFVALLES .SCHOP£W^[»CR AS
i“&;K,srp
— Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
"Pieces"
Nietzsche’s four Untimely Meditations have someth, „g of the fragment
.ncompiete, and unsystematic about them. They have this character, the first instance
rr emPhtydnUmenCal d,V,S,°nS tha' "" ^ the ‘ r ^ sectionsan , oft „ enough, estroy,ng «heir continuity. They have it, too, because the med„a,,„„s
co ected together by Nietzsche and pubhshed as a -book.- stand ,„ apparent isolation fromone another, without mtroduct.on, foreword, or preface articulating then untfymg ,dea
almost as pans of a whole left incomplete and unfin,shed. Th.s sense of fragmentary
’




typically describes his works as "writings" rather than "books." On thisdistinction and its importance, see Jacques Derrida, "The End of the Book and theBegmmng of Writing " OfGrammatology
, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 6-26 , esp. 15-20 .
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be concluded, did no, escape Nietzsche, recognition.’ indeed, he emphasized the
ragmenutry nature of his collect,on of essays when, in preparat.on for the publication ofc Untimely Meditations, he appended to the t,„es of each of h.s four texts the cautionary
tern,
pieces [W: "First Rece: Dav.d Strauss the Confessor and Wr„er," "Second '
P,ece: On the Use and Abuse of H, story for Life,” "Th.rd P,ccc: Schopenhauer as
Educator," "Fourth Piece: R,chard Wagner in Bayreuth." 3
„ .
N,etZSChC 'S deSCnpti°n °f WS - "pieces," or as "fragments," "parts "
~ lheSe t0° get at lhe sense of !he German word
'
Meditations wTh* °„aM ^y^"™^01" n ?°mPleteness °f Untimely
Project to fulfillment. Origi^y he rT WOUld 1,0 ncedcd 10 bnng the










’ man > m°re than
twelve years after outlining the prdec he a ,
As late as 1885
. some
a new publication of his initial output On Nict/lchl?^
addm8 three additional essays to
see Richard T. Gray, "Translator, Aftc™«nW/^ v”8!!)8 Plans lor lhe meditations.
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Kritische Studienaus2a.be cd GiorpinGoiV \ m
^ nedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche Briefe,








^men^ry character of the meditations, see
iL m 7 u y ’








N, ctzsche, concerned that he was failing to achieve the unity of style and thoughtcalled lor in his first meditation, asks his friend to subject the mode of "presentation
^
j t ? ,






th^ lhe ^y's fragmentary^w^k
haracte . n R ode s criticisms, see Richard T. Gray, "Translator's Afterword " inUnfashionable Observations
, 404. See also Jorg Salaquarda, "Studien zur zweitcn
unzeitgemassen Betrachtung," Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984), 1-45, esp. 9-15* HubertCancik, Nietzsches Antike: Vorlesung (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1995), 81-2* J P Stern
UnW^sTtyftess m9), *f
dUati0m
’ trans ' R ' 1 H°"mgdale (New York: Cambridge
'
On the fragmentary character of Nietzsche's writing, see Maurice Blanchot
Nietzsche and Fragmentary Writing," in The Infinite Conversation
, trans. Susan Hanson
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 151-170. See also Philippe Lacouc-
Labarthe, The Detour," in The Subject of Philosophy , trans. Gary M. Cole (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14-16, esp. 17-18.
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Sliicke" and could be used as its translation— ,.r
cultural problem that extends beyond hi
' '° J pol '"tjl
- Philosophical, and
ts own concerns about the completeness orcompleteness of his essay, Thts problem, which makes ,t more and more difficult to
f
n C rCdl 'SeS and dOCtnna ' re W°rkS modern,|y' »d whtch accounts for the mcreasmglvragmenurry and aphoristic character of Nietzsche's own writings, ong,nates an epochaleven that ,s first diagnosed, but not yet named, in the Untimely The^
hT^
Tt^' 'S lHe °nSet °f n ' h ' lism in Western modernity and the break-up of the greatp ilosophical and theological systems of thought of the past that gave purpose and meaningu political communities and individual existence, Nietzsche has done more than anyone
else to comprehend and diagnose the debilitating effects of nihilism in modernity with its
isorienting destruction of historically effective systems of value and horizons of meaning
and no one worked harder than him to find the path leading beyond nihilism and the
purposelessness it produces individual and collective life alike. In the Untime,
y
Meditations, Nietzsche inaugurates this twofold task, at once diagnostic and curative andm 1,5 f°Ur 6SSayS
' he mak6S h ' S flrst adempts— incomplete, fragmentary, and
necessarily p,ecemeal_,o transform the extraordinary loss of meaning and putpose
modernity into a liberating and exhilarating opportunity to formulate the possibilities of a
post-metaphysical, secular existence without sure footing.
Nietzsche's project of philosophizing without foundations reaches a certain apex in
he third of his Untimely Meditations, Schopenhauer as Educator. The essay has long been
Keith A nsell-Pearson is one of Nietzsche's few readers to see the problematic of
PnIitl^l°Th
T

















uer as Educator. There Nietzsche confronts the problems that defines
fil m .l?
1 re explorations of modern nihilism: the "senselessness [sinnlossV life (§4)the worthlessness of his existence
[
Uinverth seines Daseins]" (§3), and the
worthlessness ot the present age [Umverthe der gegenwartigen Zeit\" (§3).
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final output and define his
political phtlosopherof the future: To achieve a decisive "revaluation of all values " to
purpose to human hie alter the death of God and the devaluation of all values.* Tim task
Nietzsche insists, is a pohttca, task, perhaps even* petit,ca, titsk an age bereftof goals
ceding hose of the nation-state, and in Schopenhauer as Educator, he formulates „emso, what hewdl latter cal, "great politics.- Great politic, is Nietzsche's answer to the
problem ol nthttism and the crisis of values it foments in the West. It is a strategy
necessi tated by historical events, designed to respond to the new political conditions created
y ‘ C mcanms m m°dermly lhrou8h an expans,on and refinement of our concept of
politics. As Nietzsche writes in a note to himself, modern nihilism requires that we "learn
politics all overagain
[Uber Politik umlernen mrd],” and we must do so, he believes in





cons7mation of Nietzsche's early philosophy''(UriSCte 1118Psychologist, Antichrist [Cleveland: Meridian Books 19641 33) rXZChN.
Sflt^
ulo-is i hit .,i cr. r'
®
’i
' c ' 61“65). In the essay that follows, I developidea that also appear in Conway s work, but I proceed along different lines to reachdil lerent conclusions about the importance and meaning of Schopenhauer as Educator.
Twilight of the Idols
, Foreword; Gay Science, §335. On the problem of vhIup in
modernity and Nietzsche, see Gillcs Dcleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. HughS rl dTll f £’!rb'a University Press, 1983), 1-3; Martin Heidegger
Mil 7 • \ ' I













Farrcl1 Krcl1 - Frank A Capuzzi (San Francisco:
rbcrCollins, 1991 ), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA •






5al ' lS c * * ecls rethinking the concept of politics independently of the
p ctices and goals of the modern state . 7
As is well known, Nietzsche formulates his concept of great politics ,-the 'Petty politics- of the European na,ton-states and the, r reduchono, pohiZ""
0"
questions about the administration of the affairs of the state and the destiny of nations Thireduction, Nietzsche heheves, results front a failure to reHec, on the underiying valuesupport state-centered politics, a failure that .so appears as an unwilhngnel l Hucl
pulses and aims of the nationalistic politics that i, promotes. The importance of greatr “ W '"' n8neSS t0“^— -rpnse refused hv the moderTstate^and even more, to engage in the much more difficult problem of creating values
capable ol combating modem nihilism without recourse to the imperatives of the slate and*e evaluative framework on which they depend. Already, Sctopen^rasEOuvUor
Nietzsche makes it clear that he believes the philosopher, properly undemtood ,s best
'
suited to the task of evaluating modernity, dominate values, for the philosopher more
an any°nC £,SC ' " achieving the freedom necessary to evaluate the values of
the present age irrespective of the consequences and condemnations that may result ,f this
is so-and Nietzsche presents a strong case for his argument in the third meditation- then
.he political philosopher of the future must be ready to investigate spheres of life typically
held at a distance from political life by state-centered inquires into polities. This means, for
Nietzsche at least, that the philosopher of the future must be a political philosopher who
cakes up the tasks traditionally ascribed to political philosophy: The legislation of thejust
and legitimate conditions for individual and collective life. Unlike the traditional task of
political philosophy, however, Nietzsche's philosopher must legislate these conditions
independently of and in opposition to the predominate figure of the political in
modernity— the nation-state. With this reconfiguration of the task of political philosophy,




trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York:image, 1 8), §960. For a further discussion of this passage sec Lester H Hum
Nietzsche and tli£ Origin of Virtue, (New York: Routledge, 1991) 39-40- see also Tracy
flnTvT
8, 7
' (Urbane, and Chi^ag^
Y











~ “ «*„„w,„«„ Ji(M , _
,,7,
i“"'"’“”'"d «- **>*»— «>purpose— the problem of nihilism necessitates it_anri vei h„
, , ,
and y t because no known values exist
to replace the devalued values of tradition, any new creation of values appears lo lack thT
resources necessary to give ,1 the legitimacy needed to make I, more than JUs, an arbitrate
act of power, repression, or domination. Nietzsche's political philosophers-,he
practitioners of what he calls "%/ter pohtics .hohere mm," -therefore find themselvesm a difficult, seemingly untenable situation: They can no longer claim, as Plato's
Philosophers could, to be philosopher-kings whojustify their creation of values by
drawing on the resources of an eternal realmof values leg,,, mated by an ultima,evalue
called "the Good,'' for the emergence of nihilism has rendered precisely such eternal values
v alueless. '» At the same time, however, Nietzsche wants his political philosophers to be
more than just philosopher-tyrants who leg, slate values withoutjustifying or legitimating
sr^SKiSSlSSt'
^m^PobUcs ofFriendship trans. George Collins (New York Verso^997- Jean Luency, The Imperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Hollandd Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
Ecce homo
, "Why I am a Destiny," § 1.
Twilight of the Idols
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appears to lack a legtttmate basis-,hat Nietzsche wrestles with through hts very las,
writings. • The essay which ,t ,s firs, confronted, however-Schopenhauer as
MUCa,°r deSen eS Part 'CUlar SCrUtmy
' for “> more than any other of Nietzsche's




















Kaufmann in his discussion of Schopenhauer as Educator (seeNietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist










hereby announce lhe only possible solution to the devaluation
all values in modernity. This is the thesis that will be tested in the pages to follow.
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purposelessness ansing in modernity without falling
tyranny, aristocratic conservativ
prey to the charges of philosophical
asm. or the blunt imposition of power from above.'
Political Theology
In Schopenhauer as Educator, Ntetzsche approaches the problem of
meaninglessness and purposelessness m modernity from the perspective of politics aperspective which ,s informed, however, by the recognition of an even, that, more than anyCher, is responsible for the crisis of nihilism. This event, as Nietzsche would later
'
proclaim is the death of God. The decline of the power of religion over social life the
eclipse of theological values effected by the forces of secularization, and the waning of the
U6nCe °' the ChUrCh mod^hy-.hese developments, Nietzsche believes, leave
modern life senseless [sumlossy (§4) and existence "worthless [Unwerth ]" (§3 ) bereft
ol genuinely meaningful meaning and devoid of real purpose. The decline of religion and
Che onset of nihilism are for him synchronic phenomena, onginating out of the "agitated
seas ol secularization [VerwehUchungY (§4), and taken together, they effectively dissolve
Che bonds that once suppressed social antagonisms, creating a social crisis requiring new
problem in order to pre^nth^phlhwoDhvaTa^
d** pCrceive
^
shorteomings in solving this






- argUeS lhat N'“'s ™alt£n of
T^i^ers^ty





in the "ide°logy of superior/inferior and good/evil" (see











’ careless‘y asserts that "no man cameloser to the lull realiza ion of self-created 'values' then A. Hitler" (see Friedrich NietzscheNew York: Penguin, 1979], 86). Responding to all of these criticism and concerns wodd
nnH nftp
ark ° ltS °rVn ’ bu* dshou,d be said that theY are too often the product of partiala d often hurried readings of Nietzsche's works. At the very least, they do not apply to oneof Nietzsche s works





lUal,ZeS lhC CriS,S by
modernity as an
an age whtch forces onceheldTc^ «4),
direct,on or purpose, and it is only thanks to the delT
ChUrCh^ With°U‘
believes, that anarchv does no, relh T
lh° m0der"^ hC
power of the church, Ntetzsche wrttes
•' ’^^ mt° "* V°'d“ by ,he deCli"'"S
, to organize everything anew out of itself -m i
provide a bond that w,„ ho,d these tntmtca, forces check- (M, As a result^^
thechin-ch haT^
^ SOClal " m0dem ' ty
'^ "*“ previously“ Cleaning and purpose to „fe, now the state assumes thts role. And ,ust
value of ref
' 'mP°Se mean '"g^ PUrP°Se °" ' lfe denved fro"> 'he authoritetive
au hontative value „ denves from mmntaining social order. Under the forces of
ar:rr"^ offtechurchis—result, Ntetzsche argues, "the state wants peopte to worshtp ,t the vety same idols they
previously worshipped in the church" (§4).
These are the charactenstic developments that broadly define modernity accord, ng° letZSChC * ana 'yS1S Sch°P^er as Educator, and they make the problem of
mhtltsm an enormous political problem. I* magmtude can be gauged from the fact that the
solutton to the problem of nihilism appears ,n the development of the modern state a
development that, for Ntetzsche a, least, serves to exacerbate the problem by shift, ng the
locus ol soctal authority without in any way resolving the problem at its source: Nihtlism.
Rather than solvtng the problem of nihilism, the development of the modern-state obscures
d through its assumption of an authortty no more leg,,,mate than that previously held by the
church. The result, as Ntetzsche makes clear in his meditatton, is a form of political
theology, a secular, zed theocracy, produced by a transference of value and power from the
religious sphere to the secular world. Far from liberating human, ty from the chatns of




idol, the modern state, "the colder nf nil „’ iuesi ot ail cold monstpr« " 4rrii/-> aers. The danger that Nietzsche
uncovers ,n this development, an, whtch has arguab|y only _
understood, lies in the new form of power that emerges, a form of power thaulperates
ir rr
,n an obscure
' seir'concea" ng fash,°n - ,s °-^
,
h , s^
' e well-known form of a monopoly on physical v.olence, for as Nietzsche
writes—and Bismark's state-founding strategy of "blood and iron" is no doubt hts
point here it is the military despots [mUilarisclien GewaUherrscher] ” (83)more than anyone else, who use the state to "organize everything anew out of itself" and
create a new social bond. On the other hand, however, over and above this first form ofpower, another form emerges in modernity according to Nietzsche's analysis in
Schopenhauer as Educator, far more subtle in nature and free from the obvious objections
of repression and coercion.
This second form of power does not act publicly through force, violence or
coercion, but pnvately, through the consent of individuals. Nietzsche discovers it in the
state's ability to exert its power not only in public life, but m private life as well. Through
,LS ab"'ty 10 '
'
nnUenCe 3nd re*ulale education, the shite is able to promote its
own system of values, values which extend beyond the promotion of the state as the
legitimate entity lor providing "protection from internal enemies, protection from external
enemies, and protection from the protectors" (§7).“ Under the "new political conditions"
(§7) that emerge in modernity, Nietzsche argues, a new form of power appears that draws
life as such into the political sphere, politicizing the seemingly neutral domain of life by








W °n lhe Phenomenon of politicaluic i gy,
f Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concent nf
‘ vereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA.: MT Press, 1988).
Michel Foucault has done more than anyone else to advance Nietzsche's analysis of
of specifically modern power. Sec, for example,toJSSSirth of the Prison









FV°le of culture and education in promoting the power ofol al e the slate foreshadows Louis Althusser's investigations of the role ofculture and education in furthering "ideological state apparatuses.” See "Ideology and
RrfweSf rt a P^atU,SeS/' m Uni" and Phil°sophy«nd Other Essays, Iran’s. Benbrewester (London: New Left Books, 1971).
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uncovers it at work in Bismarrk-'c ™sma ck s promotion of the German nation-state as a »
'd stole that
,,
promoto^ ml 1 •
c Kulturs tacites culture only in order to promote itself" (to\ , u
the fact that "the modem stale reeards the
' he sees n at work in
tSRt A
Pr°mOtl0n °f Phll°s°phy to be one of its tasks"
2 :T th£ S,ate
'




kS dem°nStrated- iS m°t,VCd * * own ,n,crests. "The state,"'
and rV,
WnteS




Cn 'S ” (§8) - ThlS iS **- of the problem tha, Nietzsche uncovers bisva ua ton o modem politics. Culture and education, promoted by the state, transform
indi viduals into citizens who are obedient to the imperatives of the state, constituting themas its subjects by subtly inscribing them with power even as these citizens celebrate the
v.nues of the nation-sta.e and the freedom ,, provides from foreign powers. This was the
cvclopment tha. Nietzsche witnessed firsthand with the founding of German Reich and the
numphalism it unleashed in the press and public less than three years before he composed
Schopenhauer as Educmor, and this experience undoubtedly allowed him to see that,
whatever hbert.es and rights may be won when individuals achteve the status of citizen
individuals as citizens remain, more than anything else, subjects of the state. By figuring
hie in the form of the citizen, life-pub,ie as wel, as Pr,va,e-,s drawn into the order of the
state, a development unknown in classical political philosophy, where the political sphere
was limned to the public sphere of tht polls. With the rise of the nation-state in modernity,
however, the politicization of the private sphere is itself undertaken, and it is the discovery
ol this development that accounts, ,n part, for the originality and foresight of the third
Untimely Meditation .
17
Nietzsche further conceptualizes this turn from the deployment of public power to
the development of a power operating at the previously unpolitical level of the private
sphere by clanlying its telos. If the modern politics of the nation-state transforms living
human beings into citizens of states, and if citizens are thereby destined to be subject to the









’ wilhout so much as saying so, has furthered Nietzsche analysisol the politicization of the private sphere and deepened his diseovcncs. See Homo SacerSovereign Power and Pare Life
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m serving the state. According to this loeir
existence and the very fibers of life "Wh ^
lnscr'bes itsel ^ ' nto the very core of
rhetorically of h,s fellow ct.zens Th
“ “ PUrPOSC *^ ^
* uo Clti s. e answer he receives is
( ^A , „
ic l is to become a good citizen"
order titan




^ PFaCt'Ces enab**ng the articulation of popular demands against the state
.
P°WerS ' ,ndeed
’ thlS form of c' tizenship points towards a sacrificial
P< rites whtch life itself is sacnftced to "a state that demanded this sacnfice" (*) a—r ble 0n 'y " SUlte^ <§8> »—> Penetrates rifethrough mst.tut.ons of culture and education that it estranges rife from itself and
reduces ,ts energ.es towards the ends of the state. C.tizenship, then, accord, ng toeusc e s account, ,s a pract.ce of self-sacnfiee, corresponding to the "dogma that asserts
that the state is the highest aim of humanity and that a man can have no higher duty than
sc.ee to the state" «4,» Nietzsche attnhutes the power of th.s "dogma" to a confusion of
poht.es and rife. The aim of life- the a.m of individual existence-can only be a political
a.m, .1 porit.es ,s capable of solv.ng the problems of rife, if it is capable of alter, ng,
controlring, and manipulating existence itself, so that existential problems-what is the
meaning of hfe? what is the purpose of ex,stence?-can be persuasively solved through
state act,on. Nietzsche does believe that ex,stence is maleable, that there are different fonus
of existence- tragic, Socrat.c, and Apollinian are some of the examples his writings
prov.de us with- but he does not accept the claim that the state is the appropriate vehicle
for such transformations. "Any ph.losophy that believe, that the problem of existence [*,
Pmbkm deS DaS€im] ran >* altered »lved by a political event
|poliHsches Ereigniss],"
Nietzsche writes, "is a sham and pseudoph.losophy [Spaass- und Afterphihsophie]' (§4 ).
Such a philosophy, he suggests-and this was the purpose of Bismarck's
Kulturstaat—would result in a total politicization of existence in which the state pushes
itself into the recesses of an individual's being by dictating its ends and reason for existing.
This sort of all-encompassing philosophy, Nietzsche recognizes, can only be a product of








!fTCt;5ed by P°l,t,cal lheol°gy. see Jean-Luc Nancy,
of Minnesota mi 'Z-Zi '^^ S ' Libre« (Minneapolis: Universriy
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Reich represents the decisive and deviatino w
< thc r„u^08 or a^ thc
extension of state power into "existence" itself n
’ cy a,C ,call/cd to an unprecedented degree.




^ ° " Jr8UmCm' ThC m°rC ' Undamental Problem hm meditation addresses lies inc emanation of values and the role they play m furthering speeifie forms of life and
peculiarly modern types of power. In Nietzsche's en.iquc of .he modern state this
problem, as wc have already seen, is solved through the spheres of education and culture
n esc two realms, the suite imposes its values through the promotion of its own interests.
p re of culture, 11 docs so-al least in the German example Nietzsche takes as hism<^e ~ through Bismarck's "CulturkampJ” (§7), an attack on the last vestiges of religious
authority exercised by the Catholic Church, designed to draw a sharp line between church
and state and solidify the suite's power over institutions such as marriage and divorce. In
Ihe ease ol education, which is where the real conllict lies for Nietzsche-h,s meditation is
entitled, al ter all, Schopenhauer as Educator- the suite exerts its influence through the
promotion of philosophers who reflect the needs and interests of the stale. "The stale,”
Nietzsche writes, "selects its own philosophical servants, and it selects just as manv as i,
needs for its own institutions" (§8). As Nietzsche makes dear, the suite selects Us servants
according to their values, and anyone who would attempt the opposite, as Schopenhauer
did- to evaluate and critique the stale according to thc highest value of philosophy,
truth— could be assured of not secunng a salaried position in a philosophy department.
From thc perspective of thc slate, of course, such a decision would be perfectly justif ied.
"Were someone to appear," Nietzsche writes,
who really acted as though he wanted to measure everything, including thc
suite, by the standard of truth, then the state- because above all else it
allirms its own existence- would be justified in banishing such a person
and heating him as an enemy, just as thc stale banishes and treats as an
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wants to act as its^(Ts)
rCl '8 'Hn thal SeLS ilSelfatovc state and
Nietzsche's essay revolves around Precisely this conflict between the slate ti c and the
own existence and the values that support its
philosopher, between a state that affirms its
existence, and the philosopher who wants to ev-ilmto a
truth. And it is here with the
the state according to the criterion of
Nietzsche turns to the fash oflegisia^
nihilism without recourse to the values of the modern nation-state.
Culture
Nietzsche presents his revaluation of values in Schopenhauer as Educator as an
essentia y .beratory task. In the very first section of the meditation, he declares that hisessay exists to promote "the true liberation of life [«ter teahrhafien Befreiun, des Lebens, "
a liberation of life from the values of the state, and a liberation of life from the rituals of
'
citizenship that ,t enforces. Nietzsche conceptualizes the process of liberation in several
ways. I. depends, firs, of all, on a rejection of laziness and fear-fear of the suite, fear of
public opinion and the values of the day, and laziness in adapting toconvention and
avoiding the struggle to become oneself. Becoming oneself, or rather obeying the
imperative to "be yourself!" (§ 1), defines the task Nietzsche sets on, for his readers a, the
star, of his essay, and if it requires turning away from the realm of convention and opinion
.1 also depends on not retreating inward into the sphere of the subjective ego. "Your true
essence
| Wesen] does not he deeply hidden within you," Nietzsche writes, "but rather
immeasurably high above you" (§ I ). This higher self, this liberated, true self, can only be
realized through a process of education, Nietzsche believes, and genuine "educators can be
nothing other than your liberators" (§1). The third Untimely Meditation could just as easily
be titled Schopenhauer as Liberator, and Schopenhauer, if not Schopenhauer's philosophy,
certainly plays a decisive role ,n Nietzsche's essay. Above all, Schopenhauer's value lies in
his example. Indeed, his example is precisely that of the liberated life, of the "liberation of
the philosophical life" (§3). "Schopenhauer," Nietzsche writes, "wanks to have little to do
with the learned classes; he keeps to himself, and strives for independence from stale and
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society this is his example, his model" (§3)
what is exemplary and education ,! i„<; u ,
to understand
y u al m Schopenhauer's nature" (§3 ) After , u -
nr




P r S €ye trained on existence; he seeks to establish its value [Werth] anew For it
,
always been the pecuhar task of great thinkers to be legislators of the measure
and weight of things [Gesetzgeberfttr Maass, Mibtze und Gewicht der Dinge]’ (S^With
is sentence, Nietzsche tells us that the source of Schopenhauer's liberatory exemple lies^ aUt0"0my W"h * legislates new values. This understanding of the
Philosopher ,s easily imagined, and Schopenhauer's example seems to prove la possibility:
shuns the suite and society, and values things independently of the predominant scale of
va ues. He is, in short, an example of Nietzsche's philosopher who freely revalues values
without recourse to the values of the sate. Here, though, we encounter the problem of
evaluating values previously discussed: On wha, basis does Schopenhauer's revaluation of
values hike place? What legitimates h.s legislative act, his establishing the value of existence
anew? How can we be sure that this pessimistic philosopher assigned the correct value to
existence? Nietzsche's answer to these questions, and the paradox that poses them in
modernity, is perhaps grasped through a consideration of the specific character of
Schopenhauer's revaluation of values. If, as Nietzsche insists, Schopenhauer is a
legislator, what does he legislate? Nietzsche tells us that he legislates the measure, mint,
and weight ol things, as well as the value of human existence. And he also tells us, in the
same paragraph of the meditation, that Schopenhauer's evaluative, legislative judgement on
existence's value aims "to be just towards existence [gerechtgegendasDasein]" (§3).
Schopenhauer, then, on Nietzsche's account, ,s a lawgiver who assigns existence its
value— it remains to be seen what this value is-and does so justly. Schopenhauer, in
short, legislates the just laws that govern true existence and should govern the political
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community. The dedsive question, around which the whole of Nictzsch ' ,turns, therefore asks: What is this law?
mcdttahon
In Nietzsche's meditation, he tells us what the character a a r
but he does so slowly, in p.ecemeal fashton, almost as if he ,s d,s ,
“ ^ ^
He begins, in the first section of the meditation b
'*cor enng it as he writes.
accord-
’ y s,mP 1Y telling us that we "must live
be discovered through introspect,on. Rather, Nietzsche insists"
J










‘he feW ”m°ral eXemP,arS ” (§2) °f OUr a"d “ - same law
Sc openhauer the lawgiver made hts own through a legislative ac, that revalued the
mendacious values of the state: "Schopenhauer," Nietzsche writes, "never wants to create
appearances, for he wntes only for htmself, and no one likes to be deceived, least of a„ a
philosopher who has made this his law: Never deceive anyone, no, even yourself!" «2)» imperative, hke the tmperative "Be yourself!", issues from Schopenhauer's example
°"e ShOU 'd llVe ' 11 COmma"ds °>*d,ence to oneself rather than the state. But
Nietzsche does not end his discussion of Schopenhauer's law here. And indeed he could
not, lor while the command to be truthful is virtually uncritic,zable, ,, lacks the criterion
needed to determine what decides truthfulness. Here Nietzsche takes an unexpected turn, a
turn which leads through the problem of nihilism and into its solution:
All existence that can be negated deserves to be negated and to be truthfulmeans to believe in an existence that could not possibly be negated and that
senses th^meaninBofh’
* alsehood ' That is vvhy the one who is truthful
exobcable onTJE ?1S aCtlrVlty ? metaPhysical > something that isplicat ly by the laws of another, higher life [Gesetzen eines andernund hohern Lebens], one that is in the most profound sense
at lrmative— regardless of how much everything he does appears as thedestruction and violation of the laws of this life [Gesetze dieses Lebens}.
Nietzsche juxtaposes two laws here, the laws of "this life" and the laws of
"another, higher life." The laws of this life are the laws of the state, of conventional
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morality and custom. The laws of Nietzsche's nth u- ,
conventional or customary the t
' er life, by contrast, are not
true laws of "life" itself The
L°nt,ngeW Producte particu,ar socie^ or Stete, but the
define „fe,
^^ wUch
its values. To live acLarding
1
,,}^,^^ ^d^h
6" **Se^'^ terms state and
hv„
<>t transcend the state, Nietzsche argues means mlive according to laws that one "senses" nr "h~i . ,
“ s, to
that Nietzsche, who chooses hi, v ,
to be "metaphysical." I, is significant










,en^aU*r *^s^a*es— "Never deceive anyone,
our.se 1
. metaphysical, Ntetzsehe states that this law of truth must be concetved ofrom the Respective of nrcUtphystes. „ is this ,dca-,he idea of metaphysics- tha, for
ic /.sche, provides the criterion of truthfulness needed to justify Schopenhauer's
egis ative act and prescriptive law. bu, since i, does no, confuse the law or the existence
“ ^ l° " VC ' n C°nf0rmi‘y with ‘"is law with the actual achievement of a
metaphysical ex,stence-w,th a "higher life- beyond the physical plane of extstence-t, ,sa
criterion which remains always just out of reach, more a regulative idea than an achieved or
achievable reality. 19
The remainder of Nietzsche's essay unfolds the consequences of the metaphysical
'“"'a " hlghCr " ,e ” l° CXplaln Schopenhauer's example setves ,0 guide human hie
towards values and aims that are independent of those of the state. These values and aims
are articulated and prescribed m the imperatives tha, Schopenhauer's example exemplifies
The imperatives ''Be yourself!” and "Never deceive anyone, not even yourself!" are
justil led and legitimated by a metaphysical idea of life that places the meaning and value of
"hie" beyond any and every particular evaluative ac, that would define its value once and
lor all. I, therefore places „ beyond the confines of the state. Bu, i, also, in turn, places
"hie" beyond all attempts to evaluate itsdignityor meaning definitively. The attempt to
revalue values in modernity, then, finally devolves into the impossible attempt to evaluate
what has become, with the dissolution of all values, invaluable. The moral imperatives that
thc“y °f "metaPhysics" after its decline, see Theodor W Adorno
Continul l^ste’ “ Ne«ati^Dialectics. trans. E B. Ashton (New York:
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-ue l rom Schopenhauer, example of the freety evaiuating philosopher are therefore
capnctous or impostng, but necessary, and their lawful necessity ,s dc t r
the inaccessibility of the ultimate object under evaluation— "life" itself huhT^^
Nietzsche can deploy Schopenhauer as a way ou, of the problem of nthtlistn and the
values without letting his example fa], prey t„ the abyss of arbitrariness orimperatives of power. Schopenhauer, ,aw-”Never deeetve anyone, no, even
yourself!”— does not tssue in a positive definite, of life that ass,gns it a deftnittve and finalva ue. u, rathe, att.culates the negattve cond,„on-an tdea of "fife” that transcends allev luattve attempts-needed to begtn the pr^ess of Itberattng life from „s truncated
politic,zed, modern form. The cntenon of truthfulness that commands one to be one'self iserelore truthful to the extent that it does not subsume the possibtlities of life under one'
particular form of Itfe, say tha, of the German people living within a German state
The ultimate consequence of this understand,ng of "life" is, for Ntetzsehe the
creatton of a new senes of moral "duttes" (§5) that tell wha, ought to be done m the wake
o modern nththsm and the rtse of the nation-state. These duttes are already implied by the
imperatives Ntetzsehe articulates in his mediation, and they are untted ,n the task of
"berating life from its politicized, modem form so that life may finally become itself
unaltenated and independent ofltfe-denymg values. In an tmpera.tve that Ntetzsehe
’
articulates m the first sentence of his meditation, sixth sentence, an imperattve legitimated
and necessitated by the loss of those past values that gave life value and purpose, he states
the task demanded by theses duties: "Humanity
[die Menschheil] should work ceaselessly
toward produemg singular, great humans [einzelne grosse Menschen)_,h,s and only this
should be us task." Thts task, Nietzsche argues, is not a task for isolated indivtduals, but is
rather a communal task and a communal duty if humanity is to find a just and legitimate
path beyond nihilism. And these tasks and duties, Nietzsche goes on to write, are
essentially cultural in nature:
One thing above all, is certain: These new duties are not the duties of a
solitary individual; on the contrary, through them one is integrated into a
powerful commonalty [Gemeinsamkeit], one that, to be sure, is not held
ogether by external forms and laws, but by a fundamental thought
[Grundgedanken]. This is the thought of culture [Kultur], insofar as it is
capable of charging each of us with one single task: Tofoster the production
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::=:—n~:=rr
che a transfigured physis ^nen
,W (§3) , a sphere whjch ,,e^and liberates ttse.f by taking possesslon of ltseIf.„ ^ «harges us w„h promoting those forms of life which promote "life": The satm who ,c hus to renounce the illusions of thp • • , ' teac es
, , .
empmea! eg°; the philosopher, who holds out the hope




fe “ le8U,mated “*—d *- ccapse of those va,ues that wou,d
° CrWISC dCfme thC PUrP°Se 0l llfe ' From the Perspective of "life,” then-and "life" alone
remains valuable after the devaluation of values modernity- value anses from „fe,
perfection. The more perfect „fe is the more liberated, autonomous life, the one wh.ch has
tea .zed most fully what « means to be a living, human being. The duty to perfeet life, like
I e imperatives that Nietzsche discovers emanating from Schopenhauer's example, is
medfrom the laws of higher lilt," laws that come into existence in ihe absence of
earthly laws that could persuasively solve the problem of "life's" value and purpose Once
earthly laws-the laws of the church, state, or custom-fall into disrepute, then life can
appeal to nothing other than "the laws" of "life" itself, laws which withdraw into the
inaccessible sphere of metaphysics and always, of necessity, remain yet to be achieved,
and which command, as a duty, the increasing and unending perfection of earthly life.
Anything less, Nietzsche insists, would violate one's duty to "life."
It can now be better understood who Schopenhauer's "example" plays such an
important role in Nietzsche's meditatton. Schopenhauer does not represent life perfected.
He is rather- although this necessarily remains open to argument-an example of a more
perfect lile. The perfected life, the completed life, which would be completely "life,"
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purged of the diluting traces of emplrica, „mc and place, would be a genuinelyctaphysical achievement. Nihilism rules out this possibility for Nietzsche
'
1 ,no choice but to proceed by way of examnle Pv ,
tz , and so he has
P • Examples are necessary because ihrv ii- suggest distinctions once the values underlay,ng h.storically cl fc , ,
lost their authority. They alone can promote the cause of
‘ ^^
this true life th ^ rem£"nS fundame"^ly unfathomable, and the "laws” of
^ ,
' e "‘wttat defines life itself, therefore remam i„access,ble. This means that
example b
^ ^ rCfCrS
’ “ Ws mcd,tatlon
’ not only to Schopenhauer’s
s ut more broadly to "the rarest and most valuable examples [der setiensten und"" EXemPlarerm~CWn°l * SUbSUmal »d translated ,„to aC°nCePl °fW"«—^ task commanded by N.etzsche, "dudes" and
imperatives is no, to fix the concept of humamty once and for all, but, as he wrote in hissecond Untimely Meditation, to perpetually expand the concept of humanity through its
per ecu*. No genera, law ex.sts winch could finally define when this expansive process
L UOn haS ach,eved itS end 0ther laws, duties, and imperatives, however are
articulated m ScHopentiauer asEducator that d.rec, our attention towards this unfathomable
inaccessible law of life, and taken together, they provide Nietzsche with a way progress
'
cyond the problem of nihilism and the values of nationalism.
Against the ungrounded imperatives of the nation-state, Nietzsche's laws, duties
and imperatives command obedience to life itself, the sole remaining value and end for
hving human bangs in modernity. Like Aristotle's description of the end of life as the good
hie, a good defined through the cultivation and perfection of life, life's purpose for
Nietzsche is also its perfection. But for Nietzsche, ,t is not the stole or polls that furthers
this end, but a "powerful commonality" (§5) that exists independently of and in opposition
to the state’s elforls to make life serve its purposes and submit to its powers. This
commonality is a commonality of culture, a sphere of activity, in which individuals take
possession of themselves, overcome themselves, and free themselves from the values and
standards ol the modern state. Nietzsche fourth and final UntimelyMeditation- Richard
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he example of the -.deal- „fe (§5)e^p.irJ^Z^^S^hT^of the freely evaluating, liberated individua! in turn servesthe1^ ^C^^en^aUer'S examPle
;:r—
=
y ne process of secularization and the emeruenro of t









Ub,ime [4oStete*]- lhc> makeSXithS^nto
™^1T^7uUipJS^P^rian
"True Art"
"Richard Wagner in Bayreuih" is the last of the VnUme.yMelons. I, serves as
their summa: a final, labored effort to solve political, cultural, and ethical problems
unresolved by Nietzsche, previous wntings, a vast monument and testament to earlier
opes, a recapitulation and transformation of themes in a single, tnumphant swan song-a
vtsion of a future society and state free from the ,11s of mtxlemity, an image of humanity to
come, transfigured by tragedy and born anew into a rapturous world of freedom.
Everything in the essay revolves around this programmatic, utopian vision of the future,
just as the essay itself revolves around the programmattc event at its ongin- the opening of
the Bayreuth Fes'spielhms in 1876 with the first performance of Wagner, monumental
Der Ring des Nibelungen, a tetralogy ,n the mold of Greek tragedy.' Between these two
poles, between the event of Bayreuth and the realization of its program, Nietzsche, essay
unfolds. From the start, it proposes nothing other than the discovery of the path leading
from Bayreuth to the future, the Feslspielhaus to its audience, the work of art to its
community, even, and perhaps above all, from tragedy reborn to a transformed society and
state. This task, at once a defense of art, political value and redefining of art's relation to












Afte™'ord," Unfashionable Observations, inorks of riedrich Nietzsche










rryST C,tatI0A S WlU 50uglVen ,n the of the tcxt in accordance with thee say s umbered divisions. A somewhat unreliable translation of the text printed in the
Kritische Studienausgabe may be found in Unfashionable Observations
, trans. Richard TGrey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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back into the world. It ,s an*77^7 “^“ ha"S>^ *"*
rationalizing logic and sequestered in the aesthetic spheT^r^lrC.Ir!,;
^
sensuous fulfillment—so that they may he harnessed for the purposes of^sodaTand^
I ,transformation and realized ,n the practice of eveiyday „fe. This audacious progranT
'
propose once before in The Birth ofTragedy, is again taken up "Richard Wagner’,
„
yreuth, and whatever its course, it ends, or ought to end, a world transfigured
(7 A h°
r_ t0^ ‘hC^ N 'ClZSChe W'" l° ' tS "m"S-
Wo'rmirtr
§ n t is ,s Nietzsche, bold proposition in his final mcditation-can reform theworld, and as the reformer of the world, it is to be accorded a stature in contemporary
society equal to that of Greek tragedy the ancient Athenian,**
When Nietzsche turns to this vision of ar„n the first section of the meditation and
begins the slow process of delineating its path back into the world, he avoids the well-
^T^n*
Pam',iar routes. The first charts a course directly from politics to art and reaches its
goal by ml using the aesthetic sphere with political values. I. demands that works of art
ponray life with fidelity and take sides in its conflicts, insisting on the sociopolitical
consciousness of the artist and valorizing the didactic possibilities of the work of art.
Already, The Birth ofTragedy, Nietzsche had rejected this strategy, arguing that art's
liberalory force depends on its freedom from the pragmatic goals of the sociopolitical
sphere, and in "Richard Wagner and Bayreuth," he again refuses to locate art,
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emancipatory potential in its politici7aiirm 2rru ,
aesthetics with politics, and illusion with
^^^
and undermining the cause of freedom and for th
^ ml°“ aeSthC ‘'C 'de0l°8y
aesthetic values into noiitir-c rru'politics. This strategy dialectically inverts the first and ,
,
seventh se2on^ofT/2ll>2oE2<?^^^ theories of art originates in the
Klein's "political explanation" of tragic art vvhicfH
1S COncerned lhere with refuting J. L
sociopolitical sphere" and makes the traeic rhnm
tes tragedy's ongin in the
law of the democratic Athenians" and precursor™ a 'wSn*Y*
"the immutable moral
This explanation of tragedy Nietzsche^rk nou i a
constitutional popular assembly "
politicians," but it forgets that
18 appealln8
"
lo the ears of some






USt ^ lt for8ets tbat its
strict opposition to the Apolhnian values of the Cr^
6
”/^18^6 of Dionysus-exist inhierarchy, harmonious integration and wpii. i
eê P°^sand society— measured
Geschichte des Dramas, vol. I (Leipzig: IS6S) 162
Stabl lty ’ ForKlein 's theory, see his





theories of art similarly drew an
wntten under the influence of Bakunin's anarch^^T' If16 firSt Version of the Ri*g>





, s social radicalism, and




> was intended to be a
bourgeois revolution in France A, wl!
Iubon
u
stl11 more radical than the 1789
of the revolution the meaning of that revolmfon 'init
R
‘h)
Sh°U,d " make clear to the mcn
Gertrud Strobel, Werner Wolf
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, ed.
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In the final, much





zscbc discusses— it is no longer the








°'dS 'h' S Palh ’ “d U refra'nS f™“ °f ,hc *>* as a work
aons o the art of pohttcs.’ Jus, as t, steers dear of temptations to politicize art i,^n*
,*J*
e a^theticization of politics.* Neither the politicization of art nor the aestheticizationor poht.es successfully ,„tegrates art hade tnto life, and with these two opttons foreclosedNietzsche must find another path capable of bringing art back into the world and placing itin the service of emancipation. g
"truearr"T^^ ^ ““ "* - med.tatton,to a long tradition, is netther a luxuty to be contemplated
Foucault-placed this strategy
"aesthetics of existence " and the "trrhn- r u
f the arts of existence," the
.i 2,«s^*a*;sj«jjr<sss!s
>« -{a 1869 6, Mtaart
Civilization ojtheRenlsMItahu^S G C^T An -” in The
1990), 19-97. See also Hannah Arendt "TheCriri; fn
^lemore (New York: Pengu.n,
32“r^












descrit>es it as "a permanent military encampment of theApolliman and a cruel and ruthless polity [Staatswesen]." Nietzsche goes on to contrasts imperial, Apolliman" state— "the Roman imperium" (§21) and the modern nation stateS?C« his o ht £ ldeal; «
"wMiticsS
i
ww Thls P0' 111^1 form, he argues, is punfied of the excessive
'
total rvait • f
tbat do™inates *he Doric state," and so it no longer succumbs to a
tal politicization that treats the state as a total work of art, impervious to what lies beyond










le Esthetic State: A Quest in Modem German Thought (Berkeley and Los




a. a distance by cultlvated expens
, safe ,y^^
less aesthetic or politica, thaT>nTogi<T—TaTT!^
1250 *16 lbcrcfore describes it in terms^ unsr (57, and discloses a new
, unfamiJ“^ndT
“ “
culture and unimaginable within its limits 7 This rt w
’ ‘he Con,lnes ol «ur
world or the mundane, the everyda T th
" ^ “
(Zrr W“h neW CO'°rS an<1 SPeakS t0 US "eW Characters ISckriftzeichenr“tJ" * “ N,<™"“«» d«« r- ,,cess- tmnsfonns our understanding of reality and enlarges our view of life Its lruthresides not only in its freedom from the distorting discourses of politics and aesthetics^but
^ th ^
Wer l° *^Um *nate lhe world, disclose a new realm of possibilities, and reveaHhT
11
ru of needs long tabooed, repressed, and forgotten. In "true art," and „ alone






°f thC WOr‘d " “ m '8ht bC
’ fre° ”V10lenCe
'^- justice"
t e eventof Bayreuth [da! BayreKtfer&e,g„iM]"(§ i )_ becomesa* b°nheUr^ ,he Prefi^ra"' e^ an emancipation ye, to come. Out* art
,s fieed from the categor.es of aesthetics and the ends of politics-once it becomes
' irue" u supports this utopian gaze a, the center of Nietzsche’s med.tation and becomes a
force for change in the world.
depattu^^mNietz^he.^s^^^rtin^HddeggerHfVte^cAc^voi oP
Art, trans David Farrell Freii (Can n • 6 , ,
lzscne
-> vo1 - F the Will to Power as
i
r ren ivrell (ban Francisco: HarberCollins IQQn n oi ,





York: Harder and Row 1975)^ . n°UglU' lranS ' Albert Hofstadter (New
m ieW 9 ("°- ‘ W 'mer ]947) ’ 161 - sec HeilET
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The Thealer of Necessity
d*po™. „JI " " d" "* 8*>-- «...
h „ .
3,1 °"C SemenCe lhe “,on highlights Wagner'so comings, and in more lhan a few p|aces (he^ s[ecrs dear Qf Gemany ,mMrdapteral Bayreuth is rather a contribution to changing the world. On this point N.ct: I'S emPhatiC ' ThC "m°St"™ Muestion ,n a,, of philosophy," hc writes““
Wh,ch ,h,ngs possess an unaiterable modal,ty and form lunabdnderhche ArtungS ^
set
"
" ’ °nCe lh ' S qUeStl °"^ we can, with relentless courage
^ |h^°
Ut^ ,mPr°Vement °ft^lat “spect ofthe world recognized as being alterable' (§3 ) 10n h,s respect, the ^/(battle, struggle) Nietzsche wil, advocate „, s meditatesow t C world is to be improved-, s no different than the Kampfhe ascribes to greatpo tucs in £cee homo. Both put into practice a "concept of politics
{BegriffPolity basedon a spintua, battle against the dominant structures of power, and both aim to perfect a
and falsity. 11 Richard Wagner a, Bayreuth, as a„





e['D 'eskau, Wagner and
Pietsch, Young Nietzsche: BecomTea CeZTtw v" 1974) ' 84
' l3a See also Carl
Waller KaufnTann,Nietzs^SZ^pJ^ Fref Prcss - '*>D. 186-195;
York: Meridian, I960) 44-5- RichardTrpv -t
Anlichnsl (Cleveland and New
Observations," 405-6 j p Stemlntr^'V
T
??
S'“or s Afte™'ord" Unfashionable
Hollingdale (New York: R - J '
sharpest criticisms of Wagner during this period „r’
1989)
' xxv'xxv| n- Nietzsche's
Wagner in Bayreuth "sSS&^f.f0"ond !.n hls “tes for "Richard
calls for both a change in attitude towards those aspects of the world that are nottologically frozen so that they may be improved through action.
rw;
thcconcept of "great politics," see Nietzsche's Ecce Homo, "Why I am
»ryp f . : °n N^tzsche's "political perfectionism," see Daniel W. Conway Nietzscheandthe Political (New York: Routledgc, 1997), 6-27. y ’
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need for this art is created by Pla,o. The final^^7'^ ‘hC WOri“- "*
to the victory, in Nietzsche's "eternal battle " of h i
"• ,s a response to Platonism,
over the poe, reason ov
"W^ the theoretician
who appears as Nie^he'sThJ"!
U"'rUlh^ ^ * » Plato
ex,led front the repttbhc,
-the poe, ,s
to (he violence of linguistic abstraction and
8 8 he language of abstraction and bringing art "true art" thel
:t7~Nie zsche calls great politics.
Nietzsche insists on the necessity of this battle in Richard Wagner at Bayreulhn ced, he views this Kampf,as a man,Station of necessity itSe,f. as the unavoLableoutcome of the logic of history, even, and above all, as a inevitable consequence of
^
Z ionism itself. The struggle agatnst Platonism, the attempt to bnng ar, bach into the
r irrr
and ihe found,n8 or^ *- r—
•
, Phuomsm. Each,sanecessary response, neither arbitrary or ace,dental, to the languageo abstract,on, and each is an attempt, necessitated by language's Right into ideahty to
return language to the world and restore its long severed tie to humanity. More than
anything else, Bayreuth aims to reestablish language's connection to things, free from the
a stractness, arbitrariness, and accidentally of the Platonic tradition, it aims to recover a
language capable of expressing "the powerful impulses of feeling [starken GeflihlsregungJ"
(§5) that guarantee tts meaning and communicative force. This language, Ntetzsche writes,










essay, has "an eye for necessity " anH • tU r





J^ P°lK,Cal SlrUg8le agamst the inheritance of
The concept of politics thai defines this struggle, like the concept of art it dependspon, is extraordinarily expansive. It wages its battles not iag only against "the sDheres nfv,o once a„d mjustice, the state ^ [<fe SpMren^^^
t MundGesCUcHafiV bn, agatns, "power, law, tradition, contract, and the whole
'
r or of t mgs Wachl, Geselz
, Ver,mg ^
nd ,h " 1
l3r8et ,S ‘he S ‘rUCtUre °f "Sdf
’ th° SphCre °f and desires
t e collect,ve senstbtltty [G***,].
(§5) that expresses^ and ,,
. ^ ^
ery heart of the hunran sensotrunr, that N.etzsche's battle agams, Platon,sm beg, ns.
a , , a,ms to restore the rights of sens, buns. punfy the sphere of interion(y from
convennon, and I, bent,e the ,nd,vidual and the collective alike from the "monstrous
s.ckness" (§5) produced by language's estrangement from human, ty. If as N.etzsche
wntes, winning this battle depends on overcom.ng the "art, fie,al alienation and
umntelligibility [kUns,lichen Entfremdung and UnverstandUcMeUY produced by
conventional language-and the final meditittion declares that ,, does-and if, at precisely
th.s moment in the essay, N.etzsche turns to Bayreuth for an antidote to the conventional
then „ ,s because Wagner's "true art"-"the enemy of al, convention" (,5)-is capable of
combating the effects of alienation with the unconventional language of ihe mus.c-drama.
In Wagner's art, N.etzsche argues, a path is opened up that leads beyond the arb.trary and
accidental norms of modernity, and this path ends, or ought to end, in the creation of a new






resulting from language's alienation from the human being see
UnTvem tTof’inmot'^S
P°“^S ?fTramMuratbn (Urbana and Chicago:u iversi y ol Illinois Press, 2000), xxiv-xxv. On the problem of "convention" in RichardWagner in Bayreuth
, see Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, 57.
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The Commonality to Come
Wagner's art contnbutes to the creation of a
.f-*—
.. „„„» utzzr?**"'
y ' ana art- not the dialectical development ofmncepte serves aS its medium.'* In contras, to the pale abstractions of the concept
gners Ring— "the new bringer 0n|ght [dem neuen Lichtbringer]" (§6) hah, n
O t ottght without the conceptual form of thought" (§9)— this cognitive capacity iseploycd to stop the world of its film of familiarity, break the habits of perception iha,
'
truncate expenencc, and reveal realities tnaccessible to the theoretical project.'8 Everyth,ng
I"
N“-S °" ‘h,S” °f UnVe"'"g ' °f«*-*•- congealed
ayers of sedimented meaning that obscure understand,ng, and the Ring accomplishes thts
unmasking operation by taking leave of the world trnd estranging itself from conventional
culture. "Wagner's art," Ntetzsche wntes, "momently transports us outside this culture"
(§10), opening up a strange, new perspective on the world ,n which the "ordinary appears
uncanny [unheimliciiY (§7) and "the usual and commonplace" are transformed into
something "unusual and complex" (§4). It presents us with a reality in which "we no
longer recognize the most familiar [rias Bekanniesie]" (§7) and are compelled to "learn


















over its subjects and alienating them from its convenes " Noth,
) term Nietzsche uses for an art form that refuses to imitate petrified— lh,S Cm,Ca ' f0rCe
' and * "«* -e conventional, i, opens up apath to a true human societv" f, s«\ nnri « , . .ueiy (§8) and a new political order






001 d 'St0rt'nS effects op P°wer—and more than anything else, the search
h,s foundation drives the final Untimely Meditation and defines its centra, problematic
This same problem „es at the core of Wagner's music-dramas and the founding of
Bayreuth, and in the Ring, Nietzsche argues, it takes center stage. The problem of
ations, the problem of their necessity and legitimacy, of their authority and
validity— each ,s staged the Ring, and each emerges the stniggles of its heroes as an
inescapable, concrete dilemma. Nietzsche says as much-and a good deal more-when he
claims that the "tragic work of art a, Bayreuth" stages "the struggle of singular individuals
I ampfder Einzelnen] against everything that confronts them with seemingly invincible
necessity [scheinbar unbezmngliche Nothwendigkeit], with power, law, tradition,
contract, and the whole order of things [Mach,, Gesetz, Herkommen, Vertrag und game,,




Graham parkes. Composing the Soul: Reaches of
ah . . •
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I,
ar* s necessary> polemical distance from the world see Theodor










modem society, who contest its legitimacy and oppose "the se
o' "S convenl'ons— this lmage places the problem of necessttyTT
' "’CV,lable
asks, without so much as saying so, what would be necessary t, ,
'“**"*** *"* ,l
society, to guarantee its legitimacy and validity, to found n and •
“^ hUman




finds their solution in the nemii > •
8 g eroes, and Nietzsche
Thi, , :r*r **
Nietzsche turns to the struggling heroes of the Ring in his search f
foundation for a new society, beeause their struggle follows the logic of neTss^lf
kt- ,
arbitrariness and punfied of all voluntansm. This struggle asNietzsche makes clear, is a bathe against subjectivism, individualism, and perspective
^tiTd
C°nVent'°na*’ acc‘dental, and solipsistic, and it can only be won^^accedj'ng'to
a standpoint that would be so .me, universal, and necessary, that „ would be free from al,partisanship and devoid of any self-interest. Everything in Nietzsche's presentationjo- around the struggle for this elusive, difficult .xtsition, and ye, ,t ,s the difficulties
the struggle- not its successes- that the final Untune,y.Mention emphasizes. The
Ogle o struggle, the logic of overcoming and transcendence, of transgression and
cross, ng-,h,s logic necessitates certain unavoidable difficulties, and in the struggles of
agner's heroes against society, they come to light. Wagner's heroes struggle with all
their will to transcend the norms of social convention, to overcome individual I,mas
exceed the fragile bounds of human reason, and badge the gap that separates the partiality
of the individual from the truth of "the univernal" (§4). This confiict-the confiic, between
the willful, heroic individual and "the universal knowledge of things" (§4)-defines
tragedy for Nietzsche, and in Wagner's music-dramas, its ruthless logic is exposed.'" As




no other purpose than to distance us from our faith „
' ’"“^-dramas have
alienate us from the concent ru
* c '"'""potenceof the will andm in cp of the individual it sunmne n k,
fundamental lesson of the Ring and if
^ ,el/schc ^gues, is the
u •
8 ’ , 11 CXP°ses thc inadequacy of tho win
human deeds, it also reveals a new, entirely different found'd
^ l,CCCf!Sai ^
struggle. This foundation-the foundation f
' " ahon for action and
«. human „„ „ ,,c
- ,l»g. „ „ „„ * (tml
u*,
» *—— ..* m
.hi, tcumlaiion b,
,in inescapable, tragic discord, endemic to the individual and unavoidable for
intellectual and
^7
U 'n"' Cl bClWCe" " lhC UmVerSa' k"°WlcdSc of ,h'"gs»d ‘heuua, m„ra, eapactncs of the ind,vidua,-
( §4). Wagner's heroes disclose Ihts
coni, ict in their relentless strivings for pure self-sufficiency and perfect self-identity and
rr
c,,““ - •— -,4breaktngof their will— in the /?mg, we read in the last section of the final meditation
Wotan s wit, breaks up [WiUe bricHt sicHV- this vety breaking apart of the aggressive
herotc individual reveals for Nietzsche an authentic concept of subjectivity and a new
ground lor action * This moment, the most important moment in the Ring, is a moment of
patnlul inadcqualion, of incapacity and msufficiency, and Wagner's tragedies, Nietzsche
wntes, u ,s felt as "something sublime [etnas Erhabenesf (§4, §7). When the titanic
efforts of individual heroism fail to measure up to the demands of the universal, when their













conceptual form of knowledge— Nictysrh^ „
^oretical, non-
[««» gmtz IKUell Verstehenym
hC^ '11 ^ eM,rdy of understanding
t-rsicn n
j (§9)— is sentimental sensnni.c




a unes us to someth,„g suprapersonal, to some,h,ng that stands over ,Uber) m . l,d
univ
S ' t° S°me.h' n8 thal 0311 1,0 thought but never perfectly comprehended- truth toe
^
, ersa t e laws of life [*„ Gesetzen des Ubens]’ (§4) themselves. With the non-concept o the suprapersonal," N,etzsche identifies "something" that resists allI—" and tr“SCT^ norm -and though it comes to Ugh. only throughpersonal inadequacy
IpersonUches VngenugenY (§4) of Wagner's heroes it
nevertheless forms the sole adequate basis for Nietzsche's new concept of suavity andnew foundation for struggle. ^
This new concept of subjectivity-this new form of identity and individuat,on-,s
an effect of Wagner's sublime art. The sublime, Nietzsche argues, is a force for reform an
affec, which transforms subjectivity and attunes it to something beyond itself. I, makes
itself Iclt ,n "effects on the human soul [Wirkmgen aufmenschliche Seelen:]" (§8) in
effects that alter the structure of "inner nature [Na,«re...nach innen] " (§6) and leave us
"transformed into tragic human beings [zu tragischenMenschen umgewandelt]’ (§7), Th.s
concep, of the human being is less the absolute origin of its fate or the perfect master of its
destiny than a split subject, an individual suspended in a slate of tension, conscious of its
limits— its unavoidable, tragic madequacies-and yet attuned toa truth and universality that
resist theoretic determination and exceed all positive knowledge. Nietzsche places this
tension, this schism and division, at the foundation of h,s new, tragic concept of
subjectivity. This subject rests on "suprapersonal" grounds, on a foundation (hat is
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the e"emy °f C°nVenlion
' of a" “rliricial ahenation and" HUman be' ngS [dK Fei"dinaUer C“* ^hUnstiichen
tnlta,
Umm‘a"dliChkeil “ andMemch): and the final
ion, const, tutes the sole "correctsentiment [richtige Empftndung] (§5) in an age ofconven ton and al,ena„on> Once truth, universality, and necesstty become tnaccesstble,
once P i osophy, theory, and the concept become inadequate to their ends, the sentiment of
absence at the heart of human, ty makes itself felt, and on this tmposstble foundat,on-on
‘ 8rOUndlCSS 8r°Und °f ‘he subl'-e- Ntetzsche rcxrts his tragtc tndtv,duals and gtves
them a basis for struggle.
The sublime serves the cause of struggle by maktng the need for struggle known.
In the sent,mem of the sublime, something that exceeds subject, vity is fell, "something"
that no, only afienates us from convention, but from our claims to truth, universality and
necessuy. The sublime registers our inalienable d,stance from trath, our inevitable fa, lure to
colon,ze the universal, and once this sublime, "suprapcrsonal" truth is aeknowledged,






1'^1 'mpo^ceor the sentiment of the sublime in outage seeStephcn




Bna" Massumi (Minneapohs: UnivetsUyofi nes 1 84), 77-81
, Jean-Francois Courtine et al., Ofthe Sublime: Presence inQues ion
, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Albany: State University of New York 1993)- Paul deMan
, Aesthetic Ideology, 105-128; Jacques Derrida, The Truth in PaiXg, trans.’ Geofennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 122-147-Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis-
s?bZe
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overcome. So long as this stale of tension exists so ion
universal—and for Nietzsche innrt •





of struggic Wo„ei}e am Ta.es des Ktfmpfesy772777^ "" ^
announced the true language of the Wagner,an2of^ W ^^ “
speak the language of the sublime the "language of
’ gnerSmusic-dramas
nckUgenEmpfuldungy {%5)^ j;, and this language— the language of lack in,^ ,
tension, the lanauace nf Qi.ffrs , r
h a
’ madequalion, and
—tng that stands over us andom^Th d T" *>
77'
anu wc feci this- insii.izxr^zr"
s
“"t t0neS °f^ Vagner, musiedramas are music too, andml
(§9)
°
S0"0nty °f lhC ' r ' nCOnSOnanl compositions, a "discord," "connict," and "strife"
r t ** - .—- „„„„
UCS m dn lmpemt,Ve 10 re0r^anize society found the state anew 23
,
"*«— •- » h, w.„
a new culture and a new political order.
^
culture that m^mus^^thc rcdiscovcred^
^ "Hclp me discover that
foretells; reflect on h^ fact to 8^gC-°! COITeCl SCnl,mcnt ’
itself, that through you k seek^iLs 5 W1SheS l° form a body^
institution andmoSnw P to visibility in motion, action,
their numbens consulIcrZZ^ 7*° U"derstand thls call. and
found a state on music fden Slant l
S° undcrstand what it means to
asssaSsSsasafesae
This goal— to condemn the contemporary state and found it anew-is the "new and
yet no, unprecedented g«rl« (§5) that Nietzsche's medttat.on brtngs out into the open. 1, is,










manciPa ‘ion of dissonance, see Theodor Adorno In Search of
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— .j, ,"r;rz “-*"*"««-*«.-
»----~rzr^“r,rr- -*,rn~“t "—“ -- - .-
*h° 8<xs so far as local 1 11 olira-„M„,t
human sensibility to ,ts mora , dcma„d by attuning it t0^something that contmual.y tests its limits and demands morc and on ^ '
Z*
"aUUnCmCm lS,immUnSr (§7X ,hC ««""** -font, of the suite societyand community would become .xtssible for the firs, time. Wagner's an Nic, hhas this reforming effect and "red r ,
g rt, etzsc e insists,
g cl, el, real reform
[mrk,ichen ReformY^nm w„h thereformation
of the theater" -would end by "introducing innovation
verywhere [uberall...Zu neuernY (§4). Human sensibility would itself be "reformed
,nTZt Z ^
'h,S rer0rmat'°n °f art
' and 'hC rd0mall<>" 01 sensibility would
free i,2”
‘ ‘ P°'' tlCal C°mnlUn,ty 'S °Wn M°- than anything else, ,1 would
a"Cnatm8 C°nVCntl0n and a“™c ” 'he necessary, Inal,enable inadequacy that
constitutes Us "common sense [GemeinsinnY (§5) and «*. commUnis, and by attuning
' ‘° ,tS madeqUaCy
’ “ Would rcst°re the sense of tension, division, and non-
coinctdcnce with itself that nojust political community can do without. "Someone who
tves in Plato s republic," Nietzsche writes in the seventh section of his essay, might do
wtthout the artistic refotms that would attune the political community ,0 these foundational
inadequacies, and this same "someone" might even be justified in persuadtng the reforming
arttst ,0 leave the community and "go to another republic." "The rest of us, however, who
do not live in this republic, but in slates of an entirely different son" (§7), need the artist
and the artist's reforming power, and we need them, Nietzsche inststs, ,0 overturn the
inheritance of Platonism and realize a true society, a just slate, and a genuine community.
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his society, state, and community would be define i h
of commonality. It would be a kind of v
' y an overwhelming feeling
affective community, less a mailer of h-
' °""'"""S
' a community of sense and an
set of conventions, lhan of a common
C°mm°n h°mdand
- °r
modernity— the age of nihilism u
’ ra"al, and dissolution. In
effective bonds of the
d 'S°nenlaI '0n- lhe hi"y
substances— these historian,, «• •
sc t?onds, ideals, and
writes, by a "flood of revolution'ZZZ^nThdr pIZ
^'etZSC*le
y utn, 11 is coterminous with the spheres of "violent a
injustice" (§4). Nietzsche, notion of commonality shares nothing ,n commonmo cm nat,on-state, and he contrasts i, with a form of being-together that transcends the
by theZp~
d StotC a" ke'™ S UnCOmm°n f°rm °f~ — - contained
y empirical detcnmnalions of people or place-,he nation and state-and „ cannot becompre ended with a concept of community based in family, faith, or fraternity. Indeedzsche s concept of "commonality lGemei„r (§7) is notafonn of
(Gememschaft) at all, but a shared experience of community's indeterminacy
undecidability, and unraveling, „ the experience of commonality, community responds to
something uncommon, to a sense and a sentiment that attunes it to something other than
se
, to something that opens i, up and keeps i, open an experience of non-identrty and
inadequate, and this "something," Nietzsche says, is "suprapersonal." In the final
meditation, the suprapersonal is the indetenninate, non-personifiable basis of community,
series of rigorous^investigationsfntokSlS** has reccnt|y pursued in a
Blanchot, The Unavowable Conun,nhl wf„c d
Y °r“mm™ lty today. See Maurice




arrylown: Suuion Hill Press,
Michael Holland and Simona SEt iu ?’ f?"?- Peter c°"nor, Lisa Garbus,
1991); Giorgio Agamben Therif4 ®1? 01 University of Minnesota Press,
University of Minn^oto Press yichacl Hardl (Minneapolis:
George Collins“Kfc 7D«r' >™s.
Devastation: Culture, Politics, and the 'liblic SpJce'’MnXu^ The^naT^^Contrary Culture, ed. Mark Poster (New York: ’Columbia JmVersky ftess, 1993),
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withdrawing as it
"something,- and so no one escapes me h.
^^ *****^ PU" °f UliS SUbIime
It cannot be appropriated by a particular peop
^ CO“ ty -
"to be enclosed within the bounda
cxP<*nsi\e, Nietzsche writes,
ftanstvc, non-nationalist community— for this new form of
- a whole. Like the suprapersona! itself, Wagn^t
^ <§^
German [iiberdeutschY (§101 , ,
' 8"^ artis supranational and even "supnt-
commonality. Each of these demands is contained Wagner's cry to fou d th
it!rrrrT
statc uitimateiy appears® a weak vessd f°r ,he rea,izati™k ‘hCn lhe fU ‘Ure alo"e "«« determine the form they w,l| utke.
And Nietzsche does leave these tasks up to the future. He leaves them ud to V
dissonant call of tragic art, and he leaves it up to them to decide how to respond to
airT lhC dCmandS they annOUnCe '™ S ““^ "*— of an lm pera„ve, ofcall lor help, discovery, and tnventton-.'Help me,' thus he [Wagner] calls ouf-but ,t
provides no program, theory, or blueprint to guide the struggles i, demands and it
announces nocntenon for determining their final conclusion. The though, of commonality
,S °° g"e t0 b° SChemat,Zed int° an ima«e for* realization, and if it is given shape a, all“ Nietzsche's meditation, then it is through its dissociation from the modem concept of
nationality, the con.emponrry form of the state, and existing modes of community and
society. Each of these- the modem concept of nationality, the contemporaiy form of the
state, and existing modes of community and society-depends on a thought of the will, a
desire for power, and a need for self-assertion, and each is united in its search for an
ultimate identity, a sell-enclosed purity, and a perfect self-knowledge. Nietzsche's "great
fighters [grossen Kampfer)- (§3)-his future fighters for the commonality to come-refuse
the though, of self-adequation, of personal self-sufficiency and self-identical individuation,
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and in their refusal of these thoughts, they respond to another need anothe, ,
np
uni versal„y obey a law ,n Nietzsche, meditation, and this law-this
UnaV°ldab'e 'aW “'S lhe laW of ^adequation itself. Inadcquat,on-endless
permanent, ,nf,„,te-,s .one announced the imperative tssu.ng from Wagner, ar, »ddslawalonede,ermines the eourseof the great polttica, struggle announced -Rtcha'rd
agner m ayreuth. It formalizes all of the paradoxes defining the commonality to come
7-* *•»“• -—**—- ,1
Accord,ng to tins negative prolubition and its paradox,cal logic, adequation- political
personal, or communal -depends on madequation, and being adequate depends ,„ turn on
a responsible response to the madequation that haunts every deed, knowledge, norm or
identity. Nothing less is demanded by the moral demand announced Wagner, tragic
dramas, and ,t ts this paradoxical morality-,his supra-moral, unconventional
morality- that Ntelzsche places at the center of his meditation as the groundless ground and
I oundat,unless foundation of h,s new thought of commonality.
Justice, Love, and Freedom
Nietzsche, new thought of commonality is just that: a thought, a thinking and a
rethinking, on and around the concept of commonality. The final Untimely Meditation ,s
perhaps nothing more than a thoughtful mediation on the possibility of commonality, on the
possibility of a form of community that is never perfectly exemplified by a particular
community and never perfectly theorized with the instruments of theoretical labor.
Nietzsche's meditation is driven by something that proceeds the planes of theory and
empirical examples alike, and this something is the sentiments, needs, and desires that set
thought in motion and attune it to the sphere of sensibility. In "Richard Wagner in
Bayreuth," this motion and motivation is the "violence and injustice" of contemporary
182
'""“c3 ' and S°Clal inSt'tUtions 1* feeling of "suffer,ng" (§4) they produ wart speaks of this suffering as well— of iho • a
" uce. Wagner's
to change them-and in its suhl ,
ol existl"? institutions and the need
fc nem a mttssub mte language, it holds out the possibilitv or r
being-together that would decrease suffenn,, • h
“ "" °'
n8 and increase "happiness" (§7 )
concepts tall into place that accord with the law of ; naH
,
. ,
n u ot madequation and guide the difficultstruggle it sets in motion. These conceniQ til- ,
, nmst.ee" »,h ,





he™ and SOC,Cty " <§4)- and^ with those "theories of the su„ere vom laat] that justify v.olence by remaining resolutely ",apologetic
apo ogetischenj" (§6) towards existing institutions. These theories are theories of
reconciliation Hegel is their great representative for Nietzsche—and they see no tensionetween ideality and reality and leave no room for perfecting the political community
.c zsche opposes them not with a new theory, but with a new form of art that calls for
s ruggle and makes the irreconcilable gap between the real and the ideal felt ,n concrete
senttments. This art registers our distance from any supmpersonal ideality, and in
Nietzsche's meditation, ,, transforms the struggle against contemporary political and social
institutions mtoa '"battle forjustice and love [Kampfe urn GerechUgkei, und Uebe] (§4).
Justice and love- these are the concepts guiding Nietzsche's "great politics" in the final
pages of h,s final mediation, and if they demand that "great fighters" (§3) do justice to the
tragic tension irreconcilably separating them from any final perfection, they also insist that
these fighters become lovers of a very peculiar sort. Nothing else, Nietzsche writes, is
announced in the music-dramas that get this struggle off the ground- The Flying
Dutchman. TannMuser. Die Meistersinger, Tristan and Isolde, and the Ring ofthe
Nibelungen itself (§11)— and in their call for love and justice, they articulate the two
concepts that define the future of commonality. The commonality to come will do justice to
the limits of human willing and the failures of individual cognition byreflexiveiy
integrating them into a new concept of community, and the recognition of these limits and
failures will in turn transform human beings into lovers of the non-personal and
suprapersonal. Love, Nietzsche insists, takes over when the desire for "power" (§11)
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and other. In the final meditation
I
S g dcs,rc for the non-personal
inststs. is none other than a longing for the "h
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’ NietZSChc
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per aps a ways wtll exist, and though Wagner's art makes them heard for the first time
v, th air uncanny clart,„,
, s not m order to hnng them to a Cose and end the struggle for a
P -t 7 just poht,cal community. Wagner, Nietzsche writes a, the end of his long essay
evoted to the future, sees no end to the demand for justice or the need for love He ,s "no
utoptan," and his music-dramas do not prophesy an "ultimate ideal order” (§ , 1 ) jus, overthe horizon. In the final section of his meditation, Nietzsche sees something elsejus. over
t C honzon, and this something is not "an immobile mintow" of "superhuman goodness
and justice,” but the real possibility of human "evil [fl&en]" (§11). Wagner's moral
imperative— his demand to rethink community on the basts ofjustice and love-risks the
possibility of human evil by leaving "the morality of tradition
[die Sittlichkeit des
s Spoke Zaralhuslra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Baltimore: Penguin, 1975), 87
in "Discussion tfa?al°r ivTudwTn S'y “ N




convention and leave tradition behind it r
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' 'S- * -a, is necessaiy^“f <§9) ' 2^ its necessary limits and tneapl'.nesjust as * acknow,edges tradition's necessaiy distance from anyth,ng suprapersona, and
'
-versa,, Neeesstty does not guarantee the best, but it prevents the worst, and if it opensup the possibility of evil at all-ifi, opens upthepossibihtyoferror, bhndness.and
end eS dequat]on by |eavjng^^ of the^ behmd_, t ^
be honest [Ehrlich-seinY (§11) about this poss.b.hty for the first ttnre. Th.s is the
demand °f WagnCr 'S lutpetatire, of his new, extra-moral tmperahve, and by
demand,ng honesty in moral matters, ,, holds out the hope of a "distant, merely poss.ble
bu, not demonstrable future" (§8) ofjust.ee, love, and freedom with others.
Wagner's art tells of this poss.bility, and if Nietzsche is to be believed, this telling
is "a foretaste, a fore-expenenctng, of joy and life of the highest sort" (§9). Thts joy is the
happiness of commonality, of be.ng-together with others and being in love with others, and
th,s same joy is the happiness of being free and being just- with all of its risks,
difficulties, and dangers. Tragedy-and tragedy, more than any other aesthetic genre,
brings these risks to light and teaches us to respect them-gives us a taste of this joy and a
feeling for this happiness, even as it holds them out for the future. And tragedy does hold
them out for the future, for the future-the future of ideal love, justice, and freedom-
This concept ol freedom has been rigorously pursued in Jean-Luc Nanrv's Th*>‘
l993)
ienCe °fFreed0m
’ trans - BridSet Mcdonald (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
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never quite arrives. Waener'c 4
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131^ *3C*n^S enc**ess*y struggle
that these free betngs free,y respond to a
^^ dCmand
transforms them tnto someth,„g more thantli^
“ ^^^ “P~
Ring, for its tragic heroes never were just stm I
' * announc«'^» Wagner's
heroes were all along "singularities
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rccogn.ze the fragde ground of the s.ngular deed and dojustice to its demands And „ass, even emands, that we take responsibility for the future commonahty it supports
Th,s task, Nietzsche wntes, ,s the "supreme task" and "one guarantee for the future of'umantly" (§4 ). „ pr0m,ses not nations, nat.on-states, or self-enclosed commun.ties bu, acommonahty of singular be,ngs- free, just, and in love without vtolence. Th.sgoal is
utopian, and ,f N.etzsche, like Wagner, is "no utopian," he nevertheless holds t, on, as the
only moral response- the only supra-mora, response-to the unravehng of commun.ty ,„mo ermty. Thts ,s the prom.se of "R,chard Wagner ,„ Bayreuth," and N.etzsche leaves it to
us to decide if it will have a future.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE FUTURE OF NI ETZSCHE'S
IMPERATIVES
Become who you are!
-Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra






" -..culminating, a, the end of his authorship, a senes of bhstenng polemtcs
' to insure his distance from the inventor of the "music drama" r
ofJ h
8 r
11 SlgnalCd thC Cnd °f hlS drCam °f a reblrth °f tragedy and tragic cultureopes or a catharttc cleanstng of nationalist sentiment from Germany, of his belief’that the German sensus communis could be purged of the values of the nation-state^
Nietzsche an.culated, on more than one oceaston, his reason for breaking with
Bayreuth and the man who had created it. Summanzing his motives ^ iuuno he
wro.e: What did I never forgive Wagner? That he condescended to the Germans— that he
Became reichsdeutsch. Nietzsche, break w„h Wagner after completing his Vntineiy
e nations represents a break with evening reichsdeutsch, with the Gem,an nation the
German Retch, the German nation-state, and, more than anything else, the German
national,sm that defined their identity and helped determine their ends. In the years between
1870- 1 876, Nietzsche could still hold out the ho,* that the Reich and the Germans, along
with the nation-state they formed, might be salvaged, that their parochtal insistence on
"German” identity might bow before an expenence ofjustice and open to the non-identity a.
its core. In the wntings that appear after Nietzsche, break with Wagner, this vision of
collective transformation is no longer nourished by historical signs of progress, and so it
gives way to the less ambitious task of isolated, individual self-perfection.
Nietzsche, break, after 1876, with everything reichsdeutsch was complete, as was
his renunciation of h,s hopes Cor the Reich and die Deutsche,,. Hts shift in position,
Ecce homo
, "Why I am so Clever," §5.
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however, does not represent a break with n- In lhosccar;::r::r ‘r-r -
—
never was simply a matlcr f
° <n1'suUcd a v,s,on of political life thal
life. Rather, his concern ail along was vvith tl^^j^sibj^y ^
Unc'enl an<^ nuxlcrn
"commonality "as he often , ,
'Mi ty of moral community, of a
ha, transcend the dtvistons separatin ^
Sr°UndCd “ m°re fUndamCnU" COndll '0"s ol life
tragic conditions— that f „ !
IO"S^^ ^'‘--properly
works at decisive juncture^^
reSS‘°n m the mora ' imperatives that people Nietzsche's
^
purpose in modorni tv ih i
'fc, ol meaning andF ^ e ni y— they do not recede in Nietzsche's no,, w




ngutsfc form that Nietzsche chooses to express
r l; I
6'" Ur8Cm“mmand *— toan unavoidable
P becomes increasingly important in his later works. It appears, for example in
o you arc
[ Du soils, der Werden. der du Hs,V a reworking of the tmperative frontSchopenhauer as Educator, "Be yourself [*,* seller, ifse.f a precursor to the
categorical command announced Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Become who you are-
each casc-and there are many others-,he imperative form is used to announce a
universally valid command, an "ought," legitimated and necessitated by the withdrawal in
modernity, of universally accepted conceptions of who we arc and of wha, the self is This
problem, originating in the parallel phenomena of nuxlem nihilism and the philosophy
emique of reason and the natural sciences, cannot be solved by appeals to the nation the
nahon-state, or nationalism. Their principles, whether ethnic or civic, remain subject to the
problems that give birth to Nietzsche's imperatives, for these problems are inscribed in the
veiy structure of human finitude. The imperative form, and even more, the form of the
categorical imperative- the absolute command -arc our only available response to these
problems, for they dispense with claims to truth and tell what ought to be done once truth
claims are robbed of the authorities needed to justify them.
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In one of Nietzsche's last writing Th» a ,• , .




imperative an uncondittonal demand-bu, i, „ . .
^Soncal
categoncal tmperatives: "Each should tnvent his
^
imperative " This nf™.
’ w/j categorical
22~‘ ,n *• .-crz:::™
ugnt to do to remain singular This "rmoM » x T -
in Schopenhauer as Educator isal
^ 1Ctzschc already made clear
• Edu r, lways a matter of "being yourself » of •
rr *" -»>»»
-
»CPP 'o encourage the creation of any and all categorical imperatives- "each should
invent his own form of killing” would be an extreme example of such license gone^ °PPOSI,e ,S " 'rUlh 'he “*= A -egonea, tmperattve tha, commands us to
reate imperatives that revere life, thatdojustice to its manifold possibilities, ,ha, advance
i s perl eel,on and, as Nietzsche puts i,t„ Beyond Good and Evil, extend our
"responsibility" to life.
Nietzsche's imperatives, then, respond responsibly to the new and unparalleled
conditions of life in modernity, to the loss of those honzons of value that have defined
human,ty ,n the Wes, for millennia, to the Elapse of traditional systems of mcantng and
the tendency to solve these problems by huddling together ,n defensive collectives. His
moral "oughts" respond to these problems, to the terror of nihilism and the terror of
nationalism, by teaching us to revere wha, is left over after nihilism has token , to toll and
nationalism has run its course: Life itself, bare life, naked and homeless. In the writings
where he first formulates the imperatives needed to guide humanity out of the desert of
modernity, he tests the various paths along which life might make its escape. These paths
run through the political sphere, but they also run through regions of life that do not
189
h s calls, m a discussion of his first book "tho
oflife [neue Partie des Lebe«vl " 2 pr u
’
c nevv PartyUbens], Fromthe start- from The Birth ofTragedyonwards— Nietzsche allied himself with this "Doliticni" . ,
to have discovered it This d
Paity
' h° bc said
t . ls discovery takes place in his first writings, where Nietzscheannounces hts allegiance to life and the imperatives it imposes upon collective hfe^ h
^t'ecTori
31 ^°^OW
' *^S a^eg'ance is confirmed and its imperatives are extended and
^
refined. One result of this refinement, first articulated in The Gas V n
a categonca, tmperaUve, for i, says: "Whatever you will, wil, it in such a way that you canalso will it eternally."3 It was this command, which makes every decision count, that finally
onterges ,rom Nietzsche, command to "be yourself!" it is ultimate* rooted m the Delphic
imperative to "Know thyself!" first examined 77,c Birlh ofTrage^ and ,,_^
imperative that led Nietzsche, after completing his final Vnthnely Meditation, to seek
.stance from Wagner and finally abandon him altogether. Nietzsche, imperatives freed
him from Wagner, life-denying pessimism, and though they forced him to abandon the
composer of Parsifal, they insured that he remained true to the end to the "party of life."
Ecce homo
, "The Birth of Tragedy," §4.
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